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Abstract
The Internet of Things (IoT) is an emerging paradigm which aims to extend the power
of the Internet beyond computers and smartphones to a vast and growing range of
devices “things”, processes and environments. The result is an interconnected world
where humans and devices interact with each other, establishing a smart environment
for the continuous exchange of information and services. Billions of everyday devices
such as home appliances, surveillance cameras, wearables and doorbells, enriched with
computational and networking capabilities, have already been connected to the Inter-
net. However, as the IoT has grown, the demand for low-cost, easy-to-deploy devices
has also increased, leading to the production of millions of insecure Internet-connected
smart devices. Many of these devices can be easily exploited and leveraged to perform
large-scale attacks on the Internet, such as the recently witnessed botnet attacks. Since
these attacks often target consumer-level products, which commonly lack a screen or
user interface, it can be difficult for users to identify signs of infection and be aware of
devices that have been compromised.
This thesis presents four studies which collectively explored how user awareness of
threats in consumer IoT networks could be improved. Maintaining situational aware-
ness of what is happening within a home network is challenging, not least because
malicious activity often occurs in devices which are not easily monitored. This the-
sis evaluated the effectiveness of conversational agents to improve Cyber Situational
Awareness. In doing so, it presented the first study to investigate their ability to help
users improve their perception of smart device activity, comprehend this in the con-
text of their home environment, and project this knowledge to determine if a threat
had occurred or may occur in the future. The research demonstrated how a BLSTM-
RNN with word embedding could be used to extract semantic meaning from packets
to perform deep packet inspection and detect IoT botnet activity. Specifically, how
the models use of contextual information from both the past and future enabled better
predictions to be made about the current state (packet) due to the sequential nature of
the network traffic. In addition, a cross-sectional study examined users’ awareness and
iii
perception of threats and found that although users value security and privacy they
found it difficult to identify threats and infected devices. Finally, novel cross-sectional
and longitudinal studies evaluated the use of conversational agents and demonstrated
them to be an effective and efficient method of improving Cyber Situational Aware-
ness. In particular, this was shown to be true when using a multi-modal approach and
combining aural, verbal and visual modalities.
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This thesis investigates the use of conversational agents for improving Cyber Situational
Awareness. In general, situational awareness is defined as “the perception of elements
in the environment within a volume of time and space, the comprehension of their
meaning, and the projection of their status in the near future” [1]. Cyber Situational
Awareness is therefore considered the application of situation awareness to the Cyber
domain [2]. Previous research has suggested a lack of technical knowledge and ability
to explore network communication, results in little or no awareness of security issues in
consumer home environments [3]. In this research, the aim was to explore the potential
of using conversational agents to help users improve their perception of smart device
activity, comprehend this in the context of their home environment, and project this
knowledge to determine if a threat has occurred or may occur in the future.
In this first chapter, a background to the research area is presented. Research aims
are discussed, a problem statement is defined and the central question addressed by
this research is presented. An explanation is also provided regarding how the central
question was broken down into sub research questions, each of which is addressed
separately in the four main chapters of this thesis (Chapters 4-7). Next, motivation for
investigating the research questions is provided, and the contributions this thesis makes
to the field of study are described. Finally, the remaining chapters in the thesis are
outlined and details of the published literature produced from this thesis are provided.
1
1.1 Background
The Internet of Things (IoT) has quickly transitioned from a promising future paradigm
to a pervasive everyday reality. Billions of smart devices are now being connected to
the Internet creating an extensive network of connected things, capable of sensing the
surrounding environment and interacting with other devices to aid real-time monitoring
and decision making [4].
The IoT has now permeated into many areas of everyday life. Three areas of particular
growth are in health, industrial applications and smart cities [5, 6]. Central to the fu-
ture of smart cities is the smart home, where an uptake of low cost and easy to deploy
IoT devices, has already been witnessed. This flourishing smart home IoT market is
fuelled largely by the promise of convenience, greater interconnectivity and automa-
tion of everyday tasks [7]. As a result, smart devices such as TP-Link’s IP cameras,
Ring’s doorbell and Philips Hue’s light bulbs, all capable of being switched on using a
conversational agent such as an Amazon echo, are increasingly becoming commonplace
in the home. While smart interconnected devices clearly have many benefits, concerns
still exist around the security and privacy of such devices, and data derived therein [8].
Many of these concerns arise as a result of device manufacturers excluding security and
privacy mechanisms from their products, following market pressure to produce low-cost
plug and play smart devices [9]. Popular with consumers, these devices often omit vi-
tal security and privacy mechanisms (to promote simplicity and adoption), exposing
devices to potential threats and leaving them vulnerable to potential attackers.
Arguably one of the most serious threats facing IoT devices is that of botnets. The vast
threat landscape afforded by the IoT, and the inherent vulnerabilities of many smart
devices, has provided the perfect platform to perform large scale distributed denial
of service (DDoS) attacks [10]. A common trait of many of these high profile DDoS
attacks, has been their exploitation of smart devices commonly found in consumer
homes, such as IP cameras, and home routers [11]. Indeed, many powerful DDoS
attacks have been witnessed in recent years, with the most prominent example being
the Mirai botnet, which denied service to some of the most widely used platforms on the
Internet such as Twitter, Netflix and Reddit [10]. As previously mentioned, research has
suggested a lack of technical knowledge and ability to explore network communication,
results in little or no awareness of security issues in consumer home environments [3].
The research in this thesis explores if the rise in popularity of digital assistants and
conversational agents, such as the Amazon Echo, could be used to improve Cyber




The aim of this research is to investigate the potential of using conversational agents
to improve Cyber Situational Awareness. Specifically, to explore how well participants
could use agents to assimilate information about events in their environment (Percep-
tion), synthesise this into a meaningful understanding of the situation (Comprehension)
and use the knowledge to identify threats in a home network (Projection). The ap-
proach adopted by this thesis to achieve this aim is to split the research project into
smaller studies, each addressed by a chapter in the thesis. Consideration is initially
given to the effectiveness of current detection methods to detect threats before a new
method of detection based on deep learning, is proposed. The research next examines
user awareness and perception of threats and their ability to detect them within a
network. From this, the problem domain can be clearly defined, and a lack of threat
awareness confirmed. Next, the viability of conversational agents to achieve the central
aim of this thesis is tested. Finally, the utility of conversational agents is tested over
an extended period of time, to answer the central research question, which is defined
as:
Can Situational Awareness of threats in the Internet of Things be improved
using Conversational Agents ?
The central research question is broken down into four distinct research areas. A sub
research question is defined for each area and is addressed individually in Chapters 4-7
SQ1: Can current security methods detect the presence of threats within
consumer IoT networks ? This is addressed in the study of current meth-
ods of threat detection in Chapter 4, which focuses on Botnets as being a
particular threat facing consumer IoT networks in Chapter 2.
SQ2: Can users visually detect the presence of threats within consumer
IoT networks ? This is addressed in the study of threat perception and
awareness in Chapter 5.
SQ3: Are conversational agents a viable method for making users aware of
threats in consumer IoT networks? This is addressed in the cross-sectional
study of agent viability in Chapter 6.
SQ4: Are conversational agents effective in making users situationally
aware of threats in consumer IoT networks ? This is addressed in the
longitudinal study of agent utility in Chapter 7.
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1.2.2 Motivation
This research is motivated by the need to address the growing issue of threats facing
consumer IoT networks (smart home). As previously mentioned, research has suggested
a lack of technical knowledge and ability to explore network communication, results in
little or no awareness of security issues in consumer home environments [3]. If true,
the famous quote by Thomas Gilovich, a prominent researcher in social and cognitive
psychology, “People are often unaware of their own unawareness” [12] can be considered
particularly relevant to the context being investigated and a motivating factor to engage
in the research.
Personal Author Motivation
As a Computer Scientist I am obviously a strong advocate for technology. I love
exploring new ways for technology to make a positive impact in society. I am, however,
ever aware of the dangers technology brings. I want to see technology that serves
humans not the other way around. Author Cal Newport sums it up best when he
says “Technology is neither intrinsically bad nor good. The key is using it to support
your goals and values, rather than letting it use you” [13]. As a researcher in human-
centred security I am interested in the impact of computing in people’s everyday lives,
in particular in relation to their security and privacy. My research interest extends to
understanding how people perceive their personal information is collected and used; and
how quickly they are willing to sacrifice privacy for convenience. More broadly, I am
also challenged to find solutions to address the growing trend of technology addiction.
My motivation for undertaking this thesis is to explore one possible way technology can
positively impact society, that is, how computing in the new voice era could be used
to improve people’s perception and awareness of their device activity, to better protect
them from risks and threats that exist now and in the future.
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1.3 Contribution to the Field
In this thesis, a conceptual Conversational Cyber Situational Awareness Framework is
proposed. The main contributions of this thesis are as follows:
1. Production of a labelled dataset incorporating IoT botnet traffic, and
attack vectors (Chapter 4). At the time of undertaking this research a lack of
IoT botnet datasets was evident, and was therefore a major factor in the decision
to create a sandboxed environment and botnet architecture. The generated mirai
botnet dataset will provide a much needed resource for future researchers in this
area, allowing for better understanding of IoT botnets, and the development of
new detection methods. The dataset has already been made public and been used
for comparative studies [14, 15].
2. Development of a deep learning method to detect IoT botnet activity
(Chapter 4). Botnet detection is a research area which has previously received
a lot of attention. However, the focus has largely been on traditional networks
and not within consumer home environments. The growth of the IoT has seen
a rapid proliferation of insecure connected devices across the internet. The huge
number of connected devices, coupled with their inherent security issues, has
resulted in a surge of powerful distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks [16],
many often now leveraging consumer level products [17, 18, 10]. The deep learning
method proposed in this research has many implications for research and industry.
It contributes to developing knowledge relating to IoT botnet detection, and
provides evidence that deep learning approaches can be successfully applied to
this research area. The results of the research have already been used as a baseline
for future comparative research and cited extensively1.
3. Evaluation of User Awareness and Perception of threats within the
IoT (Chapter 5). Many studies exist relating to human-centered security and
the perception of risk [19]. Understanding how users perceive risk is an impor-
tant consideration when attempting to evaluate and promote better situational
awareness of risks relating to security and privacy. The results from this study
contribute to the developing knowledge relating to risk perception and awareness.
The contribution has significance since it was clearly demonstrated that users
value security and privacy but found identifying threats difficult. The research
also demonstrated that a lack of network communication can result in little or no




4. Evaluation of Conversational Agents to improve Cyber Situational
Awareness (Chapter 6 and 7). In recent years conversational agents have
experienced a significant rise in popularity, and have been widely adopted by a
range of companies, producing Microsoft’s Cortana, Apple’s Siri, Google’s Assis-
tant, and arguably the most popular, Amazon’s Alexa. Devices such as Amazon’s
Echo and its conversational agent Alexa, provide opportunities to build feature
rich conversational interactions [20]. Research in this area is growing, and pro-
ducing some very promising applications of conversational agents. However, this
research provides a novel contribution to the developing body of knowledge, since
it is the first study to explore the application of aural and verbal analysis, using
conversational agents, to the problem of IoT botnet detection.
1.4 Thesis Structure
This thesis consists of eight chapters, the first being this introduction. The remaining
chapters are organised as follows:
Chapter 2 Background and Related Work: provides an overview of security
within the IoT, exploring in particular the issue of botnets. It briefly looks into the
current methods of detecting botnets and their applicability to consumer IoT networks.
The chapter explores situational awareness and its application to the cyber domain.
Finally, it investigates the use of conversational agents within the IoT.
Chapter 3 Methodology: introduces the research methods used throughout this
thesis to answer the central research question. The chapter starts by introducing the
philosophy adopted for this research, and explaining the mixed-method approach which
was selected. In addition, it also provides justification for the techniques used and
explains how they are repeated in several chapters to ensure a level of consistency
between studies.
Chapter 4 Botnet detection in Consumer IoT networks: explores a common
threat used to leverage insecure smart devices and perform large scale DDoS attacks
on the Internet. The taxonomy of an IoT botnet is explored to better understand how
infection and spread can occur in smart devices and networks. In addition, the chapter
explores the ability of a current detection method to effectively detect botnet activity,
before finally proposing a novel application of deep learning for better detection of
botnets found within the IoT.
Chapter 5 Situational Awareness of Threats in Consumer IoT networks:
examines the awareness and perception of threats within consumer IoT networks. In
addition, it analyses user requirements from IoT devices, and the importance placed
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upon security and privacy. The chapter also assesses user ability to detect threats
within a network, and explores if there is an association between accuracy of detection,
and their technical knowledge or age.
Chapter 6 Cross-sectional study to test the viability of Conversational
Agents to improve Cyber Situational Awareness: examines the use of con-
versational agents for improving Cyber Situational Awareness. The chapter presents
a cross-sectional viability study which assesses the ability of users to detect threats
within a consumer IoT network. A method for assessing situational awareness based
on Mica Endsley’s SA model is presented, and the results of the study are discussed.
Chapter 7 Longitudinal study to assess the utility of Conversational Agents
to improve Cyber Situational Awareness: presents the final study in this thesis,
exploring the use of conversational agents for improving Cyber Situational Awareness.
Previously, the cross-sectional study collected data from a large population of users at
a single point in time. In this chapter, data was collected from a smaller sample of
users over an extended period lasting twenty-one days. Mica Endsley’s SA model was
again used to assess how participants perceive device activity, comprehend this in the
context of their environment, and use the knowledge to determine if a threat exists.
The results of the longitudinal study are presented and discussed.
Chapter 8 Conclusion: reviews the material presented in the previous chapters. A
summary of the findings is presented and the implications of the results discussed. The
chapter also discusses the limitations of the research, and provides suggestions for how
the research could be extended and taken further.
The relationship between the four main studies of this thesis is presented in Figure
1.1. Each study contributes to the overall narrative, with results informing subsequent
studies, and contributing to the central research question.
Study 1 Study 3
Study 2 Study 4Laboratory  Study
Detection methods explored and
dataset created for subsequent
studies
Online Study
User perception and awareness of
threats explored and results provide




Conversational Agents tested and
feedback used to refine agents in
final study 
Longitudinal Study
Utility of Conversational Agents is
tested for accuracy, effectivess and
usablity to answer central research
question
Figure 1.1: Four main studies Chapters 4-7
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1.5 Publications
1. McDermott CD, Majdani F, Petrovski AV. Botnet Detection in the Internet of
Things using Deep Learning Approaches. In: 2018 International Joint Conference
on Neural Networks (IJCNN); 2018. p. 1–8.
2. McDermott CD, Petrovski AV, Majdani F. Towards Situational Awareness of
Botnet Activity in the Internet of Things. In: 2018 International Conference On
Cyber Situational Awareness, Data Analytics And Assessment (Cyber SA); 2018.
p. 1–8. (Best paper award)
These papers contributed to the development and application of an algorithm
designed in Chapter 4, which was used to detect anomalous traffic utilised by
the mirai malware. The developed model used a novel application of Deep Bidi-
rectional Long Short Term Memory based Recurrent Neural Network (BLSTM-
RNN), in conjunction with Word Embedding, to convert string data found in cap-
tured packets, into a format usable by the BLSTM-RNN. In doing so, a solution
is presented to address the problem of detecting threats; and making consumers
situationally aware if a device is infected and being leveraged as part of an IoT
botnet.
3. McDermott CD, Isaacs JP, Petrovski AV. Evaluating Awareness and Perception
of Botnet Activity within Consumer Internet-of-Things (IoT) Networks. Infor-
matics. 2019;6(1).
This paper presented the cross-sectional study in Chapter 5, which evaluated
how users value and perceive security and privacy in IoT smart devices. It anal-
ysed user requirements from IoT devices, and the importance placed upon secu-
rity and privacy. An experimental setup was used to assess user ability to detect
threats, in the context of their technical knowledge and experience. It clearly
demonstrated that without any clear signs when an IoT device was infected, it
was very difficult for consumers to detect and be situationally aware of threats
exploiting home networks. It also demonstrated that situational awareness of
threats could, however, be improved if the data was presented to users in an easy
to understand manner.
4. McDermott CD, Jeannelle B, Isaacs JP. Towards a Conversational Agent for
Threat Detection in the Internet of Things. In: 2019 International Conference
on Cyber Situational Awareness, Data Analytics And Assessment (Cyber SA);
2019. p. 1–8.
8
5. Improving Awareness of Threats in the Internet of Things using Conversational
Agents (under review)
These papers describe the development of conversational agents for detecting
anomalous traffic in consumer IoT networks, presented in Chapter 6. The agents
accepted inputs in the form of user speech from Amazon Alexa enabled devices
and text conversations from a chatbot application. In doing so, the papers pre-
sented a solution to the problem of making consumers situationally aware when
their IoT devices are infected, and anomalous traffic has been detected.
6. Intrusion Detection using Mulimodal Analysis in the Internet of Things (under
review)
This paper presents the results of a longitudinal study in Chapter 7 where the
utility of conversational agents was assessed. The study was mapped to Mica
Endsley’s Situational Awareness model and was used to assess how participants
perceive device activity, comprehend this in the context of their environment, and
use the knowledge to determine if a threat exists. In addition, the usability of
the agents was evaluated for effectiveness, efficiency and satisfaction.
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Chapter 2
Background and Related Work
In this chapter, existing research is reviewed for its significance and relevance to the
research presented in this thesis. First, the Internet of Things (IoT) is defined and
the importance of the paradigm explained. Next, security concerns within the IoT are
highlighted, with a particular focus on IoT malware and botnet activity. A critical
review of the current methods of detecting DDoS attacks and botnet activity is also
presented. Situational awareness is then defined and contextualised for the Cyber
domain. Finally, the growth of voice computing and the adoption of conversational
agents is discussed, exploring current applications of the technologies, and identifying
gaps in the literature relating to its application to Cyber Situational Awareness.
2.1 Internet of Things (IoT): Domains and Security Con-
siderations
The Internet of Things (IoT) is a novel paradigm that has the potential to revolutionise
large sections of everyday life. At its core, the aim of the IoT is to connect previously
unconnected devices to the Internet [5], thus creating smart devices capable of collect-
ing, storing and sharing data, without requiring human interaction [4, 21]. The term
Internet of Things was first coined by Kevin Ashton in 1999 in a presentation made to
multinational consumer goods company Proctor and Gamble [22]. In his presentation,
Ashton proposed linking RFID in P&G’s supply chain to the internet. His vision was
clear:
“If we had computers that knew everything there was to know about things -
using data they gathered without any help from us - we would be able to track
and count everything, and greatly reduce waste, loss and cost. We would
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know when things needed replacing, repairing or recalling, and whether they
were fresh or past their best.”
This initial view of the IoT was influenced heavily by the focus of the Auto-ID Labs net-
work1, a research group in the field of networked radio-frequency identification (RFID)
and emerging sensing technologies. Their aim was to develop an Electronic Product
Code (EPC), giving physical objects a globally unique identifier, so that when coupled
with RFID technology, an objects visibility (status, current location) can be tracked
and monitored at all times [5]. While this view certainly describes an important part
of the IoT, it does not reflect the full vision, since it limits things within the paradigm
to RFID tags. Indeed, alternative definitions of the IoT recognise that the term IoT
implies a much wider vision than just object identification. Technological advance-
ments in electronics and computing have led to an exponential increase in internet
connected things, and a widening of the application domains covered by the IoT [21].
Mosenia et al. suggest the scope of IoT applications includes: Smart Vehicles, Smart
buildings, Health monitoring, Energy management, Construction management, Envi-
ronment monitoring, Production and assembly, and Food supply chains [21]. Gubbi et
al. categorise the applications into four application domains: (1) Personal and Home;
(2) Enterprise; (3) Utilities; and (4) Mobile [23]. Similarly, Atzori et al. suggest the
potential applications of the IoT are numerous and propose categorising them into
four similiar application domains: (1) Transportation and logistics; (2) Healthcare; (3)
Smart environment; and (4) Personal and social [5].
Although, it could be argued that categorising the scope of IoT applications is subjec-
tive, a number of limitations were identified in the existing literature. First, although
Mosenia et al. discussion of IoT applications was extensive, further refinement could
produce a more succinct categorisation. Conversely, Gubbi et al. categorisation was
too narrow, resulting in a list which did not reflect the breadth of possible applications.
Finally, Atzori et al. was found to be the most complete in terms of breadth of cov-
erage and succinctness, however, did not adequately cover utilities and clearly reflect
leisure activities. The application domains were, therefore, reorganised and categorised
















































Figure 2.1: IoT Application Domains
Transportation and Logistics. The first category covers any activity of transport-
ing people or goods and services to customers. Traffic congestion and road accidents
have long imposed intolerable burdens on drivers [24]. Traditional solutions to such
problems have included: increasing road capacity, reduction of demand through road
tools, and promoting greater car sharing. However, smart and autonomous vehicles
have started to revolutionise traditional transportation, helping to address some the
associated issues [21]. The transportation improvements have the potential to greatly
benefit Emergency services. With fewer road accidents, and less congestion, demand
for services could be reduced and logistical operations of ensuring timely responses to
incidents and emergencies optimised. The IoT has the flexibility to provide different
levels of vehicle autonomy depending upon the situation. Automated vehicle systems
such as pilot assist can assist in addressing issues previously discussed. However, fully
autonomous (self-driving) vehicles, have the potential to provide even further benefits
[25]. For example, supply chain tracking and delivery can be better monitored and
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managed using autonomous vehicles, as demonstrated by Amazon1 and their develop-
ment of autonomous delivery robots. In addition, the use of unmanned aerial vehicles
(UAVs), is now being explored as another method of reducing cost and time required
to deliver packages [26, 27].
Health and Leisure. The second category covers various automation processes
relating to health and leisure which can be improved through expansion of the IoT. For
instance, the evolution of health monitoring systems over the past two decades has the
potential to change the way health care is currently delivered [28]. Health profession-
als are able to monitor patients, particularly older adults [29] for conditions such as
dementia [30] and Alzheimer’s [31]. With an aging population and more people living
alone, remote home monitoring made possible by the IoT, will ensure elderly people
are able to maintain their independence and quality of life [29]. Remote monitoring
however is not limited to the elderly with wearable health monitoring systems designed
to track fitness and vital statistics such as heart rate (HR), blood pressure (BP), elec-
trocardiography (ECG), oxygen saturation (SpO2), body temperature and respiratory
rate (RR) [28, 32]. The benefits derived from the IoT extend beyond the home, and
make remote medical assistance increasingly possible. For example, drones are now
used as part of the medical-supply infrastructure to provide help and deliver resources
to remote locations that lack adequate roads [33]. In [27] fixed-wing drones were used
to deliver blood and life saving medicine in Rwanda. In [34] following a magnitude 7.8
earthquake in Nepal (2015) drones were deployed as part of the humanitarian effort to
provide vital and real-time information to rescue teams. The benefits the IoT brings to
healthcare are clear, and will likely increase as the IoT grows and expands. Finally, en-
tertainment and social networking are about to be transformed through connectivity to
billions of interconnected objects. RFIDs can be used to collect information about our
social activities and upload real-time updates to social networks, replacing the manual
“Checking in” process often used with sites like Facebook, in order to let friends know
where you have been [5].
Smart Cities and Homes. The third category covers various automation processes
relating to smart cities and homes. IBM define a smart city [35] as
“the physical infrastructure, the information-technology infrastructure, the
social infrastructure, and the business infrastructure to leverage the collec-
tive intelligence of the city.”
Alavi et al. broaden this definition of a smart city to an urban environment which
1https://tinyurl.com/amazon-autonomous-vehicles
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utilises technologies and digital data to deliver better public services, through more ef-
fective use of resources [36]. Predictions suggest that by 2050 66% of the global popula-
tion will be living in urbans areas, many in mega-cities of over 10 million inhabitants1.
It is therefore agreed that the establishment of Smart Cities is a core requirement to
cater for the expected rapid global urbanisation [37]. Expanding modern cities face
challenges relating to management, efficiency and quality. The smart city, fuelled by
the IoT, is set to provide solutions to many of these urban challenges such as waste
management[38], air quality[39], smart parking [40] and energy consumption [36]. A
basic building block for smart cities is the Smart Home [37]. A Smart home is defined
as a building that contains a communications network (gateway) to connect appliances
and services, allowing them to be remotely controlled, monitored and accessed [41].
The gateway is commonly accessed through an application running on a tablet, mobile
phone or computer; and is used to control heating, lighting, ventilation and security
systems within the home. Control of appliances is not limited to a user interface, with
voice command systems such as [42] being developed as multi-functional Smart Home
Automation System (SHAS) to control doorbells, fans, lights and curtains within the
home; and security and sprinkler systems in the garden. In addition, systems control-
ling monitored appliances can also be set to post notifications to social media platforms
such as Twitter [43]. The result is a home where the efficient control of the building
and appliances allows homeowners to remotely monitor the status and environment of
their home, and have real-time control of connected objects (temperature settings, door
locks, security cameras, etc.).
Industry and Utilities. The final category covers IoT applications within industry
and utilities. Industrial processes can be added to the IoT to create fully autonomous
operations, where groups of devices work together to achieve a process. For example,
building automation systems (BAS) can be added to the Internet to connect to exist-
ing infrastructure and Smart Grids for better device maintenance and energy efficiency
[44]. Likewise, in agriculture, key-systems such as irrigation can be integrated into the
IoT to enable intelligent control. In addition, the tractability of produce and move-
ment of animals can be tracked using IoT technologies, particularly useful during the
outbreak of a contagious disease [45]. Product tracking and logistics is not limited to
agriculture, and can also be used to enhance retail. Products equipped with RFIDs can
be integrated with smart shelves to allow real time monitoring of stock and detection
of shoplifting. Business intelligence and advertising can combine to create new oppor-
tunities for targeted adverts. For example, in [46] the authors suggest the advent of




between two points, to a dynamic and targeted environment to build novel applications
and services. If for example, a mechanism existed to profile passengers, since the car
is connected to the smart city, which in turn is connected to shops, restaurants and
bars, promotion adverts could be displayed inside the car as it passed key locations.
Finally, as industry and utilities are added to the IoT within smart cities, environment
monitoring will become critical to ensure quality of life within smart homes and cities.
2.1.1 IoT Security
The Internet of Things (IoT) is expected to usher in an era of increased connectivity,
with billions of devices expected to be connected to the Internet [47]. Many of the
smart devices found within the IoT are aimed at consumers, who value low cost and
ease of deployment over security. As a result, these market forces have resulted in IoT
manufacturers omitting critical security features, and producing swathes of insecure
Internet connected devices, such as IP cameras and Digital Video Recorder (DVR)
boxes [11]. Such vulnerabilities were investigated in [48] where three popular IoT de-
vices were tested: Philips Hue light bulb, Belkin WeMo power switch and Nest smoke
alarm. The authors undertook extensive analysis of device activity and communica-
tions, and demonstrated a clear lack of encryption, appropriate authentication and
privacy concerns when using the devices. In [49] vulnerabilities were also identified in
IP cameras and a smart home toilet, which used a default Bluetooth password, allowing
it to be controlled by anyone with the associated app. These highlighted vulnerabilities
and exploits are often derived and epitomised by smart device characteristics such as
inherent computational limitations, use of default credentials and insecure protocols.
The rapid proliferation of insecure IoT devices and ease by which attackers can locate
them using online services, such as Shodan, provides an ever expanding pool of attack
resources. By compromising and leveraging multitudes of these vulnerable IoT devices,
attackers have the potential to perform large scale attacks such as spamming, phishing
and Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS), against resources on the Internet [50]. It
is clear, as smart homes increasingly adopt IoT devices, it is vital to develop specific
security solutions for the IoT to enable users and organisations to protect their smart
devices better [51].
2.1.2 Botnets in the Internet of Things
Some of the most extensive and destructive cyber-attacks deployed on the Internet
have been DDoS attacks [52]. Figure 2.2 presents a timeline of prominent malware
which specifically targeted IoT devices, leveraging them to perform large scale DDoS
attacks. Several of these attacks, including the largest ever to be recorded, occurred
in the second half of 2016, fueled in full or part by the IoT. During this time, attacks
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of over 100 Gbps significantly increased by 140%, with three attacks reaching over
300 Gbps [16]. Attacks of the same severity and magnitude continued into 2017 and
by the fourth quarter of 2017 Verisign also reported that 82% of DDoS attacks now
employed a multi-vector attack strategy. This evidence suggested IoT botnets were
becoming increasingly more common and sophisticated in their effectiveness and ability
to exploit basic security vulnerabilities, and obfuscate their activity [16]. Indeed, the
growing trend of IoT malware has continued as demonstrated in Figure 2.3b, which
shows an increase in the number of IoT malware samples between 2017-2019. With
20.4 billion devices forecast to be connected to the Internet in 2020, maintaining security
and privacy within Smart Homes and Cities continues to be a challenge. Therefore,
to better understand this growing challenge, a brief history of malware specifically
targeting the IoT is presented. Following De Donno et al. [53, 54], only prominent
examples which leverage IoT devices to perform DDoS attacks between 2008-2018 are
discussed. Therefore, like the authors, other IoT malware with different goals are also
omitted. This literature review complements De Donno’s original list, adding additional
recent examples found within the literature.
Linux.Hydra. The earliest known malware specifically targeting devices found within
the IoT [55]. It was managed by IRC, which was historically a popular method to host
botnets, due to the networks simple, and low bandwidth communication methods. The
malware targeted routing devices based on MIPS architecture, gaining access through
a brute force dictionary attack, or leveraging a D-Link authentication bypass exploit
[56].
Psyb0t. Another IRC malware which targeted MIPSel architecture, common on
network equipment running Linux-based operating systems such as OpenWRT and DD-
WRT [56]. Since router firmware is usually read-only, the malware could only run in
RAM, however, proliferate was swift. Access was gained through brute force dictionary
attacks or by leveraging a D-Link authentication bypass exploit. Once infected the
malware could be used to initiate DDoS attacks or access other services such as MySQL,
FTP and SMB.
Chuck Norris. Malware which appeared in 2010 and shared code and functionality
with its predecessor (Psyn0t). Like Psyb0t, the binary was IRC-based and targeted
network devices running on the MIPSel platform. Its method of encrypting information
and proliferation was similar to Psyb0t scanning a list of IP addresses stored in a file
on the router, or a hard coded list within the binary [54].
Tsunami. Another malware binary which appeared in 2010 sharing code with its
predecessor (Chuck Norris), and also distinguishing features associated with the Linux
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Kaiten/Tsunami open source DDoS tool [56]. The binary was still IRC-based, highly
favoured for its means of C&C communication protocol. In addition to previous attack
vectors, the malware included capability to perform HTTP Layer 7 Flood attacks where
genuine HTTP GET or POST requests are used to perform DDoS attacks [57].TCP
XMAS attacks were also included allowing malformed packets, with all flags enabled
to be created, and overload a target [58].
Aidra. Developed in 2012 the malware, also known as LightAidra, did not appear
to follow the same development path as the previous binaries, and targeted a wider
range of architectures (ARM, PPC and SuperH [54]. Still IRC-based, delivering the
same attacks as previous malware, however was able to modify firewall settings using
iptables [59]. Its use of a cross-compiled binary, to infect multiple IoT binaries at the
same time, was adopted in subsequent malware binaries [60].
Spike. The first notable IoT malware employing a new architecture model. Previous
malware specifically targeting the IoT utilised IRC for communicating. An IRC channel
was established for infected clients (bots) to join, and commands were sent to the
channel via an IRC server. Bots would receive the commands, execute the instructions,
and return their results to the IRC channel. Spike malware, however, used an agent-
handler model, where software packages (handlers) were setup on a server, and agents
installed on infected IoT devices. The attacker communicates with handlers to identify
available agents, and instructions are sent to the agents to perform the required attack
[61].
Bashlite. The second prominent example of agent-handler malware targeting the
IoT was first detected in 2014. Although classified as using an agent-handler model,
Bashlite C&C operate similar to IRC channels, to allow operators to interact while
connected to the C&C [53, 62]. Interestingly, the C&C IP addresses are hard-coded,
making the malware easier to monitor [63]. Available attack vectors are in line with
previous malware, however, additional architectures are also targeted, including SuperH
and SPARC. The sourse code was released onto the Internet, leading to many variants
being subsequently developed.
LizardStresser. The malware came to prominence shortly after Christmas Day 2014
when it was used to bring down the Sony Playstation and Microsoft Xbox gaming
networks [64]. The malware targeted x86, ARM and MIPS CPU architectures, com-
monly used on embedded IoT devices. Once infected targets were used to scan the
Internet for further targets accepting connections via Telnet, and a brute force attack
was performed checking against a list of known default credentials.
Elknot. Also known as BillGates the malware gained a lot of traction in China in
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2015. The malware targeted similar architectures to previous malware, but added a
new DNS Amplification attack, where open DNS resolvers were leveraged to overwhelm
a target with an amplified amount of traffic [61].
XOR.DDoS. The second prominent malware targeting IoT devices detected in 2015.
The malware was able to exploit the Shellshock vulnerability, although it did not rely
upon the vulnerability to gain access [54]. The Shellshock vulnerability was a security
bug causing Bash to execute commands from environment varaibles. Attackers were
able to remotely issue commands on a server, a process also known as remote code
execution. Attack vectors including DNS amplification.
LUABOT. The first IoT malware written in LUA programming language, a
lightweight embedded scripting language. Since the language is cross-platform it proved
effective for exploiting systems running an embedded version of linux. The binary pre-
pared targets to be centrally controlled by the botnet, and was able to copy device
configurations and certificates to be sold for use in cloned devices [65]. Once infected,
remote access to a target is blocked through the use of tailor made iptables.
Remaiten. Detected in 2016, the malware presented as a fusion of two previous mal-
wares: tsunami and LizardStresser. The method of proliferation, scanning for available
telnet connections, was borrowed from LizardStresser, while the handling of C&C mes-
sages was borrowed from tsunami. As such C&C communications used an IRC Channel,
but just the IRC protocol [53].
New Aidra. Existing malware continued to be fused together in 2016 to create new,
more potent variants. The original Aidra root code, was combined with tsunami IRC-
based approach, BASHLITE scanning/injection and Mirai ’s use of a dictionary attack
to create New Aidra, also known as Linux.IRCTelnet. Released around the same time
as Mirai, it demonstrated how developers built upon existing malware to create new,


















































Figure 2.2: IoT DDoS Malware Timeline
Mirai. Arguably the most prominent example of IoT malware in recent times was
first detected in 2016 [17, 18, 10]. On 20 September 2016, the Mirai botnet was used to
perform an unprecedented 620 Gbps DDoS attack on security journalist Brian Krebs
website krebsonsecurity.com [66]. Shortly after, it was also responsible for a series of
additional DDoS attacks against French web hosting company OVH, and DNS provider
DYN. Peaking at over 1.2 Tbps, it was estimated that up to 100,000 infected IoT devices
(bots) were involved in the attacks [65]. The severity of the DYN attack was sufficient to
cause major disruption on the Internet, and render several high-profile websites such as
GitHub, Twitter, Reddit, Netflix inaccessible. This proved to be a watershed moment,
defining the future of IoT malware to the present day. Following the release of source
code on GitHub 1, Mirai has quickly become the framework for malware targeting
devices in the Internet of Things [60]. Indeed, the impact of Mirai has continued to
dominate the landscape into the second half of 2019, with tens of thousands of unique
versions of the malware detected on the Internet, an increase of 57% from 2018 [67]
(See Figure 2.3b). Although at first glance Mirai appears to utilise many features
seen in previous malware, the implementation of some (features) appear to be more
sophisticated. In [60] the authors identified a number of Mirai enhancements such
as its use of a random subset of credentials when performing brute force dictionary
attacks. Also, since IoT malware resides in RAM, and a simple restart of the device
1https://github.com/jgamblin/Mirai-Source-Code
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can remove the malware, Mirai introduced an new anti-reboot feature. In addition,
Mirai introduced a new stateless scanning method when looking for new targets. The
malware no longer needs to wait for a timeout to execute before moving on to a new
IP. Once a target is found, Mirai also now determines the device architecture and
only sends the corresponding binary, an improvement from previous malware which
downloaded all binary variants.
Mirai Mutations (2016-2018). As mentioned previously, following the release of the
Mirai source code, it quickly became the framework for new malware targeting the IoT
[60]. In 2019, Netscout reported detecting 225855 samples of Mirai variants [67]. The
vast majority of them targeting the same architectures (ARM, MIPS, Intel, PowerPC
and SPARC ) as the original malware (See Figure 2.3). In addition, the top five exploits
used by the malware continue to be: Huawei Router HG532, Realtek SDK, Hadoop
YARN Resource Manager, D-Link DSL, and Linksys E-series. For brevity, the original
list of malware compiled by De Donno et al. [53, 54] is complemented with ten new
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(b) Unique Mirai Samples
Figure 2.3: Mirai Malware Variants
In [68] the authors present Akiru, Katrina V1, Sora, Saikin, Owari, Josho V3 and
Tokyo, all new mutations of the original Mirai malware. Indeed, the proliferation
is also evident in [69, 70] where satori, masuta, and wicked are presented. Sharing
the original basecode with Mirai, many features and characteristics are retained from
the original as shown in Table 2.1. For example, the string used to confirm whether
the malware is already present on a device, or should be loaded, has only seen minor
alterations such as “MIRAI: applet not found” to “Akiru: applet not found”. Although
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only a minor difference the change can have an impact on the effectiveness of Intrusion
Detection Systems (IDS) signatures1 to detect Mirai such as
alert tcp $EXTERNAL NET any <> $HOME NET any (msg:”Possible Mirai infec-
tion”; content: ”MIRAI: applet not found”; sid: 10003; rev:1;)
Here, the Snort rule uses string MIRAI: applet not found to trigger an alert, whenever
a match is observed. While this rule would be effective for the original malware, the
rule would require modification for each variant of Mirai. In addition, Table 2.1 also
shows that in many cases new variants have been enhanced to scan for additional ports,
architecture types (ARC ), and exploits. Further enhancements also include the ability
to take direct control of compromised devices, making other malicious actions possible,
including running trojan viruses, redirecting traffic for man-in-the-middle attacks, and
delivering other viruses to devices on the network by proxy [68]. Some new variants
also target smart signage TVs and wireless presentation systems, such as LG Supersign
TVs and the WePresent WiPG-1000 wireless presentation system. [71].
Table 2.1: Mutated Mirai Malware
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Other Notable IoT Malware. A number of other notable IoT malware exist, however
were not included in Figure 2.2 and Table 2.1 since they either only share a portion of
code from Mirai or do not currently leverage devices to perform DDoS attacks. JenX
shares characteristics with previous malware including exploit vectors seen in Satori
and Masuta. Interestingly, the malware used central C&C servers, hosted on a site
providing services for Grand Theft Auto, to perform scanning and exploitation. This is
a different approach from most other IoT malware which use distributed scanning and
exploiting, where each target once infected performs its own scan to find new targets to
infect [72]. Brickerbot was first discovered in 2017 and leveraged SSH default credentials
of vulnerable IoT devices to perform a permanent denial-of-service (PDoS) attack. The
malware attempted to gain access by brute force using default telnet passwords, execute
commands using busybox to corrupt MMC and MTD storage, before deleting all files,
and disconnecting the device from the Internet [65]. Interestingly, subsequent versions
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of malware used the Tor network to conceal its location and IP address, and did not
rely on the presence of busybox on the target device. Hajime is presented in [73] which
appeared at the same time as Mirai, but is considered to include more sophistication.
In addition to scanning TCP port 23, the malware is also able to attack port 5358
which provides a way to implement web services on resource constrained embedded
devices [65]. In addition, the malware supports Universal Plug and Play (UPnP) an
Internet Gateway Device (IGD) protocol supported by many NAT enabled routers.
The malware’s use of fully distributed communications and UDP port 1457 enables it
to make use of the BitTorrent protocol for peer discovery.
The rise in IoT based DDoS attacks, witnessed in recent years, will likely continue until
IoT manufacturers accept responsibility and incorporate security mechanisms into their
devices. Until such a time, the IoT has the potential to become the new playground
for future cyber attacks and therefore presents a number of challenges.
2.1.3 Intrusion Detection Methods
The previous section highlighted prominent examples of malware which specifically tar-
geted devices found within the IoT. It also demonstrated that with 20.4 billion devices
forecast to be connected to the Internet in 2020 maintaining security and privacy within
Smart Homes and Cities continues to be a challenge [67]. This section explores meth-
ods for detecting malware within IoT environments. Specifically, the use of Intrusion
Detection Systems (IDS) as a form of passive network monitoring, in which traffic is
examined at a packet level and results of the analysis are logged. In doing so, they
can be an effective countermeasure against botnet activity by observing and identifying
active attacks and vulnerabilities in network traffic [74].
Network security monitoring has long been a topic of research, ever since Anderson [75]
published his seminal work where he demonstrated how audit logs could be analysed
to identify anomalies. Denning [76] continued this work producing a framework for a
general purpose intrusion detection expert system. Again, the focus was on identifying
security violations by monitoring a system’s audit records. In this respect, the author
regarded the model as a rule-based pattern matching system, since when an audit record
was generated, it was matched against a profile for normal and abnormal behaviour.
Lunt et al. [77] proposed improvements to Denning’s approach by suggesting the use
of prioi rules of “socially unacceptable” behaviour where a legitimate user who may
abuse their privileges, and engage in activity outwith their normal behaviour. Their
proposed system would identify this activity as separate anomalies to genuine intrusion
attempts by an attacker. Heberlein et al. [78] extended the work of Lunt to cover
intrusions at the network level, focusing on security related issues in a single broadcast
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LAN. The proposed Network Security Monitor (NSM) measured network utilisation and
host-to-host activity and used probabilistic, rule-based and mixed approaches to detect
anomalous behaviour. They further extended their work by proposing a Distributed
Intrusion Detection System (DIDS) [79], which combined host based intrusion detection
with network traffic monitoring. They also suggested that bench-marking mechanisms
should be developed in order to test the effectiveness of intrusion detection systems.
DARPA duly complied [80] and developed an intrusion detection test bed which gener-
ated normal and attack traffic. Six research groups participated in a blind evaluation
of intrusion detection systems to evaluate their effectiveness. The idea of a Distributed
Intrusion Detection System was developed further in [81], where a multi-sensor data
fusion approach was proposed. Here, data from multiple sources is combined to make
inferences about events, activities and situations. In doing so, Bass hypothesised that
the fusion of data from a myriad of distributed network sensors could provide a frame-
work for building next-generation IDS and effectively achieve “Cyberspace Situational
Awareness”. The concept of Cyber Situational Awareness will be discussed in Section
2.2.2. Since these seminal pieces of work a number of approaches have been proposed.
Following Zarpelao et al. [82], intrusion detection techniques presented in this thesis are
categorised into three main approaches: signature-based, anomaly-based, specification-
based. Hybrid approaches also exist, but generally have a dominant method, therefore,
these are categorised into one of the three main approaches. Relevant literature relat-
ing to the use of each approach is discussed and interesting themes and use cases are
highlighted, such as whitelisting, behavioural anlaysis, Software Define Networking and
Blockchain technology for detecting botnet activity and DDoS attacks.
Signature-based Detection. Commercial intrusion detection systems are predom-
inantly signature-based, detecting attacks by comparing a known attack pattern (sig-
nature) to incoming attacks [83]. As such they can be an effective tool for detecting
known threats, but require frequent rule-base and signature updates. Kambourakis et
al. [65] suggest strong signatures can be an effective method of detecting malware such
as Mirai, Hajime or Bashlite presented in Section 2.1.2. For example, in the case of
Mirai they suggest rules could be written to monitor ports 23, 2323, and 22 for repeated
authorisation attempts. Alternatively, patterns of activity could be monitored such as
, (1) establishment of a TCP connection, (2) transmission of a sequence of packets of
predictable size, (3) termination of the connection. Patterns matched to a pre-defined
signature would then raise an alert.
Whitelisting has also been used as a mechanism to identify specific devices and explic-
itly allow access or privileges to perform functions [84]. Gopal et al. [85] propose a
system for detecting and mitigating the spread of IoT malware. The system utilises
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application whitelisting to allow only trusted applications to be executed. In the con-
text of IoT malware, the application is the binary used by IoT malware to infect and
propagate within a network. The system is built using a modular architecture, with
the first module (Profiling) responsible for scanning the router or IoT node for binaries
which require to be executed. Once found, a hash value is calculated for each binary
and stored in a database. The second module (Enforcement) uses the hashed signa-
tures to enforce the whitelist of trusted binaries. The module computes the hash of
the binary just prior to execution, and compares the value to the hashed signature in
the database. If the values match, the binary is allowed to execute, otherwise it is
blocked. Testing and results were limited, but appeared to demonstrate some promise
when using whitelisting as a method of IoT malware detection and prevention. In-
deed, the same approach is taken in [86] where Heimdall, a whitelist-based intrusion
detection approach, is used to detect common IoT attacks, such as DDoS and passive
eavesdropping. Similar to the approach used by Gopal, a profile is created for each
monitored IoT device, however, here the whitelist is composed of legitimate contacts
(other IoT devices) a device can make in order to perform its functions. In doing so,
the system can prevent incoming attack traffic from logging into a device during the
infection stage of malware propagation. In addition, the whitelist also governs outgoing
traffic, preventing a device from communicating with illegitimate destinations (botnet
servers such as C&C). The whitelist is initially generated by monitoring DNS traffic for
each device, and storing hostname/IP mappings to a device profile, constituting trusted
destinations. If monitored traffic matches the profile of a device, the traffic is allowed,
otherwise it is blocked. The system was evaluated for its effectiveness to protect five
popular IoT devices including a Smart Lock and Light bulb, however the evaluation
only focused on validating the overhead of running the system on an edge router. There
was no clear indication whether attempted connections made by IoT malware were suc-
cessful or not. In addition, during the generation of the initial whitelist, consideration
was not given to an event where an infected IoT device was already present on the
network. This could potentially result in malicious traffic being identified as trusted,
and included in the whitelist.
Gu et al. [87] present BotHunter a perimeter detection system which focuses on detect-
ing malware infections associated with botnets. The IDS is built on top of Snort1 and
monitors ingress/egress traffic matching it against an extensive set of malware-specific
signatures. In addition, two custom plugins were developed to complement Snort’s
signature engine and provide inbound and outbound scan detection warnings that are
weighted for sensitivity toward malware-specific scanning patterns. Ten different IRC-
based botnet variants were used to test the system (Agobot, Gaobot, Phatbot, SDBot,
1https://www.snort.org/
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RBot, UrBot, UrXBot, and GTbot. Extensive testing in virtual and live environments
was undertaken, demonstrating that the system is capable of accurately flagging both
well-studied and emergent bots. However, some limitations are evident. Firstly, the
premise of the system is to detect botnet activity by monitoring C&C communications,
however if future botnets encrypted their communications the system would need to
be adapted. It could also be possible to evade detection by using different paths for
inbound and outbound traffic (rerouting) which would pose another challenge to the
system. Monitoring C&C communications channels to detect botnet activity was also
used in [84], where the authors monitored traffic for unusual or suspicious IRC nick-
names, matching these against pre-defined signatures.
In [88] Hadi et al. the authors propose a botnet detection system (BoDMitM ) which
uses policies defined for IoT devices, to determine the level of network access granted to
each device. The policies are defined using Manufacturer Usage Descriptions (MUD)1
which provide device visibility and allow the system to identify each IoT device type
and define the appropriate behaviours for the device. The system is configured to run
on Openwrt2, a popular firmware for SOHO routers, and uses Snort as the detection
engine. When a new IoT device is added to the network, the device uses its MUD
to inform the network what type of device it is, and what network access it requires
to perform its function. The system monitors the network traffic and attempts to
match the MUD of new devices to a MUD policy. If a match is found, access is
granted according to the specified policy, otherwise a violation occurs, and the traffic is
forwarded to the IDS (Snort) for further analysis. The authors reported 100% efficiency
in detecting attacks, however, did not provide details of the testing procedure, or how
the IDS handled the malicious traffic. In addition, the system is built on the premise
that malware enters the network when new infected devices are added, however, in
reality, devices already in the network could be infected remotely, without the need for
a device to be physically added to the network.
Kumar et al. [89] propose a system for early detection of IoT botnets. The authors
analysed traffic generated from the Mirai malware, particularly during the initial scan-
ning stage, and used it to identify specific signatures which can be used to detect the
presence of malware in IoT devices. From this they proposed an algorithm based on a
novel two dimensional sampling approach which aims to detect individual bots, rather
than the botnet network itself. This approach reduced the computational requirements
of the detection mechanism, since only a sample of packets used in the scanning process




so easily infected devices, categorised as (vulnerable), and more difficult to infect de-
vices, categorised as (non-vulnerable), were sampled differently. A sampling frequency
was specified, which determined the number of devices in each category to be sam-
pled in a defined time period. This allowed more of the vulnerable IoT devices to be
sampled. Once the sampling frequency had been fined tuned, the system appeared to
perform well, although a number of assumptions were required. Firstly, despite the
optimisation, the authors still concluded the algorithm required to be run on a special
bot detection device, with sufficient processing power and memory. This could limit
the application and scalability of the system in large ISP networks. Secondly, there was
an assumption that ISPs would have knowledge of which devices were regarded as vul-
nerable and non-vulnerable. However, it wasn’t clear how this would be achieved, other
than from a rudimentary observation that devices in homes would be most vulnerable.
The authors therefore claim that IoT devices in enterprise, industrial or governmental
networks are less vulnerable, which has not been proven.
Behavioural analysis was found to be another popular method for detecting malware.
In [90] Said et al. explored two malware detection techniques used to detect IoT
malware. First, syntactic analysis was used with string-based signatures. Rules were
created based on syntactic properties (file size and string values) and tested using
a malware detection tool (Yara1). Secondly, behavioural analysis was performed by
creating behaviour signatures from samples of the Mirai malware. For example, system
calls made by the malware when interacting with a host system were recorded, and
used as a signature to identify a pattern of behaviour. Both techniques were tested
using 500 unique Mirai samples, previously captured using a honeypot. The results
demonstrated behavioural analysis to be the more effective technique, however, the
authors ultimately recommended a hybrid of the two techniques should be deployed for
maximum performance. While the results were promising, the authors did recognise
that the techniques had limitations. Indeed, it would be quite easy to evade detection
from the syntactic technique by simply changing the size of the binary so that the
signature threshold value was not invoked. Secondly, the behavioural analysis technique
relies heavily on samples of existing malware, therefore, could prove less effective for
new or variants of existing malware.
Anomaly-based Detection. Behavioural analysis can also be used for anomaly-
based detection. In [91] Zhao et al. present a method of detecting botnet activity using
traffic behaviour analysis and flow intervals. The authors explored the feasibility of
detecting bot activity during both the C&C and attack phases based on the observation
of its network flow characteristics for specific time intervals. The system was trained
1http://virustotal.github. io/yara/
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using a subset of the ISCX 2012 IDS dataset, and a second dataset containing the Zeus
botnet. The system was then tested using two novel (at the time) botnets: Weasel
and BlackEnergy, both capable of performing DDoS attacks. A decision tree classifier
was used successfully to detect bot activity with 100% accuracy returned for both
malware. However, while the BlackEnergy returned a 0% false positive rate, the Weasel
malware returned 82% false positive rate. The significant difference in false positive
rates was likely due to the fact the BlackEnergy dataset consisted of only malicious
traffic, while the Weasel dataset contained a combination of both normal and malicious
traffic. Indeed, the author recognised this limitation suggesting future iterations could
be trained using a sample of normal traffic from the target network. While this could
certainly improve detection, it would dilute the effectiveness of the system.
Recently, deep learning has also been increasingly applied to the detection of anomalies,
where Convolutional Neural Networks (CNN), Recurrent Neural Network (RNN) or un-
supervised learning such as auto-encoders have been successfully used. In [92] Meidan
et al. extract behaviour features of IoT traffic in a network and use deep autoencoders
to detect malicious traffic from the Mirai and Bashlite IoT malware. In total, twenty
three features were collected and used to train a neural network using clean uninfected
traffic. Since the autoencoder was only trained on benign traffic, it was able to recon-
struct normal observations (normal traffic), however, failed to reconstruct abnormal
observations (malicious traffic), classifying these as anomalous. The accuracy of the
detection engine was tested by infecting common IoT devices (doorbell, security cam-
era, baby monitor) and measuring the mean TPR, FPR and detection time. Finally,
the results were compared to those of three other algorithms: Support Vector Machine
(SVM), local outlier factor (LOF) and IsolationForest. Overall, accuracy was very
good although one device appeared to be more difficult to detect, suggesting further
refinement when capturing normal traffic behaviour is required. Similarly, Kumar et
al. [93] propose a system to detect and mitigate attacks from IoT botnets. The sys-
tem was composed of three components: botnet detection using a sparse autoencoder,
cryptomining detection algorithm, and a honeypot used as a decoy IoT device. The
neural network-based anomaly detector tested the accuracy of several machine learn-
ing models to detect four variants of Mirai (FBOT, ARIS, EXIENDO and APEP).
The system also attempted to detect the presence of crypomining by monitoring CPU
usage of IoT devices, and identifying anomalies when devices exhibited high CPU and
memory utilisation, as a result of the malware running complex crypto computations.
Finally, the honeypot was deployed to attract the malware and control the propagation
of the botnet. The system returned high detection accuracy, although the accuracy of
the support vector machine algorithm was found to be considerably lower. It was also
not clear whether the results represented mean values for the four malware variants.
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In addition, it was also not clear how the honeypot had prevented the spread of the
malware, since the malware would continue scanning and connecting to other devices
in the network, beyond the failed login attempt in the honeypot.
In [94] the authors proposed a system based on a convolutional neural network (CNN).
Rather than extract features from traffic, the raw traffic data was taken as images, and
the CNN used to perform image classification. Traffic was preprocessed, anonymising,
and sanitising images before they were converted to IDX format, ready to be ingested
into the CNN. Precision, recall and F1 scores were good, however, the authors acknowl-
edged that the system was limited, since it was only able to classify known malware,
and was not tested for unknown variants.
Recurrent Neural Networks (RNN) were used in [95, 96] to detect anomalies in an ex-
isting dataset. Since DDoS attacks flood a network with similar packets, the appeal
of using a RNN is their ability to connect previous information to the present [97],
which in the case of a flood attack would mean using previous packets to inform the
understanding of the present packet. In [96] a RNN was used, with forty one features
transformed to numeric values, before being normalised [0,1]. A total of one hundred
twenty two input nodes, and two output nodes were created. The results of the model
were measured for accuracy, and compared to other machine learning methods. The re-
sults produced were good, maintaining high accuracy, however, training time was higher
when compared to other algorithms, suggesting further fine tuning, and feature reduc-
tion should be considered. The increased training time could also be due to the method
used by RNN to achieve information persistence (long-term dependencies). Although
they contain loops allowing information to persist, as the gap between previous infor-
mation and the present state grows, RNNs become less effective at learning to connect
the information. As a result some within the research community have investigated the
use of Long short-term memory (LSTM) [97, 98, 99], a special kind of RNN, capable
of learning long-term dependencies [98]. Results were promising and demonstrated the
potential for detecting, DoS, DDoS and IRC-bot communications in flows of network
traffic. In [100] Long et al. propose a deep learning intrusion detection system using
word embedding and a Long short-term memory (LSTM) recurrent neural network.
The use of word embedding was used to address the challenge of training a model with
high dimensional features. Dimensions of features were therefore reduced, while keep-
ing the similarity relationships in semantics and syntax. The Recurrent Neural Layers
helped trace the history from previous network packets, and a softmax classifier was
used to determine whether the input traffic was normal or malware. The results ob-
tained were good demonstrating that the use of word embedding for network intrusion
detection has promise, and could be applied to other areas such as the IoT.
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Gu et al. [101] present BotSniffer a network-based anomaly detection system built
on top of Snort to identify botnet C&C channels. In their previous work [87], the
authors presented a system which used an extensive set of malware-specific signatures
to detect a range of IRC-based botnets. In this research, the system does not require
a priori knowledge of signatures or C&C server addresses. Instead, spatial-temporal
correlation is used since pre-programmed C&C communications and activities will likely
display similarities for bots belonging to the same network. Anomaly-based detection
algorithms were developed to detect both IRC and HTTP based C&C which were
able to detect activity even when a low number of bots were present and the C&C
communication was encrypted. The presented results show the system to be effective,
detecting all tested botnets and generating very few false positives. Despite this a
number of limitations are present, many of which are acknowledged by the author.
Firstly, the system uses a whitelist of addresses identified as normal, which is hard
coded into the system and could easily be evaded if known. Secondly, the system
was tested using standard protocols for C&C such as IRC, however botnets which
use bespoke protocols could possibly again evade detection. Finally, the authors did
not test the scalability of the system, which could pose an issue in networks with
multiple ingress/egress points. In [102] the authors recognised some limitations of
their previous work and proposed BotMiner. The research acknowledged that bots
were evolving and being developed to use different C&C protocols and structures,
should as distributed Peer to Peer (P2P). Their aim with BotMiner was to develop
a system independent of the protocol, structure and infection model, that should also
not require a priori knowledge of signatures or C&C server addresses. The system is
built on the understanding that bots within the same botnet will exhibit similar C&C
communications and malicious activity patterns. Thus, the architecture of the system
is built on two planes: A-Plane for monitoring and clustering activity patterns, and C-
Plane for monitoring and clustering communications patterns. Clustering results from
each plane are sent for cross-plane correlation to find intersections between the two,
which may suggest evidence of a host being part of a botnet. The results demonstrated
excellent detection accuracy, and was presented as an improvement over their previous
work. However, as with any IDS the system does have limitations allowing bots to
possibly evade detection. For example, both planes (A&C) likely rely on consistency in
activity and C&C communications in order to successfully detect the bot presence. If
a bot was developed to exhibit irregular C&C communications and malicious activity
patterns, the system may struggle to identify and cluster the activity. This could
potentially impact the accuracy of detection.
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Nobakht et al. [103] proposed an intrusion detection system (IoT-IDM ), to provide
network level protection for smart devices deployed in home environments. The sys-
tem utilised a hybrid approach capable of using learned signature patterns of known
attacks, and customised machine learning techniques. The system also utilised SDN
technology, to provide network visibility using OpenFlow, and security management
was provided by a third entity as Security as a Service (SaaS). Here the SaaS provider
maintains the database of IoT devices and known attacks on behalf of home networks,
and provides updates to repository. To detect possible intruders a predictive model,
capable of distinguishing between legitimate access and an attack was used. Logistic
regression and Support Vector Machines (SVM) returned high accuracy, however the
author acknowledged the limitations of the system. The system relied on a third party
to maintain a database of known attack patterns which were used to train the detection
modules. It is unlikely that this database could be kept sufficiently up to date, and even
if this was possible, the delay between new attacks patterns being learnt and homes
being updated, would leave them open to zero day attacks.
Specification-based Detection. Adat et al. [104] propose a DDoS mitigation
framework to protect resource constrained IoT devices. Specifically, they produced an
algorithm to defend against denial of service attacks based on resource exhaustion. The
proposed algorithm consisted of two modules: an analysis module to classify incoming
traffic as suspicious or normal, and a monitoring module to categorise the attacks as
denial of service (DoS) or distributed denial of service (DDoS). Detection was performed
at the border router and packets initially checked against a blacklist, with non-black
list IP addresses allowed through. The system also used bit rate as a metric to check
for normal or anomalous packets. The presented results were good, however it was
not clear which DDoS attacks were performed. Also, the system was only tested in a
simulated environment, therefore results are limited and accuracy unknown in a live
setting.
Threshold values are often specified and used as triggers to identify potential malicious
activity. In [105] an IDS was developed using Suricata1, a free and open source real
time threat engine capable of inline intrusion prevention (IPS), network security moni-
toring (NSM) and offline pcap processing. They developed a novel security architecture
for detecting DoS attacks in 6LoWPAN Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN). Suricata’s
threshold rules were used to trigger an alert when matched packets in a UDP flooding
attack, exceeded a defined threshold. The system proved capable of detecting DoS
attacks, but was limited since rules could be easily bypassed, and the rules would re-
quire to be constantly updated. The authors extended their work in [106] where alerts
1https://suricata-ids.org/
31
were now sent to a Security Information & Event Management (SIEM), however, the
limitations of their previous work appear to have been carried forward, and therefore
remain. Ahmed et al. [107] also used threshold values to identify malicious activity by
proposing a novel blockchain based solution for detecting IoT botnets. IoT devices in
the network connect to the Internet via Autonomous System (AS), which are respon-
sible for forwarding device traffic, and maintaining four lists of IP addresses: Blacklist,
Whitelist, Suspected Attacker List and Possible Victim List. Multiple AS exist and
are connected together via the blockchain, to allow each AS to share their IP lists
with other AS in the network. In addition, every AS monitors the behaviour of the
devices connected to it, and compares their behaviour to pre-defined threshold values.
If a threshold value is exceeded the device is added to the blacklist, and then shared
throughout the network. Known trusted devices are added to the whitelist, and new
IoT devices are added to the suspected attacker list. Once identified as trusted, the
new IoT devices are moved to the whitelist. The system was evaluated in a simulated
environment, and once fine tuned, returned true detection rates of 95%. While the sys-
tem proposed an interesting and novel approach to botnet detection, it was only tested
in a simulated environment. Similar approaches have also been proposed in [108, 109],
however the feasibility of maintaining a Proof of Work blockchain in a real environ-
ment, for the purpose proposed in the studies is debatable, since it would likely require
a large number of nodes to host a live chain, and could consume a considerable amount
of electricity. Bhardwaj et al. [110] also proposed using a threshold value to detect
malicious activity utilising edge computing to deploy functions at the edge of a network
to gather information about incoming traffic. By sending the gathered information via
a fast path to an internal detection service, they report up to ten times faster detection
of DDoS attacks in the IoT. To detect an IoT DDoS attack, the edge system records
the arrival time of a packet and compares the timestamp with the arrival time of the
previous packet. The time difference is referred to as the inter-packet spacing and is
checked against expected values for HTTP request rate and UDP transmission rate.
If the inter-packet spacing drops below a specified threshold, an alert is raised. The
use of computational resources at the edge of a network, to monitor traffic and accel-
erate detection, is an interesting and novel approach, however, has some limitations.
For example, in large networks with multiple points of ingress/egress, the edge service
would need to be deployed in multiple locations. Additionally, routing traffic internally
may have an impact on the speed at which detection alerts can be sent to the internal
detection system.
Lee at al. [111] present a lightweight intrusion detection system for detecting DoS
attacks in 6LoWPAN WSNs. Interestingly, they used the energy consumption of a node
to determine if activity within the network should be classified as normal or malicious.
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They used a DoS attack to force a target node to be in a constant state of receive,
causing it to increase the energy it uses. Nodes with irregular energy consumption
were used to identify malicious activity. The work was similar to the approach used in
[112], however, Lee’s proposed detection scheme used both route-over and mesh under
routing schemes to detect malicious nodes. The detection scheme did not take into
account the position of a node within the network, and therefore genuine differences in
energy consumption that may exist. For example, a sensor node that is locate near to
a sink node (one hop away from it) will likely consume energy differently than other
nodes because they have to receive and transmit packets from and to other nodes.
2.2 Situational Awareness
A multitude of definitions and interpretations exist to explain the concept of Situational
Awareness [113]. At the most basic level, the term is understood to mean the process
of acquiring knowledge about the things going on around us [114]. The concept and use
of the term is thought to have been birthed within a military context, when it was used
to describe the theory of military grouping. Alberts et al. [115] describe situational
awareness as:
“the awareness of a situation that exists in part or all of the battlespace at
a particular point in time. In some instances, information on the trajectory
of events that preceded the current situation may be of interest, as well as
insight into how the situation is likely to unfold. The components of a situ-
ation include missions and constraints on missions (e.g. ROE), capabilities
and intentions of relevant forces, and key attributes of the environment. ”
Although clearly a definition contextualised to provide meaning and understanding in
military planning, if slightly sanitised the definition can be used to provide meaning to
a wider range of contexts.
“the awareness of a situation that exists ... [A]t a particular point in time.
In some instances, information on the trajectory of events that preceded the
current situation may be of interest, as well as insight into how the situation
is likely to unfold .... ”1
This new sanitised definition provides a clearer understanding of the concept and aids
the identification of correlations between the theories and models presented in the next
section. It is important to note that in both definitions the emphasis on time remains,
and is used to allow anticipation of the future, given the current situation. Tadda et
1Note: Ellipsis points used to represent an omission from the original quote
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al. [113] highlight the importance of time in the original definition explaining that it
allows the use of past experience and knowledge to identify, analyse, and understand
the current situation and the projection of possible futures. They contend that this
empowers a person to maintain awareness, make decisions, and take action to influence
the environment in the future, resulting in an endless cycle of update, decision and
action.
2.2.1 Situational Awareness (SA) Theories and Models
In [116] Stanton et al. suggest that three main theories exist to explain situational
awareness: Endsley’s Three level model [117], Bedny et al. Interactive Sub-systems
model [118], and Smith et al. Perceptual Cycle [119]. Stanton suggests that Endsley’s
model focuses more on the perception and understanding of the environment, with
less focus placed on projecting the future. Smith places the focus on the interaction
between the person and the world. Finally, Bedny emphasises the role of reflection in
situational awareness. When applied to the cyber domain it should be noted that any
proposed model should not promote a serial process, but rather a parallel one [113].
Elements in a cyber environment are dynamic and constantly changing, therefore, a
model is required which provides continuous updates to and from each layer. Of the
three models presented, Endsley’s model is most suited to the research in this thesis
since it fits this criteria, whereas the two competing models place unequal emphasis in
a single area. Endley’s model will now be discussed further.
From a review of the existing literature, definitions of situational awareness (SA) can
often be traced back to the seminal work presented by Endsley in [117]. A study was
presented which investigated if enhancing SA in aircraft pilots could increase their like-
lihood of making optimal decisions in dynamic situations. In [1] the author continued
the work and presented a SA theoretical model, applicable across a variety of envi-
ronments and systems, beyond aviation. Here, the author defines SA as a person’s
state of knowledge about a dynamic environment. Specifically, their perception of ele-
ments in the local environment, the comprehension of their meaning and relevance to
the person’s goals, and a projection of future states of the environment based on this
understanding. The SA model presented by Endsley in [1] is considered of central im-
portance to SA research, and has therefore been widely adopted as a reference model,
and subsequently applied to a broad range of research areas. The model is composed
of three levels, namely Perception, Comprehension and Projection which combine and
contribute to achieving a level of awareness in a given situation. At the first level of
the model (Perception), Endsley described how a pilot would perceive elements in the
environment, such as aircraft instrumentation, control of the aircraft and other aircraft
in the vicinity. The model emphasises that at this level no interpretation of information
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is required, rather it is collected from a range of sources [116]. At the second level of
the model (Comprehension), the pilot synthesises all the information collected at the
previous stage to understand the significance of each element and its relationship to
other elements. For example, the amount of time it will take to travel a certain dis-
tance, and if the aircraft has sufficient fuel to make the journey. Finally, at the third
level (Projection) the pilot uses the synthesised information from the previous level to
predict how the elements will affect the future, predict likely scenarios that may occur,
and make the appropriate decision at that moment in time.
Again, if the definition provided by Endsley is slightly sanitised it can be used to provide
meaning to a wider range of contexts, and be defined as:
1. Perception: the consciousness of relevant elements in the environment, specifically
the status, attributes, and dynamics of elements in relation to the environment.
2. Comprehension: the synthesis of the seemingly disjointed elements at level 1, to
understand their significance, fuse together to derive meaning and patterns, and
foster a holistic understanding of the environment.
3. Projection: the ability to project the current situation of the environment into
the future, predict the likely subsequent actions of elements, ultimately allowing
better decisions to made in dynamic situations.
Endsley highlighted the importance of system design when trying to improve situational
awareness. She proposed a set of interface design guidelines, which were succinctly
summarised by Stanton et al. [116] as:
1. Reduce the requirements for people to make calculations.
2. Present data in a manner that makes level 2 SA (understanding) and level 3 SA
(projection) easier.
3. Organise information in a manner that is consistent with the persons goals.
4. Indicators of the current mode or status of the system can help to cue the appro-
priate situational awareness.
5. Critical cues should be provided to capture attention during critical events.
6. Global situational awareness is supported by providing an overview of the situa-
tion across the goals of the operator.
7. System-generated support for projection of future events and states will support
level 3 SA.
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8. System design should be multi-modal and present data from different sources
together rather than sequentially in order to support parallel processing of infor-
mation
In [120] McGuiness et al. extended Endsley’s model to include an additional level,
defined as Resolution. Here, the aim is to establish the best course of action to take to
change the current situation to the desired state. Resolution is achieved by considering
all possible actions from a range, and selecting the most appropriate course of action
accordingly [113]. Tadda et al. [113] suggest that both models represent a parallel
process not serial. They contest that information at each level of the model continuously
updates the other levels, moving information and understanding throughout the levels
to achieve a state of situational awareness in the moment.
2.2.2 Cyber Situational Awareness (CSA)
When applied to the Cyber domain, Cyber Situational Awareness (CSA) can be defined
as the compilation, processing and fusing of network data to understand a network envi-
ronment and accurately predict and respond to potential threats that might occur [20].
As previously mentioned, network security monitoring can be traced back to Ander-
son’s [75] seminal work analysing security logs for anomalies. Denning [76] continued
this work producing a framework which focused on the detection of cyber attacks, lead-
ing to the Joint Directors Laboratories (JDL) creating a conceptual data fusion model
which identified the processes, functions, categories, and specific techniques applicable
to data fusion [121]. Drawing similarities to Endsley’s model it defined levels for Data
Assessment, Object Assessment, Situation Assessment, Threat Refinement, and Process
refinement. Importantly, it highlighted the importance of human elements in achieving
SA. In [113] Tadda et al. combined the JDL Data Fusion model with Endsley’s SA
model to propose a Situational Awareness model applicable to the Cyber domain. The
authors addressed the differences between level 2 and 3 of the JDL model and Ends-
ley’s Projection level. In doing so, they argued that a computer system is capable of
identifying the occurrence of an activity based on priori knowledge and cannot itself
develop or provide Situation Awareness; only a person (the decision maker) can derive
the awareness. They drew comparisons between the two models and asserted that level
2 of the JDL model and Endsley’s Comprehension level address the current situation.
Whereas, level 3 of the JDL model and Endsley’s Projection level address the ability
to project the current situation into the future, in order to predict future impacts and
threats. Essentially, they propose splitting level 2 and 3 JDL assessments based on
time rather than functionality. Other prominent researchers in the Cyber domain have
used these models, in particular Endsley’s model, to further research in this area. In
[122] Onwubiko identifies the functional attributes of situational awareness for network
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and cyber security. A SA model for network security is presented and ten fundamental
attributes are suggested, which the author proposes should be considered when im-
plementing any SA system in the domain. In [2] the author extended the work and
presented an adapted version of Endsley’s SA reference model [1]. The model incorpo-
rated Endsley’s initial levels Perception, Comprehension and Projection and also the
fourth level Resolution proposed by McGuiness et al. [120]. The proposed Cyber SA
Instantiation Model overlays Endsley’s model but is generalised to be applicable across
the Cyber domain. An additional fifth awareness level is presented and fuses with the
previous four levels as follows:
0. Information Generating Sources: Log sources such as event logs, which are evi-
dence of an attack or exploit, but are unable to detect an attack without functions
from the subsequent levels.
1. Perceive: use of individual tool-kits to gather raw data from Level 0 about per-
ceived situations in the network. Information is classified into meaningful rep-
resentations to form the basis for comprehension. Four distinct sources of infor-
mation are identified which contribute to this level namely, Protection sources,
Threat Intelligence sources, Tracking sources, External Intel sources.
2. Comprehend: use of analysis tools and techniques to continually analyse and
synthesise information from Level 1. Fusions of disparate events and correlation of
information from multiple sources, to link evidence and gain an holistic overview
of the situation.
3. Project: analysed intelligence once comprehended, can be used to predict fu-
ture events and situations. Performed as a real-time continuous process, allows
possible mitigation’s against threats to be recommended.
4. Resolve: recover and resolve situations using mitigation strategies identified in
level 3. Coordination is required for triage, investigation, classification, and pri-
oritisation in order to resolve, remedy, and recover events and Cyber situations.
SA when applied to the Cyber domain is still relatively immature as a research area.
The general models discussed here, and adapted versions for the Cyber domain, how-




A conversational agent is a software agent that interacts with users using natural lan-
guage [123]. Often referred to as a Chatbot, Bot, Virtual Assistant or Digital Assistant,
they use a dialogue system to assist users to complete tasks through aural or verbal
interactions. Indeed, Furey et al. [124], suggest that voice controlled IoT devices have
become ubiquitous in homes and offer individuals many convenient and entertaining
features.
The history of conversational agents is often traced back to 1950 when Alan Turing, a
pioneer for computer science, posed the question “Can machines think?” [125]. In doing
so, Turing was attempting to address the problem of artificial intelligence, and define
a standard for machine intelligence. Turing acknowledged that this question would be
difficult to answer, so refined it to be less ambiguous “Can a computer communicate
in a way indistinguishable from a human?” [126]. In the same article he outlined
a test which could be used to answer this question, and determine in a conversation
whether a person was speaking to a human or a computer. The idea was simple:
for a machine to pass the Turing Test, it must exhibit behaviour indistinguishable
from that of a human being. In many ways, this was the beginning of conversational
agents and artificial intelligence, mapping a path for developers to create the ultimate
conversational experience. Figure 2.4 shows a timeline of prominent conversational
agents since Turing published in article in Computing Machinery and Intelligence [125].
Eliza. The first notable agent (Eliza)1 was developed in 1966 by Joseph Weizenbaum
[127]. The program was able to convince some users they were talking with a human,
however, ultimately failed to pass the Turing test [126]. The program provided a
foundation for future agents, adopting the use of keywords, specific phrases, and pre-
programmed responses.
Parry. Six years after Eliza, Parry was developed. A conversational agent taking on
the persona of a person exhibiting traits of schizophrenia. Developed by psychiatrist
Kenneth Colby, Parry was programmed to misinterpret a users answers, suspecting
the user was concealing hidden motives, and consistently deflected their inquiries to
simulate paranoid thinking. Parry was interviewed by several expert mental health
professionals, who could not distinguish its linguistic behaviour from that of paranoid
patients [128].
Jabberwacky. Although many computer scientists were intrigued by Turing’s ques-




developed in late 1980s, and was designed to simulate natural human conversations in
an entertaining manner. The agent worked by storing important sections of conversa-
tions and used contextual pattern matching techniques to find the most appropriate
response.
Dr Sabaitso. A milestone in the development of conversational agents occurred in
1992, with the introduction of the first agent able to synthesise speech. Powered by a
Creative Labs Sound Blaster sound card, it communicated aurally with users, giving
the appearance of more human features than its predecessors [126].
Alice. Three years later, Richard Wallace developed the Artificial Linguistic Inter-
net Computer Entity, more commonly known as Alice. Created in AIML (Artificial
Intelligence Markup Language) the architecture split the chatbot engine, and language
knowledge model, to provide extensibility for alternative language knowledge models
to be plugged in [123]. Although unable to pass the Turing test, the agent was highly
regarded, receiving a number of awards for being the most advanced agent of its time.
SmarterChild & Watson. The early 2000s saw a number of agents introduced, with
different emphasis. Notably, SmarterChild an intelligent agent heavily used by users of
MSN Messenger and AOL. The agent was designed to be a fun, personalised experience,
and is regarded by many to be the precursor to Apple’s Siri conversational agent.
Around the same time IBM’s Watson also appeared, built to compete at a human
champion level on the American TV quiz show Jeopardy, beating two former champions
[129]. In addition to its question-answering accuracy, the agent was also designed
with speed, confidence estimation, and clue selection built in to improve its chances of
winning.
Development of conversational agents continued to grow steadily, due in part to Tur-
ing’s original questions, and also inspired by a global competition formed in 1990, run
by ASIB - The Society for the Study of Artificial Intelligence and the Simulation of
Behaviour1. The Loebner Prize was sponsored by Hugh Loebner, an American inven-
tor, with the intention of implementing the Turing test and finding the first computer
that could generate responses indistinguishable from those of a human [130]. A second
notable prize was added in 2017 by Amazon who have fully embraced the voice comput-
ing era stating “The way humans interact with machines is at an inflection point and
conversational artificial intelligence (AI) is at the center of the transformation”. Shar-
ing similarities with the Loebner prize, the Alexa Prize was established to accelerate
the field of conversational AI, providing a platform for university students to showcase































Figure 2.4: Conversational Agent Timeline
Alexa prize the developed agents do not try to pass as human, but rather assume the
role of an assistant, focusing on conversing through fluent and enjoyable interactions
[131].
The agents discussed so far provided the foundation for arguably the most important
decade in the history of conversational agents. The decade between 2010-2020 has
produced seismic advances in conversational agent development, fuelled in large part by
artificial intelligence. James Vlahos suggests that while IBM may have dominated the
mainframe era; Microsoft the desktop computer; Google monopolised Internet search;
and Apple and Facebook revolutionised mobile computing, we are now entering a new
era, the era of voice computing [131]. One in which personified AI assumes the role of
helper, oracle and friend, to enable us to control any, and every piece of technology. The
growing popularity of conversational agents cannot be understated, with agents widely
adopted by a range of companies, producing Microsoft’s Cortana, Apple’s Siri, Google’s
Assistant, and arguably the most popular, Amazon’s Alexa. Devices such as Amazon’s
Echo and its conversational agent Alexa, provide opportunities to build feature rich
conversational interactions. Simply put, voice controlled agents are considered the
realisation of science fiction, the dream of interacting with computers by talking to
them [132]
Siri. This new era of voice computing was started at an event in 2011 called Let’s
Talk iPhone, when Apple released the agent it had been working on called Siri. Sadly,
Apple CEO Steve Jobs didn’t get to see the evolution of voice computing, dying from
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pancreatic cancer the day after Siri was released. The inventor of Siri, Adam Cheyer had
worked on fifty predecessors of Siri, before finally releasing a personable, conversational
being that interacted in natural language, and could connect with other programs and
services to retrieve information or accomplish tasks [131]. Built on a modular and
expandable architecture, the agent was taught to grasp the overall intent of a given
utterance (speech request) rather than learn all the rules of language such as nouns
and verbs, parsing every single word which is a labour intensive process.
Google Now (later known as Assistant). Google quickly followed in 2012 with Google
Now, a voice activated search facility, which was platform agnostic and allowed users
to search the web and perform a variety of tasks such as scheduling events and posting
to social media. Branding was later phased out, and functionality incorporated into
the newly branded Google Assistant in 2016 with the launch of Google Home. A smart
speaker capable of engaging in conversation with users and assisting the automation of
tasks.
Alexa. In 2011, Amazon CEO Jeff Bezos, an ardent Star Trek fan, charged his chief
technical advisor Greg Hart with the task of building the first voice only computer.
Project Doppler, a secret Amazon project exploring conversational AI was established,
and acquired three companies Yap, Evi and Ivona which specialised in speech recogni-
tion [131]. The acquired technology was used to create a small cylindrical device with
six directional microphones, capable of being triggered using a Wake Word, initially
known as Flash, but later launched in 2015 as Echo. Powered by a conversational agent
known as Alexa, the device was able to fully converse with a user and work on their
behalf to retrieve information from the Internet and automate a variety of tasks such
as playing music and ordering a pizza.
Cortana. A noticeable absentee from the list so far is Microsoft. In 2015, they
launched Cortana their first foray into the field of voice computing and conversational
agents. Development initially start in 2009, under Zig Serafin and Larry Heck, and was
designed as an assistant to help schedule a daily routine and find information on the
Internet. Although perhaps late to the game, Microsoft have been quick to accelerate
their exploration of conversational agents with XiaoIce. Following the success of Mat-
tel’s Hello Barbie, Microsoft have been quick to explore the use of agents for affective
computing, exploring the development of emotional connections between a user and an
agent [131]. XiaoIce was designed as a “Friend” to teenagers, powered with emotional
intelligence, recognising not only the expressed request, but detecting the sentiment,
in order to respond with the correct emotional response. Indeed, personification - the
attribution of a personal nature or human characteristics to something inanimate, is a
growing field of research within voice computing and conversational agents, generating
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interesting research such as [133].
Tay. While great advancements in agent design have been experienced recently,
developers are still cautious about how much autonomy should be granted to an agent.
A case in point is Tay, a Twitter based agent developed by Microsoft and powered
by unsupervised machine learning. Launched in 2016, the agent caused controversy
when it began to post tweets using inflammatory and offensive language [131, 134].
The agent had been targeted by mischievous users, who were quick to test its ability to
learn by engaging it in controversial conversations, which it duly learnt and included
in subsequent responses.
Further concerns exist relating to security and privacy, in particular in voice activated
agents such as Google Assistant and Amazon’s Alexa [131, 124]. Although devices such
as Amazon’s Echo have been shown to support a number of security features, preser-
vation of privacy is reliant on the user implementing the measures in order to protect
their own data. In addition, anecdotal evidence by Artem Russakovskii, highlights the
issue of “accidental recordings”, something Google acknowledged as phantom events,
and assured had been fixed. The question of privacy still largely remains, and continues
to be a topic of interest for future researchers.
Despite these concerns, research into the use of conversational agents is growing, and
producing some very promising applications and use-cases. Indeed, Io et al. [135]
believe more businesses should explore the use of agents, and suggest the benefits could
expand beyond business to education, psychology and linguistics. Paikari et al. [136]
also see the potential of agents suggesting that even though at present the number
of agents using voice input and spoken output is still relatively small, this method of
interaction will become increasingly more prevalent. However, not all researchers agree
with these sentiments, suggesting voice controlled agents may be limited to simple
tasks, and struggle to execute more complex tasks, such as searching databases and
requesting inter library loans [132].
Rajalakshmi et al. [137] successfully demonstrated the potential of conversational
agents by presenting a system using Amazon’s Alexa and Node-Red, a simple and
powerful automation platform, to interconnect and control numerous IoT devices. The
agent provided the ability to switch smart lightbulbs on/off, monitor iPhone statistics,
and used voice commands to control a heater. The research offered a lot of promise in
the area, however a lack of detail made it difficult to fully assess the functionality.
Yue et al. [138] proposed a smart home system using the Reverb and Telegram mobile
apps to control smart appliances in the home. The reverb app was used to send voice
commands to the Alexa Voice Service in AWS, which interfaced with a local raspberry
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pi, to switch a device on/off. The Telegram app was used to send commands via text,
and perform similar tasks. Functionality was limited, but returned positive results,
demonstrating good promise in this area.
Solorio et al. [139] proposed a voice activated semi-autonomous utility vehicle. The
authors successfully managed to adapt a lawnmower, which could be controlled using
the Alexa Voice Service in AWS, moving in four directions, at five different speeds. The
adapted vehicle was fitted with ultrasonic sensors for obstacle avoidance, and testing
returned impressive results. The research clearly demonstrated the potential for future
applications in the area of automated mowing and transportation.
In [140] the authors proposed a system to automate detection notifications from a
security camera. The Sbot agent was deployed on Facebook Messenger and utilised a
backend Human Detection Server, linked to a smart camera, to monitor zones within a
property. When a human passed in front of the camera, the detection engine generated
a notification message, and used the agent to deliver the information to the user via
Facebook. Results showed the system to be 95.7% accurate in an indoor environment,
and 91.2% accurate outdoors. The dialogue used by the agent was quite limited, but
did demonstrate the potential of using agents to assist users secure a property.
The next generation of conversational agents were proposed in [141]. A multi-modal
dialogue system was developed to combine multiple user input modes, such as speech,
touch and verbal/non verbal gestures. The authors proposed a system which used a
camera and Microsoft Kinect device to receive speech and gesture input commands,
which were processed and stored in a knowledgebase. The application of the system
was unclear, however future use cases were suggested including, educational assistance,
robotics and home automation.
Reis et al. [142] proposed the use of conversational agents to assist the elderly. The
authors suggested that agents could be used to combat social isolation amongst elderly
people. Microsoft’s Cortana, Apple’s Siri, Google’s Assistant, and Amazon’s Alexa,
were tested for their ability to complete tasks to improve the issue of social isolation.
Each assistant was tested for functionality, and their ability to provide a basic greeting,
email management, social media, and social games. The results presented were incon-
clusive, but did demonstrate the range of applications, and problems, conversational
agents could be used to address.
Kerly et al. [143] investigated the use of conversational agents in E-Learning, presenting
two examples of agents used to provide learning support and self assessment. They
argued that the use of natural language agents in education allowed a user to focus
their cognitive efforts on learning the task at hand, rather than expending energy on
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the communication medium being used. CALMsystem used an agent to assist a user
to assess their understanding of a topic using a natural conversation. The second agent
TeachBot was designed to assist a user to consolidate their knowledge of a subject and
provide advice about completing tasks, such as writing an essay. In post trial results
users reported finding the systems helpful, easy to use and fun.
Shepherd et al.[144, 145] explored the use of avatars, to investigate if affective feedback
could be used to improve awareness of end-user security. Specifically, if human-like
agents could use subtle facial cues to improve awareness of risks, and encourage users
to in engage in more secure behaviour. Previous studies [146] had identified six basic
emotions that could be used to provide affective feedback in a given situation: happi-
ness, anger, sadness, fear, disgust, and surprise. Shepherd et al. used happiness and
sadness to denote positive and negative feedback accordingly, demonstrating the user
human-like avatars to be an effective method of enhancing a users general awareness
of security risks. The results presented by Shepherd et al. [145] provide a strong case
for exploring if agents with human-like features could be used to address the lack of
awareness of threats suggested by Legg [3].
Finally, some interesting research was conducted in [133] which investigated the per-
sonification of conversational agents, such as the Amazon Echo. They found 30% of
customers would like to treat the Amazon Echo as a human character due to its per-
sonified name (Alexa) and ability to talk. It is clear from the research presented, that
conversational agents offer a wide range of use cases and applications. The willingness
of users to adopt this new method of interacting with devices and information is likely
to promote wider use in the future, presenting interesting opportunities to researchers.
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2.4 Conclusions
In this chapter, existing literature relevant to the research presented in this thesis, was
reviewed. It is clear that the IoT is a novel paradigm with the potential to revolutionise
large sections of everyday life. However, the literature also demonstrated that many
smart devices found within consumer homes are vulnerable and can be easily leveraged
to perform large scale attacks. In particular, the evidence suggested IoT botnets are
becoming increasingly more common and sophisticated in their effectiveness and ability
to exploit basic security vulnerabilities in consumer IoT devices, and obfuscate their
activity.
Intrusion detection was shown to be a topic of growing research, particularly when
used to detect malware targeting the IoT. More specifically, when used as a form of
passive network monitoring, in which traffic is examined at a packet level and results
of the analysis are logged. However, output from Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS)
is typically designed for expert interpretation, making it difficult for non-technical
users to harness the power of these systems. Despite this limitation, an IDS can play
an important role in supporting consumers to manage their home networks and smart
devices. Since many of the attacks discussed in this chapter often target consumer-level
smart products, which commonly lack a screen or user interface, it can be difficult for
users to identify signs of infection and be aware of devices that have been compromised.
An IDS can, therefore, be used as a background monitoring tool, passing output to a
user-friendly front-end system, for interpretation by non-technical users.
The existing research demonstrated Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) to be an ef-
fective countermeasure against botnet activity when observing and identifying active
attacks and vulnerabilities in network traffic [74]. Of particular interest was research in
[100] which presented a LSTM-RNN used in conjunction with word embedding to detect
the presence of malware. As discussed, the appeal of using a RNN for malware detection
is their ability to connect information from previous packets to the present state and
inform the understanding of the present packet. In addition, the use of LSTM-RNN
can overcome the problem of long-term dependencies, and when used in conjunction
with word embedding can be used to provide a method of extracting semantic meaning
from information within a packet. However, the existing research performed detection
by aggregating network traffic into flows of communication [97, 98, 99], likely collected
using a flow collector such as NetFlow or sFlow. Since the aim of this research is it to
investigate threat detection in consumer IoT networks, it is unlikely that SOHO routers
would be equipped to collect flow information, therefore, detection would be required
at the packet level. A gap in the literature is therefore identified, concerning the use
of LSTM-RNN with word embedding to extract semantic meaning from packets, and
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perform deep packet inspection. This will be the topic of investigation in Chapter 4.
A second objective of this thesis is to investigate user awareness and perception of
threats within the IoT, in order to promote better situational awareness of risks relating
to security and privacy. A number of theories and models were discussed [120, 113, 147],
however since the aim is to improve awareness, the additional Resolution level used in
some models is considered out of the scope of this research. Therefore, Endsley’s
definition of situational awareness is adopted for use in this thesis and is contextualised
for Cyber Situational Awareness (CSA). Since Endsley highlighted the importance
of system design when trying to improve situational awareness, the interface design
guidelines, which were succinctly summarised by Stanton [116] will be considered when
this topic is investigated in Chapters 5-7.
The ultimate objective of this thesis is to investigate if conversational agents can be
used as a mechanism to improve Cyber Situational Awareness. It is clear from the
literature that recent advancements in technology have produced a range of power-
ful conversational agents, able to fully converse with users to respond to requests or
automate a variety of tasks. Numerous interesting examples of agents being used to
assist users were identified in the literature. Of particular interest was [141] which pre-
sented a multi-modal dialogue system to assist users. Indeed, Amazon also recognise
the potential of multi-modal agents, encouraging developers to develop agents1 that
combine other modalities (vision, touch) with voice controlled Alexa agents. Interest-
ingly, Endsley also suggested a multi-modal approach for system design could improve
situational awareness [116]. Therefore, having reviewed the existing literature, a gap is
identified regarding the use of conversational agents for threat detection and network
monitoring, specifically the use of multi-modal agents to aid situational awareness of
threats in consumer IoT networks.
In the next chapter, the research methods used throughout this thesis are introduced.
Many of the quantitative and qualitative techniques are repeated in several chapters,
however, will be presented in the next chapter for ease of reference. Also, by outlining a






In Chapter 2 relevant literature related to this research was reviewed. The litera-
ture was chosen due to its relevance to the central research question addressed in this
thesis: namely if situational awareness of threats in the Internet of Things could be
improved using conversational agents. This question was further broken down into
four sub-questions, each addressing a different but related aspect of the research. This
chapter introduces the research methods used throughout this thesis to answer the
central research question. Many of the techniques are repeated in several chapters to
ensure a level of consistency between studies when addressing the sub-questions in the
subsequent chapters.
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter, the techniques used throughout this research are introduced. The
central focus of the research question investigates an increasingly important aspect
of human behaviour, namely awareness of security threats. In behavioural research
empirical investigations can be broadly categorised into three groups: descriptive in-
vestigations, relational investigations, and experimental investigations [148]. Descrip-
tive investigations allow a researcher to observe phenomenon, relational investigations
enable the identification of relations between multiple factors, and experimental inves-
tigations can help determine the casual effect between two factors [149]. The research
presented in this thesis combines multiple investigations presented in Chapters 4-7, each
of which detail a separate, but related study, addressing one of the four sub research
questions outlined in Section 1.2.1. This chapter begins by discussing the adopted re-
search philosophy before continuing to describe methods and data analysis techniques
used throughout this thesis.
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3.2 Research Philosophy
Each researcher holds a set of beliefs about the world and nature of reality. An un-
derstanding of these philosophical perspectives can help a researcher gain an under-
standing of the wider philosophical perspective underlying the research, and also aid
in choosing the appropriate research methods to use [150]. There are four main trends
of research philosophy: positivism, interpretivism, pragmatism and realism. Positivist
studies incorporate formal propositions, quantifiable measures of variables, hypothe-
ses testing and the drawing of inferences about a phenomenon from the sample to a
stated population. In contrast, interpretive studies assume that people create and as-
sociate their own subjective meanings as they interact with the world around them,
therefore researchers attempt to understand phenomenon through accessing meanings
that participants assign to them. [151]. In pragmatism researchers have the freedom
to choose the methods, techniques, and procedures that best meet their needs and
scientific research aims. Realism is based on the principles of positivist and Interpre-
tivist research philosophies [150]. Chapters 4 - 7 use quantitative approaches since
the studies attempt to quantify variables, test hypotheses and use control groups to
mitigate confounding variables and enhance scientific rigour. However, in Chapters 5
- 7 qualitative approaches are also adopted to elicit subjective meanings when assess-
ing participants perception and awareness of threats facing smart devices. Therefore,
the research contained within this thesis draws upon both a positivist and interpre-




Specifying the optimal number of participants for a usability study continues to be a
topic of hot debate [153]. A widely accepted view within HCI is that five users will find
approximately 80% of usability problems and is therefore sufficient for most usability
testing [154]. Other research studies however have found that the appropriate num-
ber of users is dependent on the size of the project, with seven users being suggested
as the optimal number in a small project [155]. For comparative studies where stati-
cally significant findings are being sought, a group size of 8-25 participants is typically
valid [153]. Participants were required for three of the studies in this thesis and were,
therefore, recruited in accordance with these suggestions. In Chapter 5 the aim was to
analyse a range of views from a wide audience, to assess how users value and perceive
security and privacy in smart devices found within the IoT. An online study was chosen
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for format flexibility, and to allow access to different populations [156]. Participants
were informed that consent to participate was implied when they decided to engage
in the research and complete the online study. In Chapter 6 the aim was to assess
the viability of conversational agents for improving awareness of threats facing smart
devices. Convenience sampling was employed, with participants selected due to their
convenient accessibility, and proximity to the author. Participants were recruited at
University events open to the public to ensure a wide range of views were collected and
oversampling of a specific demographic did not occur. This seemed appropriate since
research into human-computer interaction often uses a more focused population [149].
Since randomisation is an important element of a well-designed experiment [157], par-
ticipants were therefore randomly assigned to two groups (Control and Intervention).
In Chapter 7 the aim was to assess the utility of the conversational agents tested in the
previous chapter. In compliance with [155] [153] a suitably sized sample of users was
recruited, and again randomly assigned to two groups (Control and Intervention). In
addition to protect against confounding the authors in [157] suggest randomising other
factors of the study. Here, confounding is defined as when the effect of one factor or
treatment cannot be distinguished from that of another factor or treatment [157]. This
approach was used in [158] where the researchers found it necessary to randomise the
order of the scenarios being used in an experiment. If the order of the scenarios was
not randomised, there was a possibility that one scenario could influence the results
of the next. To avoid such an occurrence in the studies of this thesis, the order of
conversational agent use in study two and three was randomised. Four participants
used the aural agent to complete study two, while the remaining four participants used
the verbal agent. Agent use for study three was reversed.
3.3.2 Use-Case Development
To evaluate the use of conversational agents for improving situational awareness a set
of use-cases were devised, each representing a realistic description of how a user might
want to use the conversational agents for monitoring smart device and network activ-
ity. These were formulated from existing literature [3], which provided discussion and
insight about user engagement with tools designed to improve cyber situational aware-
ness. From the use-cases it was then possible to build a range of different scenarios,
which could be used to evaluate the agents in Chapter 6 and 7. The use of scenarios
is widely used in a range of areas, such as the military, theatre and software develop-
ment [159]. The ability to have different scenarios to represent the same use-case was
important in order to avoid confounding variables or adding bias into the research. If a
participant had seen a scenario in a previous study it may effect their decision making
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or performance. Using different scenarios to represent the same use-case ensured confi-
dence in the reliability of the collected data. The developed use-cases used for Chapter
6 are presented in Table 3.1 and the additional use-cases for Chapter 7 in Table 3.2.
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Table 3.1: Uses-Cases Chapter 6
Use Case
uc1 In the first scenario, a user is not aware of any threats or unusual activity
within the network, and would simply like to request a summary of all
activity taking place today.
uc2 In the second scenario, a user suspects a threat or unusual activity has
occurred within the network. They invoked the intent associated with
the first scenario and have been told there has been no unusual activity
today. The user proceeds to query the database for unusual activity on
a different date (perhaps yesterday).
uc3 In the third scenario, a user suspects a threat or unusual activity has
occurred within the network, on a specified date. They suspect a specific
device may be causing the problem, so proceed to query the database
for unusual activity on a specified date, by the given source device.
uc4 In the fourth scenario, a user suspects a threat or unusual activity has
occurred within the network, on a specified date. They are unsure which
device has caused the problem, so proceed to query the database for the
first unusual activity on the specified date. The intention is to identify
more information about the specific device which may be causing the
problem.
uc5 In the fifth scenario, a user suspects a threat or unusual activity has
occurred within the network, on a specified date. They have invoked
other intents to query the database, and now suspect they know when a
threat or unusual activity took place. They now query the database to
get full details of the activity ID of when the unusual activity occurred.
uc6 ± In the sixth scenario, a user suspects a threat or unusual activity has
occurred within the network. They are not sure which smart devices
have been active and are possibly compromised. They now query the
database to get a list of all active source devices on a specified date.
uc7 ± In the seventh scenario, previously compromised smart devices have been
fixed, but the user would now like to check if network activity has re-
turned back to normal for the last three days. They query the database
to check if total network activity has been normal and consistent over
the last three days.
± not used in pilot study
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Table 3.2: Additional Uses-Cases Chapter 7
Use Case
uc8 In the eighth scenario, previously compromised smart devices have been
fixed, but the user would now like to monitor the activity level of specific
smart device’s on the network. They query the database to check if
specific smart device activity has been normal and consistent over the
last three days.
uc9 In the ninth scenario, previously compromised smart devices have been
fixed. They invoked the intent associated with the eigth scenario and
found the smart device activity level to be normal. They would now
like to be able to identify future risks by monitoring all Smart Device
activity levels over several days, to establish normal daily activity levels
for each device.
Table 3.3 demonstrates the scenarios used for each study in Chapter 6 and 7, and how
they map to the nine use-cases which were developed. The scenarios devised for each
use-case in Chapter 6 are described in Appendix D.1, while the scenarios devised for
each use-case in Chapter 7 are described in Appendix D.2 - D.5.
Table 3.3: Use-case to Scenario mapping
uc1 uc2 uc3 uc4 uc5 uc6 uc7 uc8 uc9 Append
C
h
6 Pilot sc1 sc2 sc3 sc4 sc5 - - - - D.1




Study 1 sc8 sc11 sc12 sc10 sc13 sc9 sc15 sc14 sc16 D.2
Study 2 sc17 sc20 sc21 sc19 sc22 sc18 sc24 sc23 sc25 D.3
Study 3 sc26 sc29 sc30 sc28 sc31 sc27 sc33 sc32 sc34 D.4
Study 4 sc35 sc38 sc39 sc37 sc40 sc36 sc42 sc41 sc43 D.5
Use-Case descriptions found in Tables 3.1 and 3.2
3.3.3 Survey Design and Question selection
Surveys are considered to be one of the most commonly used research methods across
all fields of research [149]. They can be an effective tool when a researcher wishes
to describe a population or explore and explain behaviours [160]. Survey instruments
were used in a number of studies in this thesis (Chapters 5-7) and were delivered
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using LimeSurvey an online survey platform service1. To ensure consistency between
studies the general design, structure and rationale for question selection remained the
same throughout. In this section these general considerations are discussed and the
rationale that informed their adoption highlighted. Deviations from this general design
for individual studies are discussed in the study design section for each chapter. For the
general survey design, consideration was first given to the overall structure. Trusted
guidelines were followed and each survey started with a clear set of instructions [160],
detailing how a respondent should interact with the survey. Related questions were
grouped together into sections to lower cognitive load on respondents, allowing deeper
thought, rather than mentally switching contexts between questions [161]. Debate
exists whether demographic questions should be left until the end of the survey, as these
are the least interesting [160]. However, as some study hypothesis were dependent on
this information, this was considered vital data to collect and was therefore requested at
the start of each survey. Finally, it was important to avoid adding bias into responses,
so care was taken not to prime questions using biased wording [160]. For example, in
Chapters 5-7 the surveys were used to measure participants awareness of threats. To
avoid priming, the word “Awareness” was not used and any occurrence of the word
was substituted for “Appreciation”. By not alerting participants that the study was
measuring their awareness of potential threats, participants would be less likely to
report inflated confidence levels, which is often found as a result of a phenomenon
known as the Hawthorne Effect [162].
3.3.4 Measuring Usability
The performance of anomaly detection techniques are often evaluated from two per-
spectives; efficiency and effectiveness [163]. The International Organisation for Stan-
dardisation (ISO) state “the objective of designing and evaluating systems, products
and services for usability is to enable users to achieve goals effectively, efficiently and
with satisfaction, taking account of the context of use” [164]. ISO 9241-11 specifically
suggests that measures of usability should cover:
• Effectiveness: the consciousness of relevant elements in the environment, specif-
ically the status, attributes, and dynamics of elements in relation to the environ-
ment.;
• Efficiency: the level of resource consumed in performing tasks;
• Satisfaction: users subjective reactions to using the system.
1https://www.limesurvey.org/
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These suggested measures were used to evaluate the viability and utility of the conver-
sational agents in Chapters 6 and 7.
Effectiveness (Accuracy): Precision, Recall and F -Measure
Effectiveness is the measure of a systems ability to distinguish between normal and
intrusive activities. The most common classification application is binary classification.
Within this two-class nature of detection, there are four possible outcomes [165]:
1. True positive (tp): anomalies that are successfully detected
2. False positive (fp): normal activities that are incorrectly classified as intrusive
3. True Negative (tn): normal activities that are successfully classified as normal
4. False Negative (fn): anomalies that are missed and classified as normal
In Chapter 7, measures of accuracy were used to determine if participants had cor-
rectly detected compromised devices using three popular metrics; precision, recall and
F Measure. These metrics ignore the normal data that has been correctly classified
(tn) and are calculated using:
Precision (P): Defined as the % ratio of the number of true positive (tp) records
divided by the sum of true positive (tp) and false positive (fp) classified records.
P = tptp+fp , precision ∈ [0,1]
Recall (R): Defined as the % ratio of number of true positive records divided by the
sum of true positive and false negative (fn) classified records.
R = tptp+fn , recall ∈ [0,1]
F Measure (F1): Defined as the harmonic mean of precision and recall and represents
a balance between them. It is often used to measure the performance of a system when
a single number is preferred [165].
F 1 = 2 · P · RP+R , F Measure ∈ [0,1]
Efficiency (Time): Duration of Detection
The second metric used to measure the usability of the conversational agents in Chapter
7 was efficiency [163]. This again complied with the recommendations stated in ISO
9241-11 [164] for specifications of products to ensure quality, safety and efficiency. The
efficiency of each of the agents was calculated by measuring how long (in seconds) it
took for participants to collect the necessary data about smart device activity and
54
process this into meaningful information which they could use to determine if a threat
had occurred. The Mean, Median and Standard Deviation was calculated for each agent
and compared against a baseline Visual (Vi) method, to see if the use of the agents had
made the process of detecting threats more efficient (quicker). The use of the baseline
Visual (Vi) method was required to ensure a fair comparison was achieved, since as
shown in Chapter 5 without any additional information users find it very difficult to
identify an infected smart device and correctly detect threats. If the efficiency (time) of
detecting threats using the agents was compared with a scenario that did not provide
the user with any additional information, there would be obvious improvement and
result in an unfair comparison. Since in Chapter 5 a visual presentation of information
was found to improve awareness of threats, this modality was used as a baseline metric
for comparison.
Satisfaction: System Usability Score (SUS) Instrument
Originally introduced by John Brooke in 1986, the System Usability Scale (SUS) is a
tool used to measure the usability of systems [164]. The tool is technology agnostic,
non-proprietary, quick and easy to use, and provides a single score which is easy to
understand. Although some excellent alternatives have been created since its release
the SUS continues to be a valuable and robust tool and a good choice for general
usability practitioners [166]. Usability questionnaires were used in Chapter 7 to assess
the utility of each conversational agent (see Appendix G). As suggested by Brooke
participants completed a SUS scale for each agent after having had the opportunity to
use the system, but before any discussion or debriefing took place [164]. Respondents
provided immediate responses to the ten questions and marked the centre point of the
scale if they were unable to respond to a particular item. Participants ranked each
question on a scale from 1 to 5, based on their level of agreement.
The final SUS score was calculated by first determining the sum of each item. The
score contribution for odd numbered questions was adjusted to be the scale position
minus 1. The scale contribution for even numbered questions was adjusted to be 5
minus the scale position. Finally, the sum of the scores was multiplied by 2.5 to obtain
the overall value of system usability.
3.3.5 Measuring Situational Awareness
The SA model presented by Endsley in [1] is considered of central importance to SA
research, and has therefore been widely adopted as a reference model, and subsequently
applied to a broad range of research areas. The model is composed of three levels,
namely Perception, Comprehension and Projection which combine and contribute to
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achieving a level of awareness in a given situation. They can be defined as:
1. Perception: the consciousness of relevant elements in the environment, specifi-
cally the status, attributes, and dynamics of elements in relation to the environ-
ment;
2. Comprehension: the synthesis of the seemingly disjointed elements at level 1,
to understand their significance, fuse together to derive meaning and patterns,
and foster a holistic understanding of the environment;
3. Projection: the ability to project the current situation of the environment into
the future, predict the likely subsequent actions of elements, ultimately allowing
better decisions to be made in dynamic situations.
Although extensions to Endsley’s model have been proposed [120], since the aim of
this thesis is to improve awareness of threats, the additional resolution layer was not
considered relevant for inclusion. Therefore, to measure participants awareness and
confidence to detect threats in Chapters 6 and 7, the SA model presented by Endsley
was adopted. The model was used to explore how well participants could assimi-
late information about events in their environment (Perception), synthesise this into
a meaningful understanding of the situation (Comprehension) and use the knowledge
to identify threats in a network (Projection). Nine confidence statements were created
and mapped to the three levels of Endsley’s model as shown in Table 3.4. For each
statement, participants were asked to indicate their level of agreement using a five-point
Likert scale from Strongly Disagree (1) to Strongly Agree (5). In both studies (Chap-
ters 6-7), a Pre-Study Post-Study methodology was used, therefore the participants
were asked to provide responses before and after using the conversational agents and
differences in their responses compared.
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Table 3.4: Cyber Situational Awareness Statements










pe1 I am confident I can tell which smart devices are using my
home network.
pe2 ± I am confident I can tell how often a smart device is commu-
nicating on my homework, and how much of the available
network bandwidth it is using.
pe3 ± I am confident I can tell which smart devices have the highest











n co1 I am confident I can tell if my network is experiencing a nor-
mal level of device communications and bandwidth usage.
co2 I am confident I can tell if a smart device is functioning
normally.
co3 ± I am confident I can tell if a smart device is using my home








pr1 I am confident I can tell if an attack has taken place on my
home network.
pr2 I am confident I can tell if a smart device on my home net-
work has been compromised.
pr3 ± I am confident I could tell in the future if my home network
or smart device had been compromised.
± not used in Chapter 6 pilot study
Since data collected to measure situational awareness is ordinal (Projection, Compre-
hension and Projection) it is unlikely the data will be normally distributed. Therefore,
ranked based tests will be used, and described in the next section.
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3.4 Data Analysis Techniques
3.4.1 Quantitative Methods
Cronbach’s Alpha
Cronbach’s alpha (α) is commonly used to measure internal consistency (reliability).
The calculated α score would fall in the range [0.0,1.0], and quantifies the degree to
which items on an instrument are correlated with one another [167]. It is most com-
monly used to assess the internal consistency of a questionnaire (or survey) that is made
up of multiple Likert-type scales and items. A reliability coefficient of .70 or higher is
considered “acceptable” [168]. Cronbach’s alpha was used to test the internal consis-
tency of participant SUS responses in Chapter 7, and Situational Awareness scores in
Chapters 6 and 7. For Cronbach Alpha tests the α score is reported.
Wilcoxon Signed-Rank
The Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test is the most commonly used non-parametric test for
paired data. The test determines whether there is a statistically significant difference
in the median of a dependent variable between two related groups. It is the non-
parametric equivalent to the paired t-test. As the Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test does not
assume normality in the differences of the two related groups, it can be used when
this assumption has been violated and the use of a paired t-test is inappropriate[169].
In Chapters 6 and 7 related groups were compared, where participants completed the
same survey Pre and Post-Study, therefore Wilcoxon Signed-Rank tests were used for
comparisons. For Wilcoxon Signed-Rank tests the Z score and p-value are reported,
where a p < .05 is considered significant.
Chi-Squared
Data is considered categorical when it can be placed into distinct categories rather than
being measured as a point on a scale or ranked in order [170]. If the relationship between
two variables is of interest, such as whether they are independent or associated, the
number of observations simultaneously falling into the categories of two variables can be
counted. The chi-square test for independence, also called Pearson’s chi-square test or
the chi-square test of association, can also be used to discover if there is a relationship
between two categorical variables. The assumptions of the Chi-square which must be
met include: degrees of freedom greater than one, randomised samples and independent
observations [171]. In Chapter 5 detection accuracy was measured and dichotomous
data collected. The dependent variable was nominal and the independent variable was
ordinal. To check for relationships between the two variables, Chi-squared tests were
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performed to check for independence. For Chi-Squared tests the chi-squared statistic
value χ2, degrees of freedom df, and p-value are reported, where a p < .05 is considered
significant.
Friedman One-Way Repeated Measure
The Friedman One-Way Repeated Measure is used to test for differences between groups
when the dependent variable being measured is either ordinal or continuous, and where
the data has violated the assumptions necessary to run the one-way ANOVA with re-
peated measures [172]. In studies where the normality or variability of the distributions
was a concern, a Friedman test was selected to avoid yielding misleading results from
an ANOVA [173]. In Chapter 7 efficiency (measured in seconds) of detection using
the conversational agents was measured and compared with a baseline visual method.
The dependent variable (efficiency) was continuous data therefore a Friedman test was
performed to test for differences in the time taken to detect threats. For Friedman
tests the chi-squared statistic value χ2, degrees of freedom df, and p-value are reported,
where a p < .05 is considered significant.
3.4.2 Qualitative Methods
Throughout this research a large amount of data was collected in a variety of different
forms. Quantitative data was analysed using the methods in the previous section
however, the use of survey instruments also resulted in the collection of qualitative
data. In Chapters 5-7 the surveys included open-ended questions which enabled a range
of rich responses to be collected. In Chapter 7 short structured Post-Study interviews
were conducted, resulting in data which required to be transcribed. In Chapter 6
feedback about the agents use and effectiveness was collected and exported in csv
format. Before any data could be analysed, it was important to first ensure everything
was converted into a common format (csv), ready for analysis in a qualitative data
analysis package called NVivo 1. To analyse the data a form of thematic analysis
known as template analysis was chosen. This method of qualitative analysis is often
used when a researcher has some prior understanding of the concepts to be identified.
In this approach hierarchical coding is used and a coding template is created, which
summarises the data into themes, and organises them in a meaningful and useful manner
[174]. The coding template is usually created from a subset of the data, and is later
applied to more sections of the dataset, revised and refined. The main procedural steps
described in [174, 175] were followed and therefore created a set of a priori themes in
advance of the coding process. These initial themes were created from the authors prior
knowledge of the subject area, and were designated tentative so could be re-defined or
1https://www.qsrinternational.com/nvivo/home
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removed, if they did not prove to be relevant, useful or appropriate. First, it was
important to become familiar with the raw data to be analysed. Common with most
thematic approaches the next step mandated a preliminary coding of the data. This
involved working through the data and using the a priori themes to highlight anything
in the text which was thought to be relevant to the underlying research question. Next,
the identified themes were used to define an initial coding template which provided
a good cross-sectional representation of the concepts and ideas in the dataset as a
whole. The initial coding template was then applied to further sections of the data
in an attempt to find potential relevance in the data. With each iteration the coding
template was refined, adding new themes or modifying existing ones as required, until a
final template had been defined. Finally, the template was applied to the whole dataset
and results were interpreted accordingly. An example coding template is shown in Table
3.5.
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Table 3.5: Chapter 6: Example Coding Template








Convenience “lots of people already own an
Alexa so this would be a good
way to get people to monitor
their smart devices”
Hands free “I liked how it was hands free and
didn't require a laptop etc”
Quick “much quicker than checking
each device individually”




“how everybody in the home
could share in monitoring their
own devices”
Accessibility Visually Impaired “it would be great for anyone vi-
sually impaired”
Interactive
Enjoyable & Fun “I enjoyed using this technology”
Educational “I liked learning new technology”
New Experience “I liked playing with an Alexa for
the first time”
Digital Assistant “I like the idea of making better
use of my Alexa to assist me with





“This would actually convince
me to care more about security”
Improved Security “non technical people like me can
understand it”
3.4.3 Ethical Practice
To collect the necessary data for the research presented in this thesis, the university
Research Governance and Integrity Policy 1 was followed to establish and promote good
ethical practice in the undertaking of the studies. Computing professionals are bound




since three of the studies involved human participants, it was also necessary to follow
relevant ethical guidelines of the British Psychological Society (BPS). In doing so, care
was taken to ensure the guidelines relating to informed consent, information provision
and data protection, were followed. The studies in Chapters 5-7 explored aspects of
human behaviour and therefore required the involvement of human participants. It was
therefore vital that careful consideration was given to the recruitment of participants,
the storage of data, and the reporting of results. Recruiting participants and utilising
informed consent online can be tricky [176]. Indeed, studies have highlighted concerns
over the use of large scale email campaigns to recruit participants [177], arguing if care
is not taken participants can engage in an online study without fully understanding
what is involved or providing informed consent. Therefore, participants were first
recruited from the local student population, and later via only trusted LinkedIn and
Facebook accounts, associated with the researcher and School of Computing. In line
with the university Research Governance and Integrity Policy, at the beginning of each
of the three studies, participants indicated their consent to participate by reading a
study agreement form (See example in Section 7.2.4) and ticking a box to confirm
their understanding and compliance. The form included a description of the study
aims, the process of handling data including anonymity of participants and the process
for withdrawing from the study. In all three studies no personally identifiable data
was explicitly collected, however the use of online survey platforms often (by default)
retain information relating to participant IP address and date/time stamps. In line
with GDPR guidelines 1 this feature was disabled, therefore preventing the capture of





This chapter introduced the research methods used throughout this thesis. Many of
the quantitative and qualitative techniques are repeated in several chapters, however
were presented here for ease of reference. By outlining a standard practice and utilising
this throughout the thesis, consistency has been established in the research. The next
chapter presents the first of the four studies undertaken in this thesis. In this first
study, the ability of current detection methods to effectively detect threats found in
consumer IoT networks, is explored.
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Chapter 4
Botnet Detection in Consumer
IoT Networks
Chapter 2 explored how the Internet of Things (IoT) has ushered in an era of increased
connectivity [47]. It examined how many of the smart devices found within the IoT are
often insecure and vulnerable to misuse. This chapter focuses on one particular threat
which has been used to leverage insecure smart devices, in order to perform large scale
DDoS attacks on the Internet. The chapter briefly explores the taxonomy of an IoT
botnet, using the recently experienced Mirai botnet to better understand how infection
and spread occur in smart devices and networks. The ability of a current detection
method to effectively detect botnet activity is explored, before finally proposing a novel
application of deep learning for better detection of botnets found within the IoT.
4.1 Introduction
The focus of this chapter is attempting to answer sub research question SQ1: “Can
current security methods detect the presence of threats within consumer IoT networks
?”. As shown in Chapter 2 the Internet of Things (IoT) has quickly transitioned from a
promising future paradigm to a pervasive everyday reality [4]. Billions of smart devices
have already been connected to the Internet creating an extensive network of connected
’things’. However, as highlighted, many of these devices are vulnerable, and can used by
hackers to perform DDoS attacks against targets on the Internet. This chapter focuses
on the detection of botnet activity within consumer IoT networks. A quantitative
approach was used to examine how effectively a current detection method can detect
the presence of the mirai botnet in a sandboxed environment. Subsequently, the use
of deep learning and its application to threat detection within the IoT, is explored.
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During the undertaking of this study a labelled data set was created and has been
made available to the wider research community (See Section 4.5).
4.2 Methodology
4.2.1 Experimental Variables
This study measured an existing security method’s ability to detect a known malware
threat which targets consumer IoT networks. In addition, a new threat detection
method was also developed, and its ability to detect the same threat was assessed. In
the process, numerical data was collected and accuracy and loss metrics were used as
dependent variables. The malware used in this study leveraged infected smart devices
to perform a range of DDoS attacks. The attacks and C&C messages were used as the
independent variables.
4.2.2 Study Design
Figure 4.1: Botnet Experimental Setup
A secure sandboxed environment was created as shown in Figure 4.1. This consisted of
a command and control C&C server, a Scan/Loader server and an additional utilities
server to handle DNS queries and reporting. A soft tap (Tap0) SPAN port was created
to mirror all relevant traffic to a packet sniffing device, to capture for later analysis.
Two Sricam AP009 IP Cameras running busybox utilities were used as bots to attack
a target Raspberry Pi. A detailed description of the setup is presented in Appendix A.
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The Mirai source code was downloaded from GitHub 1. To ensure a true representation
of an infection and attack, amendments to the source code were kept to a minimum,
however, some configuration changes were required to comply with ethical and legal
regulations. Namely, IP address ranges to be scanned were limited, and DNS queries
were directed to a local DNS server in the sand-boxed environment.
4.2.3 Case Study (Mirai): Taxonomy of a Botnet
To foster greater understanding of how botnets target insecure IoT devices, a detailed
analysis of the Mirai botnet was conducted. The analysis was found to be consistent
with other research [10, 178] and is presented below. Figure 4.2 shows the process
of infection and propagation method employed by Mirai. The Mirai infrastructure
consists of a command and control (C&C) server, a Scan/Loader server and infected
IoT devices known as bots. Infection and propagation occurs by exploiting weak default
security credentials found on many IoT devices running busybox, an embedded version
of Linux. An attacker (botmaster) starts the process by connecting to the Scan/Loader
server (step 1 ) and initiating ./loader to execute the scanner.c module, and scan the
Internet for vulnerable IoT devices with Telnet services and ports 23 or 2323 open.
To avoid detection, 90% of scans use TCP port 23 as their destination, and 10% use
port 2323 (step 2 ). Upon detecting a vulnerable device, the malware attempts to brute
force a successful login using a list of 62 known default usernames and passwords [10].
If access is successful, the malware runs command /bin/busybox MIRAI, and waits for
reply MIRAI: applet not found to confirm the malware is currently not installed on
the device. Successful login credentials and device information are sent back to the
C&C server, and will be used later by the Scan/Loader server to login and deliver
the malware to the vulnerable device (step 3 ). An infect command is sent from the
C&C server to the Scan/Loader server containing all necessary information such as
login details, IP address, hardware architecture. Mirai was found to support multiple
hardware architectures, including arm, mips, sparc and powerpc (step 4 ).
The Scan/Loader server uses this information to login and instruct the vulnerable device
to tftp or wget to the Scan/Loader server, download and execute the corresponding
payload binary. Once executed, the first infected IoT device becomes part of the Mirai
botnet and can communicate with the C&C server. The malware binary is removed and
runs only in memory, to avoid detection (step 5 ). The botmaster can now issue attack
commands, specifying parameters such as attack duration and target (step 6 ). The
malware includes 10 DDoS attack types, including UDP flood (udp), Recursive DNS
(dns), SYN packet flood (syn), ACK packet flood (ack), GRE flood (gre ip), which
1https://github.com/jgamblin/Mirai-Source-Code
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Figure 4.2: Botnet Infection and Proliferation
can be used to attack a target on the Internet (step 7 ). The first bot now attempts
to repeat the infection process and propagate the botnet by scanning the Internet for
additional vulnerable IoT devices with Telnet services and ports 23 or 2323 open (step
8 ). New vulnerable IoT device information is returned to the C&C server (step 9 ). A
new infect command is issued to the Scan/Loader server (step 10 ). The appropriate
hardware binary is loaded onto the newly discover vulnerable IoT device (step 11 ).
The relevant attack command is issued from the C&C server (step 12 ). The attack
is executed by the newly infected second bot, in conjunction with the first bot (step
13 ). Scanning for additional vulnerable IoT devices is repeated to further expand the
botnet. (step 14 ).
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Figure 4.3: Snort IDS Experimental Setup
Chapter 2 explored the growing issue of security within the Internet of Things (IoT).
It highlighted how household smart appliances often contain vulnerabilities [48] and
are therefore targeted by hackers, threatening the security and privacy of families [82].
The chapter also demonstrated the need for security solutions to be developed, tailored
specifically for the IoT, to enable users and organisations to better protect their smart
devices [51]. In traditional networks, Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) have proven to
be powerful and versatile tools for network security management [179]. They have been
successfully deployed to monitor the operations of corporate networks, generating sys-
tem alerts when security violations are detected [180]. They are, however, not limited
to the protection of complex networks or critical infrastructures, and can be configured
to provide protection for smaller networks or single hosts. An aim of this study was to
analyse the effectiveness of using an IDS to protect smart homes and devices within the
IoT. Although a range of commercial and open-source IDS was found to exist, not all
systems were found to be suitable for use in a smart home environment. Firstly, it was
deemed unlikely that users in smart home environments would purchase an expensive
commercial IDS; therefore, they were immediately omitted from consideration. Sec-
ondly, previous research had evaluated various open-source IDS for their effectiveness
to detect threats and was also used to inform the selection of IDS to analyse. For
example, in [181, 182] the authors compared Snort1 and Suricata2, two popular open




while returning comparable accuracy metrics as Snort. However, importantly Snort
was found to have a lower system overhead in terms on CPU and RAM requirements.
In the context of home environments it is also important to consider the requirements
for computing resources, storage space and network bandwidth [183]. Here, the authors
compared Snort, Ourmon1, and Samhain2 IDS and assessed them for CPU load, net-
work bandwidth, and memory demand. Results confirmed the findings in [181, 182],
and also found Snort to have a lowerer CPU load. Since scalability is unlikely to be
a requirement in smart home environments, and home environments are likely to have
limited resources on which to run an IDS, Snort was chosen as the IDS to be evaluated.
Snort was installed and added to the Botnet experimental setup (See Figure 4.3). A
Snort oinkcode api key was generated, and Pulled Pork used to download the latest
rule packages. The signature for the Mirai botnet3 was also download and used to
test the ability of Snort to detect infections and attacks. The Mirai botnet malware
contains ten available attack vectors, which leverage infected IoT devices to engage
in DDoS attacks against targets. To analyse Snort five attack vectors were chosen,
including Acknowledgement (ACK) flood, Domain Name System (DNS) flood, User
Datagram Protocol (UDP) flood, Generic Routing Encapsulation IP (GREIP) flood,
and Synchronize (SYN) flood. Command and control messages between the C&C
server and the infected IoT IP camera (bot) were also captured, as was normal traffic
generated by the camera. Each attack was run for a period of 60 seconds, with Snort
Log alerts summarised in Table 4.4.
4.2.5 Proposed Threat Detection: BLSTM-RNN IDS
Having analysed an existing method of threat detection, the study next explored if Deep
Learning could be used to improve the detection of threats facing smart devices within
the IoT. A new IDS model based on a Bidirectional Long Short Term Memory Recurrent
Neural Network (BLSTM-RNN) was developed, and tested for its ability to detect the
same attacks as used in Section 4.2.4. To test the model a dataset was generated from
the experimental set-up described in Section 4.2.2, which consisted of Mirai botnet
traffic such as Scan, Infect, Control and Attack traffic (described in Section 4.2.3), and
also normal IoT IP Camera traffic. The captured dataset included features No., Time,
Source, Destination, Protocol, Length, and general information relating to the payload
in the Info feature (See Table 4.1). All features were retained in the dataset, however,
































































Figure 4.4: Botnet Architecture and Deep Learning Detection Model
Since a large portion of the captured information resided in the Info feature, as shown
in Table 4.1 a model was required that could read and understand the text presented
in this feature. As discussed in Section 2.1.3 an Artificial Neural Network(ANN) and
more complex versions of Recurrent Neural Networks(RNN) such as Long Short Term
Memory (LSTM) only work with numerical values. However, [184] demonstrated that
a Deep Bidirectional Long Short Term Memory based RNN (BLSTM-RNN) can be
used which provides promising results for text recognition. This potential was further
demonstrated in [99, 100, 185] where a BLSTM-RNN was used in conjunction with
Word Embedding, to map phrases and vocabulary to vectors or real numbers, and
proved to be an effective method for modelling and predicting sequential text.
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Table 4.1: Attack Packet Structure
Packet Source Destination Pro Len Info
Normal 192.168.252.40 192.168.252.60 TCP 66 81 - 50451 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0
Ack=1 Win=5840 Len=0 MSS=1460
SACK PERM=1 WS=2
Mirai 192.168.252.40 106.65.144.6 TCP 64 62002 - 23 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=57378
Len=0 [ETHERNET FRAME
CHECK SEQUENCE INCORRECT]
UDP 192.168.252.40 192.168.252.50 UDP 554 55741 - 65170 Len=512
DNS 192.168.252.40 192.168.252.22 DNS 90 Standard query 0x0c9 A
nnt1heibflkk.report.McDPhD.org
* No. and Time features Omitted for Brevity
Table 4.2: ACK Packet Structure and Sequencing
Packet Source Destination Pro Size Info
ACK 192.168.252.40 192.168.252.50 TCP 566 59693 - 41058 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1
Win=29597 Len=512
ACK 192.168.252.50 192.168.252.40 TCP 60 41058 - 59693 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1
Win=29597 Len=0
ACK 192.168.252.40 192.168.252.50 TCP 566 28029 - 45060 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1
Win=29597 Len=512
ACK 192.168.252.40 192.168.252.50 TCP 566 56493 - 64047 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1
Win=29597 Len=512
* No. and Time features Omitted for Brevity
Motivated by the potential demonstrated by Wang et al. [185], and since the infor-
mation captured in the Info feature of the dataset appeared to follow a sequence (See
Table 4.2), a model was designed which used a BLSTM-RNN in conjunction with Word
Embedding. This enabled string data to be converted into a format usable by the deep
learning model. The approach taken was to first convert each letter into a tokenised
and integer encoded format. Next, a dictionary of all tokenised words and their index
within the Info feature was created and text replaced with its corresponding index
number. In order to understand each attack type, it was important to maintain the se-
quence order of the indices, therefore an array of the indices was created. Since attacks
are often closely coupled to the protocol used and the length of the captured packet,
the Protocol and Length features also required to be included in the array. Word Em-
bedding was again used to convert and create a dictionary of all tokenised protocols
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and their index. These were then added, along with the Length feature, which was
already an integer, to the array. Labels identifying each type of captured packets were
mapped from string to integer (’norm’: 0,’mirai’:1,’udp’: 2, ’dns’:3, ’ack’:4), and were
also injected into the array. To simplify this process, the Keras library was used with
a wrapper API around Theano and Tensorflow. The Keras one hot function was used
to convert strings into indices, form a 2-dimension list and create a dictionary at the
same time. Finally, since deep neural networks require arrays to be of equal length, it
was necessary to find the maximum length of a sentence within the Info feature and
pad all the arrays with 0 to be equal to the maximum length of 25. After processing
the dataset it was split into training and test datasets and reshaped into 3 dimensions,
the format required for BLSTM-RNN layer (see Algorithm 1.)
To test the effectiveness of the deep learning approach to threat detection the model
was tested against a series of attacks associated with the Mirai botnet. As shown in
Algorithm 1 unit and Output layer with sigmoid activation were added to the model.
The model was then compiled with the Mean Absolute Error (MAE) loss function and
the Adam optimiser over total of 20 iterations, as shown in Table 4.3.
Table 4.3: BLSTM-RNN Model Parameters
Variables Values
Activation Sigmoid
Loss Mean Absolute Error (mae)
Optimiser Adam
BLSTM layer total units 20
Dense layer total unit 6
Epochs 20
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Algorithm 1 BLSTM IoT Botnet Detection
1: procedure dataProcessing(attack dataset)
2: path← attack dataset location
3: allFiles← open pattern matched csv files in write mode
4: frame← define two dimensional labeled data structure
5: unitToDrop← 25%
6: repeat
7: /*create concatenated dataset*/
8: for i← in allF iles do
9: df← read files
10: list ← append(df) read files
11: end for
12: until files concatenated into dataset
13: dataset← concatenated (list )
14: repeat
15: /*Integer encode dataset*/
16: for d← in dataset.values do
17: encoded docs← tokenise words
18: dict← create dictionary of encoded docs
19: array← map indices of dict
20: if array length != 25 then
21: invoke-process← pad array == 25
22: end if
23: end for
24: until Data tokenised and integer encoded
25: padded docs← array of tokenised and padded text
26: dataset.dropna← split dataset based on unitToDrop
27: repeat
28: /*Train and evaluate model*/
29: model.compile← (loss == mae, optimiser == adam)
30: for i← in epochs do
31: reshape← Training and Test to 3 Dimension
32: model.evaluate← Accuracy and Loss
33: end for
34: until trainingDataset and testDataset are reshaped
35: Return Loss, ValLoss, Acc, ValAcc
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Figure 4.4 shows the data flow and anomaly detection process. Data is transitioned
through three distinct phases. The Pre-processing phase adjusts features to ensure data
representation is suitable for the developed algorithm. Word Embedding tokenises the
data, before normalisation and removal of packets with missing data is performed. In
the Modelling phase the BLSTM-RNN algorithm is applied to the training data to
define, fit and evaluate the detection model. Finally, in the Anomaly Detection phase
the test data is tested to determine the effectiveness of the model in terms of accuracy
and loss. Since the aim was to test the effectiveness of using a BLSTM-RNN with Word
Embedding on sequential data, as demonstrated in [185], another model was required
for comparison. A unidirectional LSTM-RNN was selected since it would only use past
information for context, whereas the bidirectional LSTM-RNN would also utilise future
contextual information [186]. Comparing the two models would allow us to ascertain if
a bidirectional LSTM-RNN use of both past and future contextual information, would
result in better accuracy or loss metrics for the captured threat dataset. Results of the
comparative tests are presented in Table 4.6.
4.3 Results
4.3.1 SNORT IDS
The results for Snort analysis are presented. Snort’s ability to detect malware and
identify each of the five individual attacks was tested. Table 4.4 shows that Snort
was able to detect the presence of mirai using the specific Snort signature ID (Sid)1.
Sid 7748 “MALWARE-CNC Unix.Trojan.Mirai variant post compromise echo loader
attempt” alerts were present in all attacks and appeared to relate to C&C messages
used by mirai during the initial infection process and also when issuing subsequent
attack commands. Sid 32655 “stream5: TCP Small Segment Threshold Exceeded” was
also generated for each of the attacks. On first inspection, this alert would appear to
be generated as a result of each of the DDoS flood attacks, however the generation of a
TCP threshold alert would not be expected for the UDP based flood attack. Further
research found that this alert plus Sids 32660, 32653 have previously been reported
by some Snort users2 who attributed it to the use of SSH/Telnet connections within
the topology, not to the presence of an attack. It was therefore inconclusive whether
these alerts were indicative of an attack taking place. The final alert 513 “ICMP
Test detected” was only generated for three attacks SYN, DNS, UDP. It would appear
Snort recognised this traffic as being anomalous, however was not able to attribute it




Table 4.4: Snort IDS Alerts




I 7748 MALWARE-CNC Unix.Trojan.Mirai variant post
compromise echo loader attempt
2




7748 MALWARE-CNC Unix.Trojan.Mirai variant post
compromise echo loader attempt
1
32653 SSH: Protocol mismatch 12




513 ICMP Test detected 78
7748 MALWARE-CNC Unix.Trojan.Mirai variant post
compromise echo loader attempt
2
32653 SSH: Protocol mismatch 36




513 ICMP Test detected 75
7748 MALWARE-CNC Unix.Trojan.Mirai variant post
compromise echo loader attempt
1
32655 stream5: TCP Small Segment Threshold Exceeded 153




513 ICMP Test detected 72
7748 MALWARE-CNC Unix.Trojan.Mirai variant post
compromise echo loader attempt
2





7748 MALWARE-CNC Unix.Trojan.Mirai variant post
compromise echo loader attempt
2
32655 stream5: TCP Small Segment Threshold Exceeded 54
* Sid: Snort Signature ID
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4.3.2 BLSTM-RNN IDS
Table 4.5: Captured Attack Samples
Attack Normal Mirai Cleaned
Mirai 0 598676 5102 595478
UDP 9380 590524 2576 601542
ACK 67444 588560 6372 632889
DNS 8706 598410 4408 602496
The results of the comparative test between the Bidirectional Long Short Term Mem-
ory Recurrent Neural Network (BLSTM-RNN) and the unidirectional LSTM-RNN are
presented. To compare the deep learning detection models a series of four experiments
were performed for each. Since unidirectional LSTM-RNN only preserve information
from the past, the aim of the comparison was to ascertain if the use of a bidirectional
LSTM-RNN, which is able to accumulate contextual information from both past and














































Figure 4.6: Loss Metrics for Detection Models
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Table 4.6: Detection Accuracy and Loss
Attacks (n) Accuracy (%) Loss
Train Validate BLSTM LSTM BLSTM LSTM
Mirai 387060 208418 99.998992 99.571605 0.000809 0.027775
UDP 391002 210540 98.582144 98.521440 0.125630 0.125667
ACK 411384 221515 93.765198 93.765198 0.858700 0.858773
DNS 391622 210874 98.488289 98.488289 0.116453 0.116453
Multi-Vector
(inc ACK)
419887 226094 91.951002 91.951002 0.841303 0.841381
Multi-Vector
(no ACK)
395564 212996 97.521033 97.521033 0.115293 0.115293
Multi-Vector
(three ACK)
468534 252289 92.243513 92.243513 0.161890 0.242358
For Experiment 1 each attack type (See Table 4.5) was split between train and validate
using a cross validation fold of 35%, presented to each model and trained over a total
of 20 iterations. The mean accuracy and loss metrics for each attack were measured,
and are presented in Table 4.6. As can be seen from the results, both models returned
high accuracy and prediction for mirai (99%), udp (98%) and dns (98%) attack types.
However, they returned less favourable results for ack (93%) attacks, despite this at-
tack having the highest number of samples. Respective validation loss metrics mirai
(0.000809), udp (0.125630), and dns (0.116453) were low, however, were again less
favourable for the ack (0.858700) attacks.
Since multi-vector DDoS attacks were highlighted as being a growing issue in Section
2.1.2, Experiment 2 consisted of norm, mirai, udp, dns, and ack captures being con-
catenated to form a multi-vector attack scenario. Results on row 5 of Table 4.6 show
the impact of the ack attack on the overall detection accuracy (91%) and particularly
loss metrics (0.841303). To validate this observation, Experiment 3 consisted of norm,
mirai, udp, and dns captures being concatenated to form a multi-vector attack scenario,
without the ack attack. Results on row 6 of Table 4.6 show that once the ack attack was
removed, overall detection accuracy and prediction (97%) of the model were very good.
A final validation of this observation was conducted in Experiment 4 which consisted
of three ack attacks being performed during the same time frame, increasing the total
sample size of ack attacks, in order to observe the variation in accuracy and prediction.
Row 7 of Table 4.6 shows an increase in sample size, improved the overall validation
accuracy to 92%, with BLSTM-RNN returning the better loss metric. Accuracy and
loss metrics for both detection models are presented in Figures 4.5 to 4.6. It should be
noted that the performance of the model has not been tested with new data due to a
lack of associated IoT malware datasets at the time.
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4.4 Discussion
This study was undertaken to investigate the effectiveness of current methods for de-
tecting threats within the IoT and to present a new method of threat detection. The
research in Chapter 2 demonstrated the growing issue of botnets within the IoT [52, 73]
and how increasingly difficult it can be to detect these threats within smart home en-
vironments. It also demonstrated how easily malware can be mutated to create new
variants of the original, making it difficult to maintain smart device security [68, 69, 70].
The Mirai malware was identified to be suitable for use in this study, since it predom-
inately targeted consumer IoT devices, and the sourse code was readily available on
github1. This allowed the experimental setup in Figure 4.1 to be established, which was
then used to test an existing IDS, and the newly developed threat detection method
presented in Section 4.2.5. Snort was chosen as a suitable IDS to analyse, and jus-
tification for its selection was provided in Section 4.2.4. From the results presented
in Section 4.3.1, it was clear that Snort was able to detect the presence of the Mirai
malware within the test environment, but was not able to detail each individual at-
tack type. The Snort signature ID (Sid)2 produced alert Sid 7748 “MALWARE-CNC
Unix.Trojan.Mirai variant post compromise echo loader attempt” whenever the initial
infection process was run, or whenever a new command was sent from the C&C server
to an infected smart device (IoT Camera). It was not clear whether the remaining
Sid alerts (513, 32653, 32655, 32660) could be attributed solely to the presence of Mi-
rai since although they could be indicative of Telnet/SSH session use by Mirai, they
have previously been reported by other Snort users3 to be general alerts. Further in-
vestigation of the Snort rule for Mirai showed that the rule checks for specific string
values used by the malware. This was evident from research in [10] where the authors
presented the Snort rule as:
alert tcp $EXTERNAL NET any <> $HOME NET any (msg:”Possible Mirai infec-
tion”; content: ”/bin/busybox MIRAI”; sid: 10003; rev:1;)
Here, the Snort rule uses the string /bin/busybox MIRAI to trigger an alert, whenever
a match is observed. Variations of this rule have also been found to monitor other
strings used by Mirai such as MIRAI: applet not found, which was observed during
the research in Section 4.2.3. While these rules appear to be effective for the original
malware, they are likely to prove ineffective for future mutations. Indeed, from the
mutated versions of Mirai, identified by avast [68] and presented in Table 2.1 six were





void. The research did identify that new signature rules have been written to detect
mutated variants of Mirai, such as satori:
alert tcp $EXTERNAL NET any -> $TELNET SERVERS 23 (msg:”BACKDOOR
MISC Linux rootkit satori attempt”; flow:to server,established; content:”satori”; refer-
ence:arachnids,516; classtype:attempted-admin; sid:216; rev:6;)1
However, writing new signature rules for every mutation of a malware would prove
difficult to sustain long term. The research therefore demonstrated that the use of
current signature-based intrusion detection, although accurate and effective at detecting
known threats [82], can be ineffective at detecting new attacks or variants of known
attacks, since a matching signature for these attacks is likely not known [187, 188]. The
inability of existing signature-based IDS such as (Snort) to effectively detect new or
variants of known IoT threats, was used as justification for developing the new threat
detection method in Section 4.2.5.
Motivated by results in [184, 185] a threat detection model based on a Bidirectional
Long Short Term Memory Recurrent Neural Network (BLSTM-RNN) was developed.
In doing so, a method for modelling and predicting sequential text in the captured
dataset was achieved. The BLSTM-RNN detection model was compared with a unidi-
rectional LSTM-RNN to ascertain if the use of contextual information from both the
past and future, could return better accuracy and loss metrics for the captured dataset.
Results in Table 4.6 showed that both models returned high accuracy and prediction for
mirai C&C commands, and udp, dns attack types. However, returned less favourable
results for ack attacks, despite this attack having the highest number of samples. This
was possibly due to the nature and complexity of information in the info feature, as
seen in Table 4.2, where the sequence numbers in each ack packet changed. Despite
this, a pattern can however be seen on rows one and two, where sequence numbers
(59693-41058, 41058-59693) of contiguous packets were clearly linked, and packet size
and Length were consistent. Unfortunately some packets appeared out of sync as seen
in rows three and four, and possibly resulted in the detection model not recognising
this pattern, contributing to the lower detection rate, and significantly higher loss met-
ric. By contrast, although some captured packets in Table 4.1 appear to be equally
complex, the information in the info feature for each packet type, remained largely the
same, possibly aiding better detection.
The BLSTM-RNN model was assessed for its effectiveness to detect multi-vector DDoS
attacks and results showed that overall detection accuracy and prediction was still
generally very good. However, since the model did not perform as well for ack attacks,
1https://github.com/eldondev/Snort/blob/master/rules/backdoor.rules
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when these were present in a multi-vector attack overall accuracy was reduced (91%).
Interestingly Figures 4.5 to 4.6 show the accuracy and loss metrics for the LSTM-RNN
appeared to level after 10 iterations, however, continued to improve with each additional
iteration for the BLSTM-RNN. Therefore, the total sample size of ack attacks was
increased, in order to observe the variation in accuracy and prediction. Results showed
that the increase in sample size, resulted in improved accuracy (97%), and better loss
metrics in the BLSTM-RNN model (0.161890). The results of this study showed that
the bidirectional nature of the BLSTM-RNN, and its use of contextual information
from the past and future, coupled with a larger datatset made it a better progressive
model over time. Training the model with a larger dataset could result in further
improvements in accuracy and loss. This study set out to answer the question “Can
current security methods detect the presence of threats within consumer IoT networks
?”. It is clear from the results that although the existing IDS (Snort) was able to detect
the presence of threats (Mirai) used in the study, mutated versions of the malware could
prove more difficult to detect, rendering existing signatures ineffective. The proposed
threat detection model (BLSTM-RNN) demonstrated the potential for deep learning
to be applied to threat detection in consumer IoT networks. The study showed that
once trained with previous attack data the deep learning IDS model could accurately
predict future threats facing consumer IoT network.
4.5 Publication of Dataset
During the undertaking of this study a labelled IoT botnet dataset was created, con-
taining both normal traffic and attacks [17] from the Mirai malware. The data set
spans five days and incorporates a total of 37 wireshark pcap files, and corresponding
labelled csv files. The generated mirai botnet dataset has been made public, been cited






This chapter examined the ability of a current security method (Snort) to detect threats
within consumer IoT networks. In Section 2.1.2 botnets were identified to be a par-
ticular problem facing the IoT, therefore the Mirai malware was chosen as a suitable
threat for use in this study, since it predominately targeted consumer IoT devices.
The results of this study showed the IDS to be accurate and effective at detecting
the Mirai malware, however also demonstrated it could be ineffective at detecting new
variants of the malware. Finally, a new threat detection method was presented based
on a BLSTM-RNN. Once trained, the model accurately predicted future threats from
the Mirai malware and demonstrated the potential for deep learning to be used for
threat detection. In the next chapter, awareness and perception of threats within con-
sumer IoT networks will be examined and the results of a cross-sectional study, which
examined if users are able to detect the presence of botnet activity, will be presented.
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Chapter 5
Situational Awareness of Threats
in Consumer IoT Networks
In Chapter 4 the effectiveness of current threat detection methods in consumer IoT net-
works was examined. A recent and prominent example (Mirai botnet) of threat facing
consumers IoT networks was analysed, to better understand how insecure smart devices
can be exploited and leveraged to perform attacks on the Internet. A new application
of deep learning for threat detection was also proposed and clearly demonstrated its
effectiveness in detecting botnet activity within consumer IoT networks. This chapter
examines the awareness and perception of threats within consumer IoT networks. Pre-
vious work [189, 190, 191] had suggested that demographic characteristics may have
an effect on users awareness of threats. Results of a cross-sectional study are presented
which examined this phenomenon and also if users are able to detect the presence of
botnet activity.
5.1 Introduction
The focus of this chapter is attempting to answer sub research question SQ2: “Can
users visually detect the presence of threats within consumer IoT networks ?”. Firstly,
a quantitative approach is used to examine how users value and perceive security and
privacy in smart devices found within the IoT. Next, user requirements from IoT de-
vices are analysed and the importance placed upon security and privacy investigated.
Secondly, the ability of users to detect threats is assessed, in the context of demographic
characteristics, namely technical knowledge and age. This twin-pronged approach to
analysis is carried out to examine the impact of botnets within the IoT, in the context




The study presented in this chapter used an online survey, which was split into two
sections. The first section collected information relating to user awareness and require-
ments of security and privacy, and is discussed in Section 5.2.2. The second section
measured participants ability to identify when a smart device had been infected, and
was being used to perform attacks on the Internet. Detection accuracy was used as the
dependent variable and data collected was dichotomous and nominal. In [3], the author
suggests a lack of technical knowledge and ability to explore network communication,
results in little or no awareness of security issues. An aim of this study was to test
this assumption and discover if there was a relationship between the dependent vari-
able and participant’s technical knowledge which was used as the independent variable
and collected ordinal data. A study in [190] also suggested age may have impact on
security awareness, where they found participants aged over 55, although heavy users
of “gadgets” (smart devices), overwhelmingly failed to recognise threats, and neglected
to protect their connected devices. A second aim of this study was to test this assump-
tion, and discover if age has an impact on security. Age was, therefore, used as the
second independent variable, and used to determine if a relationship existed between
the dependent variable and a participant’s age. Age was categorised into ranges, and
was collected as categorical data. The following hypothesis is derived from the desire
to test these assumptions:
Hypothesis A: Demographic characteristics have an effect on the accuracy of detecting
threats in consumer networks
The null hypothesis for a chi-square independence test states that two categorical vari-
ables are independent in a population [170]. To test the assumption that no association
existed between the dependent and independent variables it was hypothesised:
H1: There is no association between detection accuracy and technical
knowledge when detecting threats in consumer networks.
H2: There is no association between detection accuracy and age when
detecting threats in consumer networks.
5.2.2 Study Design
An online survey instrument was produced and used to assess how users value and
perceive security and privacy in smart devices found within the IoT. The online sur-
vey was created using the guidelines specified in Section 3.3.3, and was split into two
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sections, each comprised of 17 questions in total. Section one collected information
relating to user awareness and requirements of security and privacy in smart devices
contained within the IoT. Section two evaluated user’s ability to identify when a smart
device had been infected, and was being used to perform attacks on the Internet. The
secure sand-boxed environment created in Section 4.2.2 was used to perform DDoS
attacks against a smart camera, commonly found and exploited within the IoT [192].
Three DDoS attack scenarios were performed and recorded, including a DNS flood at-
tack, Synchronise (SYN) flood attack, and a Generic Routing Encapsulation over IP
(GREIP) flood attack. Normal traffic was also generated from an uninfected camera,
and was used for comparison. Participants were presented with the four recorded sce-
narios, and asked to identify if an attack had taken place, specifying the time when
they think it occurred.
5.2.3 Participants
The aim of the study was to assess how users value and perceive security and privacy
in smart devices found within the IoT. The study analysed user requirements from IoT
devices, and the importance placed upon security and privacy. Convenience sampling
was employed, with participants selected due to their convenient accessibility, and
proximity to the author. Participants were recruited between October and November
2018 from the local university population, and also through LinkedIn and Social Media.
This approach enabled a wide range of views to be collected and avoid oversampling of
a specific demographic. Participants provided informed consent by reading the study
agreement on the first page, before indicating their consent to participate when clicking
to proceed to the next page of the survey. A total of one hundred ninety two participants
started the study, however, thirty four did not complete resulting in an attrition rate
of 17.7%. The threat of attrition in research to internal and external validity is an
important issue [193]. Attrition rates of 30-40% are indicative of “fatal” flaws within
a study, while below 20% is acceptable [194]. Therefore, the results of this study
are believed to have validity, since the attrition rate was below the acceptable level.
Table 5.1 presents the participant demographics where 17 (11%) participants were aged
[under 18], 52 (33%) aged [18-24], 54 (34%) aged [25-39], 29 (18%) aged [40-59], and 6
(4%) aged [60+]. When asked to indicate their level of technical knowledge 23 (15%)
self-identified as [Novice], 70 (44%) as [Intermediate], 57 (36%) as [Advanced], and 8
(5%) as [Expert]. Participants had a varying range of computing experience with 42
(27%) currently working within a computing related environment, 86 (54%) currently
studying, and 30 (19%) not currently studying or working within a computing related
environment.
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Table 5.1: Participant Demographic
Age % Ability %
< 18 17 (11) Novice 23 (15)
18-24 52 (33) Intermediate 70 (44)
25-39 54 (34) Advanced 57 (36)




5.3.1 Section One Results
In Section one of the online survey participants were asked a series of questions relating
to their awareness and perception of security and privacy considerations and require-
ments in IoT devices. Firstly, as shown in Figure 5.1a, participants were asked if they
owned any IoT devices; 70 (44%) responded that they did not own any IoT devices,
57 (36%) owned one device, with Amazon Echo being the most popular with 47 (30%)



















(b) Level of concern
Figure 5.1: Exposure to IoT devices and level of security concern.
To measure perception and importance placed on security and privacy, respondents
were asked to rate the importance of various features related to IoT devices. As shown
in Figure 5.2 security 102 (65%) and privacy 100 (63%) were clearly considered very
important features by a large percentage of the population. However, interestingly
when asked to rank the features in order of priority, cost was ranked higher than both
security and privacy by the largest percentage of respondents 53 (34%) (see Figure 5.3).
Although compatibility and ease of setup were considered very important features as
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shown in Figure 5.2, again when asked to rank features in order of priority they were
very clearly ranked less important (see Figure 5.3).
To assess whether respondents ranked security and privacy highly in theory, but not in
practice, respondents were asked how concerned they would be if a smart device they
owned was infected with a virus, but was still functioning as expected. Figure 5.1b
shows that over three quarters of respondents 91 (58%) and 41 (26%) respectively said
they would be very concerned or concerned.
Not very important Not important Neutral Important Very important
Security 9 4 14 29 102
Privacy 10 2 19 27 100
Compatibility 16 15 33 42 52
Ease of Setup 12 9 28 55 54
Ease of Use 9 30 47 45 27















Figure 5.2: IoT device feature importance.
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Rank 1 Rank 2 Rank 3 Rank 4 Rank 5 Rank 6
Security 39 42 27 21 21 8
Privacy 29 48 23 26 19 13
Compatibility 15 9 26 32 24 52
Ease of Setup 6 10 26 18 46 52
Ease of Use 16 36 25 35 34 12















Figure 5.3: IoT device feature rank.
5.3.2 Section Two Results
In section two of the online survey respondents were presented with the four recorded
scenarios in Section 5.2.2. Scenario A and B were presented as live video feeds from
an IoT IP camera. In scenario A the camera was not infected, and no attack was
performed. In scenario B the camera was infected and performed a DNS flood attack
against a victim device in the sandboxed environment (see Figure 5.4). Scenario C and
D were presented as recorded outputs from a popular packet capture tool (wireshark).
In scenario C the camera was infected and performed a SYN flood attack against a
victim device in the sandboxed environment. In scenario D the camera was infected
and performed a GREIP flood attack (see Figure 5.5).
Figure 5.4: IoT IP Camera Video Feed (Scenario A and B).
87
(a) SYN Flood Attack (Scenario C) (b) GREIP Flood Attack (Scenario D)
Figure 5.5: IoT Camera Video Feed (Scenario C and D).
Results for the four scenarios are presented in Tables 5.2–5.5 with time periods high-
lighted to indicate when the associated attack took place. In scenario A 97 (61%) of
respondents indicated they could not tell if the IoT IP camera was infected and an
attack took place (see Table 5.2). Respondent responses were consistent across all time
periods. In scenario B an attack took place during time period [31–50 s]. Again, most
respondents 94 (59%) indicated they could not tell if the IoT IP camera was infected
and an attack took place. Respondent responses were again consistent across all time
periods. When asked how easy it was to identify when the IoT IP camera was infected,
32 (38%) indicated very difficult, 25 (29%) difficult (see Figure 5.6a), indicating that
it was not easy to detect if the device was infected from the presented live video feed
shown in Figure 5.4. This was consistent with the authors own observations that during
the infection process and attacks, the camera did not display any adverse symptoms
of infection, and continued to function as expected. Remote access to the device was
still possible, and performance did not appear to be degraded. Live video streaming
continued to be as responsiveness as prior to the attacks. Therefore, without any clear
signs of an infection it was confirmed that detection or awareness of botnet activity
proved very difficult within consumer networks.
Table 5.2: Scenario A: Detection rate (no attack).
0–10 s 11–20 s 21–30 s 31–40 s 41-50 s 51–60 s Dont Know
n (%) n (%) n (%) n (%) n (%) n (%) n (%)
Yes 22 (14) 24 (15) 26 (16) 23 (15) 24 (15) 13 (8) 97 (61)
No 136 (86) 134 (85) 132 (84) 135 (85) 134 (85) 145 (92) 61 (39)
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Table 5.3: Scenario B: Detection rate (dns attack).
0–10 s 11–20 s 21–30 s 31–40 s 41–50 s 51–60 s Dont Know
n (%) n (%) n (%) n (%) n (%) n (%) n (%)
Yes 35 (22) 26 (16) 33 (21) 29 (18) 30 (19) 23 (15) 94 (59)
No 123 (78) 132 (84) 125 (79) 129 (82) 128 (81) 135 (85) 64 (41)
Table 5.4: Scenario C: Detection rate (syn attack).
0–10 s 11–20 s 21–30 s 31–40 s 41–50 s 51–60 s Dont Know
n (%) n (%) n (%) n (%) n (%) n (%) n (%)
Yes 36 (23) 76 (48) 92 (58) 53 (34) 30 (19) 27 (17) 38 (24)
No 122 (77) 82 (52) 66 (42) 105 (66) 128 (81) 131 (83) 120 (76)
Table 5.5: Scenario D: Detection rate (greip attack).
0–10 s 11–20 s 21–30 s 31–40 s 41–50 s 51–60 s Dont Know
n (%) n (%) n (%) n (%) n (%) n (%) n (%)
Yes 44 (28) 34 (22) 39 (25) 47 (30) 51 (32) 30 (19) 65 (41)























(b) SYN and GREIP Attack
Figure 5.6: User perception of detection difficulty.
In scenario C an attack took place during time period [11–30 s] and participants were
shown the recorded wireshark output (see Figure 5.5a). The use of the packet capture
tool significantly improved detection of the infected IoT IP camera with 120 (76%) of
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respondents now indicating they knew when an attack took place. Results in Table 5.4
confirm this, with 76 (48%) [11–20 s] and 92 (58%) [21–30 s] correctly identifying the
time period when the attack took place. In scenario D an attack took place during
time period [21–40 s] and participants were shown the recorded wireshark output (see
Figure 5.5b). In this scenario the packet capture tool did not appear to improve detec-
tion, as results presented in Table 5.5 show respondent responses were varied across all
time periods. The number of respondents who indicated they knew when the attack
took place dropped with 93 (59%) of respondents now indicating they knew when an
attack took place.
Bivariate analysis was employed to cross tabulate between variables and look for pos-
sible associations. To determine if an association existed between a participants level
of technical knowledge and their ability to detect an attack, a cross tabulation between
these variables was undertaken. Frequency distributions were calculated and are pre-
sented in Tables 5.6–5.9.To check for relationships between the two categorical variables
Chi-square tests were performed to check for independence [170] and examine the asso-
ciation between technical knowledge level and the ability to detect attacks. The data
met the assumptions of having degrees of freedom greater than one (more than one
group being compared), randomised samples and independent observations [171].
Table 5.6: Scenario A: Accuracy by Knowledge Level (no attack).
Knowledge
Novice Intermediate Advanced Expert
n (%) n (%) n (%) n (%)
Yes 19 (83) 39 (56) 30 (53) 7 (88)
No 4 (17) 31 (44) 27 (47) 1 (12)
n = 158, p = .026
Table 5.7: Scenario B: Accuracy by Knowledge Level (dns attack).
Knowledge
Novice Intermediate Advanced Expert
n (%) n (%) n (%) n (%)
Yes 0 (0) 15 (21) 15 (26) 1 (12)
No 23 (100) 55 (79) 42 (74) 7 (88)
n = 158, p = .028
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Table 5.8: Scenario C: Accuracy by Knowledge Level (syn attack).
Knowledge
Novice Intermediate Advanced Expert
n (%) n (%) n (%) n (%)
Yes 11 ( 48) 41 ( 59) 37 ( 65) 6 ( 75)
No 12 (52) 29 (41) 20 (35) 2 (25)
n = 158, p = .584
Table 5.9: Scenario D: Accuracy by Knowledge Level (greip attack).
Knowledge
Novice Intermediate Advanced Expert
n (%) n (%) n (%) n (%)
Yes 2 (9) 28 (40) 23 (40) 5 (62)
No 21 (91) 42 (60) 34 (60) 3 (38)
n = 158, p = .013
Table 5.10: Accuracy within knowledge level (all scenarios).
Knowledge
Scenario A Scenario B Scenario C Scenario D Total
(no) (dns) (syn) (greip)
n (%) n (%) n (%) n (%) n (%)
Novice 19 (83) 0 (0) 11 (48) 2 (9) 32 (35)
Intermediate 39 (56) 15 (21) 41 (59) 28 (40) 123 (44)
Advanced 30 (53) 15 (26) 37 (65) 23 (40) 105 (46)
Expert 7 (88) 1 (12) 6 (75) 5 (62) 19 (59)
(%) percentage of accurate detections for each scenario
Scenario A was used as a control, however since users were not informed of this, at-
tempts were still made and are presented in Table 5.6. Since an attack did not exist,
if a user selected ’No’ against each time scale and indicated they ’Don’t Know’ if the
device was infected, this was used as evidence of a correct detection. It was not possible
to analyze whether an association existed between knowledge level and the ability to
detect an infected device, for this scenario. The results were, however, found to be
statistically significant, χ2 (3, n =158) = 9.253, p = .026. In scenario B, a dns attack
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was performed, but a clear association between level of knowledge and ability to detect
an infected device, was not evident. Results were again found to be significant, χ2 (3, n
=158) = 9.094, p = .028. In scenario C, a syn attack was performed, and participants
were shown output from a packet capture tool wireshark (see Figure 5.5a). Detection
rates across all knowledge levels increased substantially and a positive association was
evident between knowledge level and a user’s ability to detect an attack. Results were,
however, not found to be statistically significant, χ2 (3, n =158) = 1.944, p = .584. Fi-
nally, in scenario D, a greip attack was performed, and participants were shown output
from a packet capture tool wireshark (see Figure 5.5b). Again there appeared to be a
general positive association between the variables, however frequency distributions in
Table 5.9 indicated the association was not as clear compared to scenario C. Results
were found to be significant, χ2 (3, n =158) = 10.711, p = .013. Accuracy levels for
each technical knowledge level are summarised in Table 5.10.
Bivariate analysis was also employed to determine if an association existed between
a participants age and their ability to detect an attack. To check for relationships
between the two categorical variables Chi-square tests were performed to check for
independence [170] and examine the association between age and the ability to detect
attacks. Frequency distributions were calculated and are presented in Tables 5.11–5.14.
Accuracy levels for each age group are summarised in Table 5.15 and did not indicate
an association existed between age and ability to detect an attack. Results were not
found to be significant across scenarios A-D (p = .268, .120, .190, .127 respectively).
Table 5.11: Scenario A: Accuracy by Age (no attack).
Age
< 18 18-24 25-39 40-59 60+
n (%) n (%) n (%) n (%) n (%)
Yes 7 (41) 28 (54) 33 (61) 23 (79) 4 (67)
No 10 (59) 24 (46) 21 (39) 6 (21) 2 (33)
n = 158, p = .268
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Table 5.12: Scenario B: Accuracy by Age (dns attack).
Age
< 18 18-24 25-39 40-59 60+
n (%) n (%) n (%) n (%) n (%)
Yes 5 (29) 13 (25) 11 (20) 1 (3) 2 (33)
No 12 (71) 39 (75) 43 (80) 28 (97) 4 (67)
n = 158, p = .120
Table 5.13: Scenario C: Accuracy by Age (syn attack).
Age
< 18 18-24 25-39 40-59 60+
n (%) n (%) n (%) n (%) n (%)
Yes 13 (76) 34 (65) 31 (57) 12 (41) 4 (67)
No 4 (24) 18 (35) 23 (43) 17 (59) 2 (33)
n = 158, p = .190
Table 5.14: Scenario D: Accuracy by Age (greip attack).
Age
< 18 18-24 25-39 40-59 60+
n (%) n (%) n (%) n (%) n (%)
Yes 10 (59) 20 (38) 17 (31) 6 (21) 1 (17)
No 7 (41) 32 (62) 37 (69) 23 (79) 5 (83)
n = 158, p = .127
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Table 5.15: Detection accuracy within age level (all scenarios).
Age
Scenario A Scenario B Scenario C Scenario D Total
(no) (dns) (syn) (greip)
n (%) n (%) n (%) n (%) n (%)
< 18 7 (41) 5 (29) 13 (76) 10 (59) 35 (51)
18 - 24 28 (54) 13 (25) 34 (65) 20 (38) 95 (46)
25 - 39 33 (61) 11 (20) 31 (57) 17 (31) 92 (43)
40 - 59 23 (79) 1 (3) 12 (41) 6 (21) 42 (36)
60 + 4 (67) 2 (33) 4 (67) 1 (17) 11 (46)
% shows the percentage of accurate detections for each scenario
5.4 Discussion
This study was undertaken to investigate user awareness and perception of security
and privacy within the IoT. Since the Mirai malware predominately targeted consumer
IoT devices, it was chosen for use in the experimental setup. In the process of building
the experimental setup shown in Figure 4.1 it became clear how easily botnet malware
can spread, and new variants and mutations of existing botnets appear on the Internet.
Indeed, this is evident in [69, 70] where satori, masuta, wicked, and JenX are presented
as new variants of the original Mirai botnet. Sharing the original basecode with Mirai,
these new variants are enhanced to allow direct control of compromised devices, making
other malicious actions possible, including running trojan viruses, redirecting traffic
for man-in-the-middle attacks, and delivering other viruses to devices on the network
by proxy. The last point being particularly concerning, since devices which were not
originally vulnerable, could now be infected. In this study, 56% of respondents indicated
they owned an IoT device, with 20% owning one more device. The study found the
Amazon Echo to be the most popular IoT device (30%); however, many IoT devices
leveraged by the above botnets, such as smart lightbulbs (16%) and IP cameras (8%),
were also popular. Despite IP cameras only accounting for 8% of devices, if they
could be leveraged and used as a proxy to infect other devices in home networks,
the potential impact from IoT botnets, could be significantly greater than already
experienced. Clearly, early detection and mitigation of such attacks is vital.
The study first explored participants attitudes towards security and privacy in the IoT.
To assess whether respondents ranked security and privacy highly in theory, but not
in practice, respondents were asked how concerned they would be if a smart device
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they owned was infected with a virus, but was still functioning as expected. In asking
this question, the aim was to assess whether the phenomenon known as the Privacy
Paradox was evident in the context of attitudes towards IoT devices. The privacy
paradox has been well documented in papers such as [195, 196], and although mainly
in the context of online security, demonstrates that user attitudes towards security and
privacy, often differ from the actions they take or decisions they make. Indeed, this has
been highlighted in studies such as [19, 197]. In this study, Figure 5.1b shows that given
a scenario where a device was infected with malware, but still functioning normally,
over three quarters of respondents indicated that they would still be very concerned.
When asked to rate the importance of various features related to IoT devices (as shown
in Figure 5.2), security 102 (65%) and privacy 100 (63%) were clearly considered very
important features. However, interestingly when asked to rank the features in order of
priority, cost was ranked higher than both security and privacy by the largest percentage
of respondents 53 (34%) (see Figure 5.3). In [198] it is suggested, while many users
show theoretical interest in their privacy and maintain a positive attitude towards
privacy-protection behaviour, this rarely translates into actual protective behaviour.
The results in this study could confirm this, and suggest a possible dichotomy between
privacy attitudes and actual behaviour, during procurement of IoT devices.
The study next explored the particpants ability to detect threats in consumer IoT net-
works. In doing so, a sandboxed botnet environment was used to infect an IoT IP
camera, and leverage it to perform four attacks against a target. Respondents of the
online survey were presented with video recordings of the four recorded attack scenarios,
and their situational awareness and ability to detect infections recorded. Situational
Awareness (SA) was defined in Chapter 2 as “the state of being aware of circumstances
that exist around us, especially those that are particularly relevant to us and which we
are interested about” [199]. Applied in a cyber context the author further presents an
adapted SA model composed of four levels where perception, deals with evidence gath-
ering of situations in the network. Comprehension refers to the analysis of evidence to
deduce threat level, type and associated risk. Projection deals with predictive measures
to address future incidents, and resolution deals with controls to repair, recover and
resolve network situations [122]. This study evaluates the first of these levels (percep-
tion), and clearly demonstrates the difficulty users face in detecting threats found in IoT
consumer networks. In scenario A and B users were presented with video recordings as
shown in Figure 5.4. During the infection process and attacks, participants indicated
that the camera did not display any adverse symptoms of infection, and continued to
function as expected. This was evident from the results in Tables 5.2 and 5.3 where
61% and 59% of respondents reported not being able to detect any unusual activity in
the video. Comments from respondents included:
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“There wasn’t any clear evidence” (Advanced Participant)
“I could not tell at all if the camera was infected” (Intermediate Participant)
In [122] the author suggests that perception in the context of Cyber SA also refers
to knowledge of the elements in the network, and awareness of alerts such as those
reported by intrusion detection systems, firewall logs, and scan reports. However, while
this is certainly true of security analysts, this information is unlikely to be available
in consumer networks, therefore may not be a contributing factor in achieving SA
in consumer networks. In these environments the user would only have information
displayed by the IoT device, in the case of scenario A and B in the study that would
be the live video feed. Since there were no adverse symptoms of infection, and the IP
camera continued to function as expected, it is understandable that 32 (38%) indicated
it was very difficult, and 25 (29%) difficult, to detect the device was infected from the
presented live video feed.
In scenario C and D users were presented with recorded outputs from a popular packet
capture tool (wireshark) as shown in Figure 5.5. The use of the packet capture tool
significantly improved detection in scenario C with 120 (76%) of respondents now
indicating they knew when an attack took place. Results in Table 5.4 confirm this, with
76 (48%) [11–20 s] and 92 (58%) [21–30 s] correctly identifying the time period when
the attack took place. However, in scenario D the packet capture tool did not appear
to improve detection, as results presented in Table 5.5 show respondent responses were
varied across all time periods. The number of respondents who indicated they knew
when the attack took place also dropped to 93 (59%).
In [3], the author presents the need for greater online awareness and protection for
NEUs. The author undertook a study to establish the views of NEUs on personal
cyber security and suggests a lack of technical knowledge and ability to explore network
communication, results in little or no awareness of security issues. Previous studies such
as [191] have also demonstrated relationships between the technical ability of a user, and
the ability to be perceive and be aware of risks. To test this assumption a hypothesis
was defined in section 5.2.1 as:
H1: There is no association between detection accuracy and technical
knowledge when detecting threats in consumer networks.
Figure 5.7 shows the accuracy of detection for each scenario across the four knowledge
levels. When accuracy rates for the four scenarios are combined to give a Total accuracy








































Figure 5.7: Accuracy within Knowledge levels
However, when the four scenarios were considered separately a clear dichotomy was
found between scenario A-B and C-D. Results in Table 5.6 show that for scenario A,
where no attack was performed, detection accuracy across the four knowledge levels
did not demonstrate any association between knowledge level and ability to detect an
infected device. Novice (83%) and Expert (88%) demonstrated similar accuracy, and
better than that of both Intermediate (56%) and Advanced (53%). In Table 5.7, the
results for scenario B again show that detection accuracy across the four knowledge
levels did not demonstrate any association between knowledge level and ability to detect
an infected device. Participants across all knowledge levels reported finding it difficult
to identify an infected device from just the live video feed.
“I couldn’t see anything happen so assume they were not infected”, “it wasn’t
possible to tell if anything bad happened” (Novice Participant)
“I do not think these cameras were infected, as I expected some stuttering
or a black out, but this did not happen” (Intermediate Participant)
“There was no stuttering or black outs of video, so I would say neither
camera was infected” (Advanced Participant)
“I could not tell at all if the cameras were infected. I only noticed a timing
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difference between the two videos, concerning the L/R letters animation”
(Expert Participant)
For scenarios C-D a clear association was found between the two variables, as shown in
Figure 5.7. As technical knowledge increased from Novice to Expert, so did participants
ability to detect an infected device: Novice (48%), Intermediate (59%), Advanced (65%)
and Expert (75%) (see Table 5.8). Presenting network communication as shown in
Figure 5.5a appeared to greatly improve their awareness of a threat, and ability to
correctly detect when an attack took place. Participants reported colour being helpful
and a positive contributing factor to better detection accuracy:
“Program code went red”, “Bulk black lines appeared”, “Maybe the black bits
with red writing may be something bad?” (Novice Participants)
“yes wire shark made it easier to see that it was infected by all the ran-
dom traffic”, “there were red warnings on the screen”, “Vast number of red
highlighted addresses” (Intermediate Participants)
“On the first the red warning messages were visible”, “I saw a lot of areas
highlighted in red, red highlights usually denotes a problem, so by deduction,
those were errors”, “Red text black blocks” (Expert Participants)
It was clear from participants comments that the way information is presented, and
importantly the colours used, helped to aid better detection. This was evident even
among Novice participants, who appeared not to fully understand what the information
was showing, but were able to use it to become more situationally aware of what was
happening with the IoT device.
“Red normally represents danger, so I would guess the parts of video which
were red was when the cameras were infected”, “It was difficult to tell but
I would guess the bits which flashed red (first camera) and the bits that
flashed black/red (both cameras) could be a warning of something happening
?” (Novice Participants)
In scenario D, participants were again shown network communication as shown in
Figure 5.5b. Results in Table 5.9 again demonstrated an association between the two
variables, although not as strong as the previous scenario. Data presentation differed
from the network traffic in scenario C, and appeared to be a contributing factor in
detection rates, particularly within the Novice knowledge group where the detection
rate significantly dropped to (9%).
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From the analysis in this study it is possible to conclude that the authors assertion in
[3] that “a lack of technical knowledge, and the ability to explore network communica-
tion, results in little or no awareness of security issues”, is true in part. The results in
this study show that a lack of network communication can result in little or no aware-
ness of security issues; however, if presented with data, awareness can be improved.
Presentation of the data is however also vitally important, otherwise the presence of
the additional data, can have little impact. Since the results were not statistically
significant in all four scenarios, the null hypothesis H1 cannot be fully rejected.
This study also tested the assumption that age has an impact on security [190] to
discover if there was a relationship between the studies dependent variable (accuracy)
and participant’s age which was used as the second independent variable in this study.
To test this assumption the hypothesis was defined in section 5.2.1 as:
H2: There is no association between detection accuracy and age when
detecting threats in consumer networks.
Accuracy levels for each age group were summarised in Table 5.15 and did not indicate
an association existed between age and ability to detect an attack. Results were also not
found to be significant for any scenarios, therefore the null hypothesis H2 was accepted
and the study concludes there is no association between age and ability to detect threats
in consumer IoT networks. This chapter set out to answer the question “Can users
visually detect the presence of threats within consumer IoT networks ?”. It is clear from
the results that users find it very difficult to detect the presence of threats, however,
this can be improved through the presentation of additional information, which will be
explored in the next chapter.
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5.5 Conclusions
This chapter examined the awareness and perception of threats found within the IoT.
First, it explored how users value and perceive security and privacy in smart devices.
It also analysed user requirements from IoT devices, and assessed their ability to detect
threats, in the context of demographic characteristics (technical knowledge and age). It
is still unclear whether a clear association exists between demographic characteristics
and the ability to detect threats. However, the results suggested that users valued
security and privacy but found identifying threats difficult. The study found that a
lack of network communication can result in little or no awareness of security issues;
however, if presented with data, awareness can be improved. Presentation of the data
is, however, vitally important, otherwise the presence of the additional data, can have
little impact. This evidence provides the justification for the further research presented
in subsequent chapters, namely an exploration of different modalities for presenting
data to non technical users. The next chapter reports the results of a study which
examined the use of conversational agents for improving situational awareness. The
development of two agents based on Aural(Au) and Verbal(Ve) modalities is presented,
and the findings of a cross-sectional viability study reported.
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Chapter 6
Cross-sectional Study to Test the
Viability of Conversational
Agents to Improve Cyber
Situational Awareness
Chapter 5 examined how users value and perceive security and privacy in smart devices
found within the IoT. The study analysed user requirements from IoT devices, and
the importance placed upon security and privacy. It also assessed a users ability to
detect threats, in the context of technical knowledge and experience. The study showed
that although users reported to value security and privacy they could not adequately
detect when an IoT device was infected and performing attacks. This chapter seeks to
address this issue and examine the use of conversational agents for improving situational
awareness. The chapter presents the development of two agents based on Aural(Au)
and Verbal(Ve) modalities and reports the findings of a cross-sectional viability study.
6.1 Introduction
The focus of this chapter is attempting to answer sub research question SQ3: “Are
conversational agents a viable method for making users aware of threats in consumer
IoT networks?”. Firstly, a quantitative approach was used to examine the use of
two conversational agents for improving Situational Awareness of threats in consumer
IoT networks. Mica Endsley’s [1] model was adopted to assess how participants per-
ceive device activity, comprehend this in the context of their environment, and use
the knowledge to determine if a threat exists. Secondly, a qualitative approach was
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taken to examine feedback about the conversation agents using a thematic analysis
technique. This twofold approach to analysis was carried out in order to examine the
viability of the conversational agents for improving situational awareness, and to elicit
feedback which could inform possible refinements to the conversational agents ahead of
a longitudinal study in Chapter 7.
6.2 Methodology
6.2.1 Experimental Variables
This study measured participants ability to be situationally aware of threats within
consumer IoT networks using two conversational agents. The statements created in
Section 3.3.5, which had previously been mapped to Endsley’s SA model [1], were used
to calculate a Cyber Situational Awareness score (CSAS ). Since the aim of this study
was to test the overall viability of the agents, the three layers of Endsley’s model were
combined to create a single metric (CSAS ). This metric was used as the dependent
variable and was derived from calculating the sum of the three means Perception,















Data was collected using Likert scales and was therefore ordinal. The Aural(Au) and
Verbal(Ve) conversational agents were used as the independent variables. Since the
aim of the study to test the assumption that participants awareness of threats could be
improved using the agents, a Pre-Study/Post-Study analysis of the dependent variable
was performed to measure any reported differences in (CSAS ). The hypothesis for this
study is therefore defined as:
Hypothesis A: Situational Awareness of threats will be improved using conversational
agents.
The previous study, presented in chapter 5, found that a lack of understanding/knowl-
edge of network communication can result in little or no awareness of security issues;
however, if users are provided with additional information in the correct format, situ-
ational awareness of threats can be improved. A visual modality was used to present
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the additional information to non technical users and was demonstrated to be a con-
venient and effective method of improving awareness. In addition, previous research
[143, 140, 141] has also suggested awareness and understanding can be improved using
other learning modalities. Therefore, the aim of this study was to explore if conversa-
tional agents, based on additional learning modalities, could improve situational aware-
ness of threats. Specifically, the study tested the assumption that conversational agents
based on Aural(Au) and Verbal(Ve) modalities could be used to present additional in-
formation to users to improve situational awareness of threats. It was hypothesised:
H1: Post-Study Cyber Situational Awareness Score (CSAS ) of the
Intervention group will be higher than the Pre-Study Cyber Situational
Awareness Score.
H2: Post-Study Cyber Situational Awareness Score (CSAS ) of the
Control group will be lower than the Pre-Study Cyber Situational
Awareness Score.
H3: Post-Study Cyber Situational Awareness Score (CSAS ) of the
Control group will Not be significantly different than the Intervention
group Pre-Study Cyber Situational Awareness Score.
The first hypothesis (H1) was used to measure if participants became more situation-
ally aware of threats as a result of using the conversational agents. The results in
Chapter 5 and research in [19] suggested that participants may have some awareness of
potential threats, but may not fully understand the implications or potential for mis-
use. The second hypothesis (H2) was, therefore, used to measure changes in situational
awareness, as a result of watching a video which explained how insecure smart devices
could be used to perform attacks on the internet. If the control groups Post-Study
results were lower than their Pre-Study results, this may confirm the existence of this
phenomenon. Finally, it was important to establish that any measured changes in situ-
ational awareness could be attributed to the use of the agents and not as a result of any
hidden factors [149], such as the video which was watched. Participants were therefore
split into two groups and the Post-Study Control group results compared with the
Pre-Study Intervention group results in hypothesis (H3). If there was no significant
difference found between the Post-Study Control group results and the Pre-Study In-
tervention group, the reliability of the results could be established and the mitigation
of confounding variables confirmed.
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6.2.2 Study Design
A cross-sectional study was conducted to evaluate the viability of using conversational
agents to improve Cyber Situational Awareness (See Figure 6.1). Participants were
recruited and assigned to two groups as described in Section 6.2.4. Participants in the
Intervention group watched an introductory video1 about threats facing smart homes
and completed a short related activity. The video was chosen since it provided a good
summary of recent DDoS attacks which have targeted smart devices found within the
IoT, and could, therefore, be used to gauge participants current awareness of such
threats. In addition, it could be used to check for confounding variables as discussed
below. The participants were then asked to complete a Pre-study survey and indicate
their level of agreement with nine statements (See Table 6.1) relating to their awareness
and ability to monitor smart device and network activity. These were mapped to Mica
Endsley’s SA model as described in Section 3.3.5. Participants were then asked to
use the agents to answer questions relating to use-case scenarios presented in Section
6.2.2, and provide feedback on their effectiveness. Finally, the participants completed
a Post-study survey of the same nine statements, and variance in their attitudes were
recorded. The use of a control group enabled confounding variables to be mitigated
and enhanced scientific rigour. Participants in the control group completed the same
Pre-Study survey, before watching the introductory video about threats facing smart
homes and completing the short related activity. Finally, they completed the Post-
Study survey. This approach allowed their Pre-Study/Post-Study scores for the nine
confidence statements to be compared and variance in the scores measured. If they
reported being less confident in the Post-Study survey, this may indicate they initially
reported inaccurate confidence levels due to a lack of awareness of the threats facing
smart home environments. The study design also allowed the intervention group results
to be checked for confounding variables, by comparing the control group Post-Study
scores with the intervention group Pre-Study scores. Since these were both completed
after watching the short video and activity, they should be similar and validate the
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Figure 6.1: Cross Sectional Study Design.
Use-Case Scenario Design
To evaluate the viability of using conversational agents to improve Cyber Situational
Awareness the use-cases developed in Section 3.3.2 were used. Each use-case was de-
signed to represent a realistic example of how a user might use the agents to monitor
smart device and network activity. To give use-cases context and ensure participants
had a realistic experience of monitoring smart device and network activity, a contextual
scenario was created for each use-case. Table 3.1 describes the five use-cases used in
the Pilot and the further two use-cases used in the Main study. The corresponding
scenario devised for each use-case is presented in Appendix D.1. Finally, Table 3.3
demonstrates how each scenario mapped to the corresponding use-case in the study.
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Cyber Situational Awareness
Cyber Situational Awareness was measured using the nine confidence statements cre-
ated in Section 3.3.5. A survey was generated which included the nine confidence
statements, plus seven additional statements relating to general smart device security
(See Table 6.1). The additional general security statements were only used as a distrac-
tion [200], to disguise the focus of the nine confidence statements. This was important
as previous studies have emphasised the importance of avoiding the introduction of
bias into a study by priming participants [201, 202]. The use of the seven additional
statements ensured participants were unaware that the focus of the study was on their
confidence to detect threats, which could have resulted in inflated confidence levels
being reported. For each statement in the survey participants were asked to indicate
their level of agreement using a five-point likert scale from Strongly Disagree (1) to
Strongly Agree (5). Finally, participants completed the same survey before and after
using the conversational agents, and the differences in their responses was compared.
The Pre-Study/Post-Study Survey is presented in Appendix I.
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Table 6.1: Pre-study/Post-study Cyber Situational Awareness (CSA) Statements
Five-point Likert Scale from Strongly Disagree (1) to Strongly Agree (5)
# SA Statement
pe1 I am confident I can tell which smart devices are using my home network.
± Smart devices are more secure than non smart equivalent devices.
pe2 I am confident I can tell how often a smart device is communicating on my
homework, and how much of the available network bandwidth it is using.
± Smart devices update themselves automatically.
pe3 I am confident I can tell which smart devices have the highest usage on my
home network.
± Smart devices are intelligent and can protect themselves from attackers.
co1 I am confident I can tell if my network is experiencing a normal level of
device communications and bandwidth usage.
± Smart devices alert you if an attacker is trying to compromise the device.
co2 I am confident I can tell if a smart device is functioning normally.
± Smart devices are less likely to be targeted by attackers.
co3 I am confident I can tell if a smart device is using my home network more
or less than normal.
pr1 I am confident I can tell if an attack has taken place on my home network.
± Smart devices in the home are not accessible from the Internet.
pr2 I am confident I can tell if a smart device on my home network has been
compromised.
± Smart devices in the home can be used to perform attacks on the internet.
pr3 I am confident I could tell in the future if my home network or smart device
had been compromised.
± used as a distractor statement
6.2.3 Conversational Agent Design
This section describes the design of the Aural(Au) agent used in both the initial Pilot
study (See Section 6.2.5) and the main study, and the additional Verbal(Ve) agent
used in the main study only. A more detailed description of each agent development is












Figure 6.2: IDS Log Parsing and Storage.
In Chapter 4, a secure sandboxed environment was created, and a dataset containing
IoT botnet traffic was generated. The generated dataset consisted of 37 captures (3600
second duration each), over a total of five days, and was stored in pcap and csv for-
mat. Ground truth labels were assigned to classify traffic as either normal or attacks
associated with the Mirai malware. A subset of the dataset was used in this study,
and contained both background (classified as normal) and IoT botnet related traffic
(classified as unusual). To aid better understanding of the data, features were renamed
from No. Time, Source, Destination, Protocol, Label to ID, DateTime, SourceDevice,
DestinationDevice, DataType, Activity. Although features Length and Info were used
during the detection and classification of threats in Chapter 4, the complexity of the
information meant they had limited value when using the conversational agents. Since
the features would not be required later, they were removed. Finally, the csv files were
concatenated, converted to JSON format, and stored in a specified directory ready to
be ingested by the ETL pipeline. A sample record from the newly amended dataset is
found in Source Code 6.1.
1 {
2 ”ID”: ”487”,






Source Code 6.1: Sample JSON record
The ETL pipeline to Extract, Transform, and Load IDS logs into DynamoDB is pre-
sented in Figure 6.2. Suitable IDS logs are parsed and stored in the specified directory,
ready to be ingested by the ETL pipeline. For this study, the IDS logs consisted of the
classified dataset (subset) in JSON format. In (step 1) a script monitors the directory
for new files. When a new JSON file is added, the file is extracted, transformed, and
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loaded to an S3 bucket on AWS. In (step 2) a Lambda function is triggered whenever
a new file is added to the S3 bucket. The use of Lambda allows code to be executed
without provisioning or managing a server. It also ensures costs are reduced since they
only occur when a function is triggered, and code run. In (step 3) once the handler
object has been triggered, the code in the Lambda function is executed, and data loaded















Figure 6.3: Aural Agent Architecture.
Primary input for the Aural(Au) conversational agent is speech derived from Amazon
Alexa enabled devices. Input is analysed using natural language processing (NLP)
techniques to understand the user query (intent), and is matched to sample phrases
(utterances) of ways a user could ask the query. The intent is used to query the
secondary input source (IDS logs stored in a DynamoDB table) for an appropriate
answer to the query, and responses are returned accordingly.
The agent consists of three main components: a database of classified IoT traffic created
in Chapter 4, NLP engine as an interface between a user and the Alexa device, and
a query handler. The Aural(Au) agent architecture is presented in Figure 6.3. The
speech recognition engine is contained in the Alexa device, the query handler is the
developed Alexa Skill and AWS Lambda function. Finally, a DynamoDB database is
used to store and query classified IDS logs.
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In Figure 6.3, the agent frontend is powered by an Amazon Echo device. NLP software
in the Echo device uses speech recognition to convert user input (in the form of speech)
to text. The query handler acts as the bridge between the Echo device and the IDS
database. The Alexa skill receives converted aural requests from the Echo device (step
1), matches them to specified (utterances) and configured functionality intents and
forwards the request to the AWS Lambda function (step 2). Next, a query request is
triggered to interact with the DynamoDB table (step 3). Once fulfilled, an appropriate
answer to the user query is returned. Finally, the Alexa skill generates an aural response
from the returned answer, invokes the Echo device, which in turn communicates the
response to the user (step 4).
The backend of the system is hosted on AWS infrastructure as a scalable serverless
solution, which parses and stores IDS logs in a DynamoDB table. The handler function
is also hosted on AWS Lambda, using server-less technology to allow event-driven
code to be run without provisioning servers. The handler function is used to trigger
interaction with the DynamoDB, and provide functionality to the Alexa Skill.
The intents developed and used by the Aural(Au) agent are described in Section 6.2.3
and were tested using the use-cases described in Section 6.2.2. An example user query
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Figure 6.4: Verbal Agent Architecture
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Primary input for the Verbal(Ve) conversational agent is text derived from a chatbot
running on the Telegram1 messaging service. The architecture is similar to that of the
Aural(Au) agent, however, is hosted on Google’s Dialogflow2, a popular platform for
creating conversational agents. Natural language processing (NLP) techniques are also
used to understand user queries and extract information from a DynamoDB table to
identify threats which may have occured.
The process of interaction between a user and the Verbal(Ve) agent is shown in Fig-
ure 6.4. A user interacts with the agent using a chatbot deployed in the Telegram
app, running on a mobile phone or tablet. The user query (intent) is sent from Tele-
gram to Dialogflow which uses Google’s Machine Learning NLP to understand the user
query. For each intent, sample phrases (utterances) of what a user might say when
interacting with the agent were provided. Dialogflow then uses extensive accumulated
domain knowledge to analyse and understand the user’s intent, to ensure accurate query
responses. Once understood the query is forwarded to the AWS Lambda Function how-
ever, since the query requires to be forwarded from Google’s platform to Amazon, an
AWS API was created and used as a webhook, creating a bridge between the two plat-
forms. Whenever a user query is received by the Lambda function, the query handler
is triggered and interacts with DynamoDB to find a suitable response the user query.
The response is sent back to Dialogflow and is then forwarded to the chatbot running
in Telegram.
The Verbal(Ve) agent uses the same backend infrastructure as the Aural(Au) agent
which is hosted on AWS infrastructure as a scalable serverless solution.
The intents developed and used by the Verbal(Ve) agent are described in Section 6.2.3
and were tested using the use-cases described in Section 6.2.2. An example user query






Hi Welcome to Threat
Detector, How can I
help ?
give me a summary of











Hi Welcome to Threat
Detector, How can I
help ?





and Smart Bulb were
active on the network
goodbye
(b) Verbal Agent
Figure 6.5: Example Agent Conversations
Agent Intents
Conversational agents built with Amazon’s Alexa Skills Kit1 or Google’s Dialogflow2
use intents to represent an action that fulfills a user’s request (Aural or Verbal). Ten
custom intents were configured, and used to trigger specific event functionality and
enable a user to query the IDS logs in DynamoDB for information. Seven in-built
Amazon intents were also used as triggers to perform preconfigured functionality such
as repeat, stop or cancel an intent.
For each custom intent a series of utterances were configured. Utterances are the
phrases a user may use to trigger a particular intent. Given the variation of spoken
language in the real world, there will often be several ways to express the same request.
For example, to invoke the activitySummaryToday intent a user could say “show me a
summary of today’s activity”, “show me the summary of today’s activity ” or “give me
summary details for today’s activity ”. To ensure an intent could be invoked using a
variety of expressions, a minimum of three sample utterances were configured for each
custom intent.
Utterances which contained words that represented variable information specified by
a user, were assigned a slot/action. For example, to invoke intent activityDetailsByID
the utterance “show me details for activity id {ID}” was used, where the {ID} slot




six. In total ten intents were created. Five were used in the initial pilot study, and a
further five were added in the main study as detailed below:.
1. activitySummaryToday: Responds to a user query and returns a summary of
all activity taking place today.
2. activitySummaryByDate: Responds to a user query and returns a summary
of all activity taking place on a specified date.
3. activitySummarySrcDevAndDate: Responds to a user query and returns a
summary of all activity from a specified source device on a specified date.
4. firstUnusualActivityByDate: Responds to a user query and returns details of
the first activity on a specified date, which is classified as unusual.
5. activityDetailsByID: Responds to a user query and returns details of a speci-
fied activity ID.
6. networkStatusToday: Responds to a user query and informs if there has been
any issues detected on the network.
7. listSrcDevToday: Responds to a user query and returns a list of all active
source devices on the network today.
8. listSrcDevByDate: Responds to a user query and returns a list of all active
source devices on a specified date.
9. activityTotalBySrcDevLastThreeDays: Responds to a user query and re-
turns details of how much activity a specified source device had on each of the
last three days.
10. activityTotalLastThreeDays: Responds to a user query and returns a sum-
mary of how much activity has occurred on each of the last three days.
Example intents, utterances and responses are presented in Table 6.2, and full details
of each intent is provided in Appendix C.
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Table 6.2: Example Agent Intents, Utterances and Responses
Intent Utterance Response
i1 activitySummaryToday (1) “show a summary of
today’s activity”
(2) “give me a summary of
today’s activity”
Alright, Today there has
been 66.19 percent normal
activity and 33.81 percent
unusual activity. Anything
else I may help you with?
i4 firstUnusualActivityByDate (1) “give me detail of
first {input} activity on
{unusualDate}”




what was the first {input}
activity”
Alright, First unusual
activity on 2019-01-20 For
which I.D is 690, Date Time
is 20/01/2019 09:53, Source
Device is Smart Camera,
Destination Device is Smart
Fridge, Data Type is UDP,
Activity type is unusual.
Anything else I may help
you with?
i5 activityDetailsByID (1) “give me details of activ-
ity id {ID}”
(2) “show me activity id
{ID}”
(3) “what is the details of ac-
tivity id {ID}”
I.D is 366, Date for that
is 2019-01-18, time is 19:39,
Source Device is Amazon
Echo, Destination Device is
Smart Camera, Data Type
is ARP, Activity type is nor-
mal. What else would you
like to know?
Full list of intents are presented in Appendix C
6.2.4 Participants
In the main study the aim was to assess the viability of conversational agents for im-
proving awareness of threats facing smart devices. Convenience sampling was employed,
with participants selected due to their convenient accessibility, and proximity to the
author. Informed consent was provided by participants by reading the study agreement
on the first page, before indicating their consent to participate by proceeding to the
next page of the survey. Participants were recruited at university Applicant Day events
in February and March 2019, and during public events held in the university during
British Science Week 2019. This approach enabled us to collect a wide range of views
and avoid oversampling of a specific demographic, namely the local student population.
A total of eighty participants started the study, and were randomly assigned to either
the control or intervention group creating groups of similar sizes. Eight participants
did not complete the study resulting in an attrition rate of 10%. When attrition oc-
curs, the groups can become dissimilar which can lead to bias in the estimated effect
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of the intervention [203]. However, although this study had high differential attrition
(13.5%), the attrition predominately took place in the control group, therefore the in-
tervention results are still considered to have validity. Although the intention was to
avoid oversampling, the largest demographic was participants aged 18-24 with advanced
technical skills as presented in Table 6.3. This however was considered acceptable since
statistically this is the largest demographic of conversational agent users [204].
Table 6.3: Participant Demographic
Age % Ability %
18-24 34 (47) Novice 6 (8)
25-39 25 (35) Intermediate 20 (28)
40-59 11 (15) Advanced 32 (44)
60+ 2 (3) Expert 14 (20)
n = 72
Randomisation is an important element of a well-designed experiment [157]. Partici-
pants were therefore randomly assigned to the two groups (Control and Intervention)
as shown in Table 6.4.
Table 6.4: Group Allocation
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To test the effectiveness of the prototype conversational agent a pilot study was con-
ducted in December 2018, using a representative sample (n=12) of users. This size
adhered to recommended guidelines [205] [206] of being a minimum of 10 particpants
or 10% of the treatment group in the main study. Consent to participate was implied
when participants decided to engage in the research and complete the agent evaluation.
Convenience sampling was employed, with subjects selected due to their convenient ac-
cessibility and proximity. To evaluate the conversational agent, each participant was
asked to complete a Pre-Study survey and indicate their level of agreement with five
statements (See Table 3.4) relating to their awareness and ability to monitor smart de-
vice and network activity. A Likert-type scale from Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree
was used. To test the functionality of the conversational agent, participants were then
asked to use the agent to answer questions relating to five use-cases presented in Section
3.3.2. The use-cases were designed to represent realistic descriptions of how a user might
want to use the conversational agent for monitoring smart device and network activity.
Finally, participants completed a Post-Study survey of the same five statements, and
variance in their attitudes was recorded. Since related groups were being compared,
where participants completed the same survey Pre and Post study, Wilcoxon signed-
rank tests were used for comparisons. A statistically significant median increase (p <
.05) was observed in three statements [20]. This clearly demonstrated the agent had
the potential to make a positive contribution towards improving situational awareness
of threats in smart homes. On conclusion of the Post-Study survey, participants were
asked for suggestions of how the agent could be improved. These can be summarised
as follows:
1. The ability to get a simple status of the network and if any unusual activity has
occurred.
2. The ability to see which devices have been active on the network on a given date,
and their total activity.
3. The ability to see the total activity for a device, and combined total for the
network.
Amendments for Main Study.
The feedback was used to make amendments and additions to the Aural(Au) agent
to improve the utility of the agent for the main study. Firstly, feedback suggested
the functionality of the agent should be extended, therefore five additional intents
were added to the agent for the main study (See Appendix C.1). This also resulted
in the addition of two extra use-cases (See Table 3.1). Finally, participants found it
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challenging to find devices using their IP address and suggested using the device’s name
“don’t use ip address to search for a device but rather its name” (# p12 ). Therefore,
all intents and agent responses were amended to use device names.
6.3 Results
6.3.1 Cyber Situational Awareness Score (CSAS)
Participants awareness and confidence to detect threats was measured and is presented
in Table 6.5. Pre-Study/Post-Study Mean, Median and standard deviation for both the
control and intervention groups are reported. In addition, the three layers of Endsley’s
SA model were combined and are reported as a single metric (CSAS ). This was derived
from the sum of the three means Perception, Comprehension, and Projection.
Table 6.5: Mean, Median and Standard Deviation: Cyber Situational Awareness Score
(CSAS)
SA Levels CSAS




L Pre-Study 3.50 3.33 .69 2.11 5.00 10.51
Post-Study 2.46 2.50 .39 1.56 3.44 7.37
IN
T Pre-Study 2.41 2.33 .41 1.56 3.44 7.23
Post-Study 4.06 4.00 .44 2.78 4.78 12.17
To check if differences between Pre and Post-Study scores were significant Wilcoxon
Signed-Rank tests were carried out. The Post-Study Intervention median score (4.00)
was found to be higher than the Pre-Study score (2.33). A Wilcoxon Signed-Rank
test indicated that the difference was statistically significant, Z = -5.240, p < .001.
The Post-Study Control median score (2.50) was found to be lower than the Pre-Study
score (3.33). A Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test indicated that the difference was statistically
significant, Z = -5.076, p < .001.
To test the validity of the data a Cronbach alpha coefficient test was performed on both
groups Pre and Post-Study situational awareness scores. Cronbach alpha coefficient for
the Control and Intervention groups (α = .77, .84 respectively) were found to be above
the recommended value .70 [207], therefore the data was considered valid with good
internal consistency.
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6.3.2 Conversational Agent Effectiveness
Participants effectiveness rating for both conversational agents was measured and is
presented in Table 6.6. The Mean and Median effectiveness scores were calculated for
each of the seven use-case scenarios and used to compare the two agents. Results show
that the effectiveness of the Aural(Au) agent was rated higher in three scenarios (sc1
(4.56), sc2 (4.36), sc3 (4.47)), while the Verbal(Verbal) agent was rated higher in the
remaining four scenarios (sc4 (3.94), sc5 (3.97), sc6 (4.31), sc7 (4.22)). However, in
the three scenarios where the Aural(Au) agent was rated higher, the mean scores for
the two agents were comparable: sc1 (.23+), sc2 (.08+), sc3 (.14+). In comparison,
the mean difference between agents in the scenarios where the Verbal(Verbal) agent was
rated highest was shown to be more significant: sc4 (1.05+), sc5 (1.11+), sc6 (.62+),
sc7 (.55+).
Table 6.6: Mean, Median: Agent Effectiveness
x x̃ min max
sc
1 Au 4.56 5.00 3.00 5.00
Ve 4.33 4.00 3.00 5.00
sc
2 Au 4.36 4.00 3.00 5.00
Ve 4.28 4.00 3.00 5.00
sc
3 Au 4.47 5.00 3.00 5.00
Ve 4.33 4.00 3.00 5.00
sc
4 Au 2.89 3.00 1.00 5.00
Ve 3.94 4.00 2.00 5.00
sc
5 Au 2.86 3.00 1.00 5.00
Ve 3.97 4.00 3.00 5.00
sc
6 Au 3.69 4.00 2.00 5.00
Ve 4.31 4.00 3.00 5.00
sc
7 Au 3.67 4.00 2.00 5.00
Ve 4.22 4.00 3.00 5.00
Aural(Au) Verbal(Ve)
n = 36
Figure 6.6 further demonstrates the difference in effectiveness rating between the two
agents. Participants rated the agents on a scale of One to Five (1 being low and 5
high). Results show that for the first three scenarios the reported effectiveness scores
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are comparable, with 88.89% of participants rating both agents either 4/5 or 5/5. For
scenarios four and five the difference in effectiveness rating is more evident with 69.45%,
72.22% respectively rating the Verbal(Ve) agent either 4/5 or 5/5. In comparison, for
scenarios four and five participants rating the Aural(Au) agent either 4 or 5/5 was
only 27.77%, 27.78%. Finally, for scenarios six and seven the Verbal(Ve) agent was
clearly rated much higher with 94.44%, 88.89% rating the agent as either 4/5 or 5/5.
In comparison, the Aural(Au) agent was only rated as either 4/5 or 5/5 by 58.34%,
































































Figure 6.6: Aural and Verbal Effectiveness Rating
6.4 Discussion
This study was undertaken to assess the viability of using conversational agents to im-
prove Cyber Situational Awareness. Specifically, it sought to explore if user awareness
and perception of threats facing consumer IoT could be improved through using the
agents which were developed. As previously mentioned, participants in the Interven-
tion group were asked to use the two conversational agents to answer questions relating
to use-case scenarios presented in Section 6.2.2, and provide feedback on their use and
effectiveness. Feedback was later used to refine the agents for use in the longitudi-
nal study in Chapter 7. Template analysis was used to analyse the feedback data as
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described in Section 3.4.2. Coding tables produced from the qualitative analysis of re-
sponses are presented in Appendix E. For brevity, a representative sample of responses
are provided below for each of the questions asked. Participants were first asked what
they liked and disliked about each of the conversational agents. Participants reported
the usability of both agents to be a strength:
“Convenient to quickly check if devices are ok” (# p1 )
“handy way to check your devices are ok” (# p17 )
“much quicker than checking each device individually” (# p9 )
“that I can check my devices are ok from my phone anytime I want” (# p3 )
Participants reported finding the agents a convenient and easy way to quickly check
if their devices were functioning normally. The portability of the Verbal(Ve) agent
was found to be particularly useful since it allowed devices to be checked outside of
the home. Participants also reported finding the interactive nature of the agents to be
enjoyable and educational.
“I enjoyed using this technology” (# p7 )
“It was actually quite fun to use the Alexa for checking smart devices” (#
p22 )
“I liked learning new technology” (# p29 )
Interestingly, elements of agent usability were also reported to be areas least liked about
the agents. Participants reported difficulty with the Aural(Au) agent understanding
their voice commands. While typing difficulties were reported with the Verbal(Ve)
agent.
“Was a bit laggy for a while” (# p3 )
“sometimes struggled to understand me first time” (# p13 )
“had to speak like a robot for it to understand me” (# p17 )
“typing the same questions multiple times may become tedious” (# p10 )
“typing each question could be prone to error” (# p16 )
“lack of help to know what queries were available” (# p34 )
Since the intention of soliciting feedback was to inform refinements needed in prepa-
ration for the final longitudinal study in Chapter 7, participants were next asked to
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recommend one improvement that would make the agents better. As speech recognition
was identified as an issue with the Aural(Au) agent, this was an area recommended for
improvement.
“improve how it recognises peoples voice” (# p13 )
“understand Scottish accents better” (# p32 )
In addition, since participants reported issues relating to typing when using the Ver-
bal(Ve) agent it was recommended to improve this area by enabling predictive typing
and providing a list of available queries which can be used.
“help facility to see which questions are available and what they do” (#
p17 )
“some kind of reminder of the the questions that are available” (# p34 )
“predictive typing like when you are texting on your phone” (# p23 )
Finally, it was recommended that more queries be added to both agents, in particularly
a method to provide a quick summary of activity for multiple days. It was recommended
that the availability of the Verbal(Ve) agent should be expanded to other popular
platforms such as Whatsapp and Facebook Messenger.
“quick summary for multiple days” (# p10 )
“never heard of Telegram, more people might use it if it was on something
like Facebook messenger” (# p31 )
Since the study was aimed to assess participants attitudes towards IoT threats, both
groups (Intervention, Control) were asked if they already monitored their devices, and
if not, if they would likely start as a result of engaging in this study. If only a small
number of participants previously monitored their device activity, this could suggest the
risk of threats was not warranted to be sufficient to require device monitoring. If after
engaging in the study participants reported they may start monitoring devices, this
could suggest their initial lack of awareness contributed to their risk-aversion position.
The vast majority of participants in both groups reported they did not previously
monitor their smart device activity.
“takes too long” (# p3 )
“never got round to it” (# p10 )
It was also very evident that a lack of knowledge and perceived risk of threats con-
tributed significantly to the general lack of device monitoring. Participants reported
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being unaware of threats or that their data could be at risk.
“I didn’t know my devices were at risk” (# p1 )
“didn’t think too much about the risks to be honest” (# p20 )
“didn’t think anyone would be interested in my data” (# p7 )
However, when asked if would they change their behaviour as a result of engaging in
this study, a significant number of participants advised they would. It would appear
that once they had made aware of the potential threats and the likeliness of their
devices being compromised, they considered the risk sufficient enough to start device
monitoring.
“It’s probably something that I can do so should start being more proactive”
(# p5 )
“To be honest I don’t think people are aware this is a problem, but it has
certainly given me something to think about” (# p9 )
“risk seems quite real, so yes I should consider starting” (# p22 )
Finally, participants in the Intervention group were asked if they would be more likely
to monitor their smart device and network activity if they had access to the Aural(Au)
and Verbal(Ve) at home, and if so, would they feel better equipped to detect unusual
smart device activity in the future. Participants overwhelmingly reported they would
be more likely to monitor devices, and feel equipped to detect unusual activity in the
future.
“they would give me a better awareness of what was going on my network”
(# p3 )
“it looks quite simple and quick, so I would be more likely to check them”
(# p30 )
“It would be easy to use the Alexa when at home, and the Telegram app
when out and about” (# p20 )
“I think they would encourage me to think more about what my devices are
doing” (# p5 )
It was clear from the responses and results in Section 6.3.2 participants found the agents
to be an effective way to monitor smart device activity. The feedback and suggested
improvements were used to make amendments and refinements to the agents ready for
use in the final longitudinal study in the next Chapter.
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In this study, a large amount of quantitative data was collected and used to test the
hypotheses in Section 6.2.1.
Hypothesis A: Situational Awareness of threats will be improved using conversational
agents.
Table 6.5 shows the Pre and Post-Study Cyber Situational Awareness Score(CSAS ) for
both the control and intervention group. The results show that the Post-Study CSAS
score (12.17) for the Intervention group was considerably higher than their equivaent
Pre-Study CSAS score (7.23), therefore Hypothesis H1 was accepted. Participants
reported being more confident at detecting threats when using the conversational agents
suggesting situational awareness had been improved. However, it was important to
confirm that changes in situational awareness were derived from using the agents, and
not from other influencing factors such as the IoT video they watched. To confirm
the video had not contributed to confounding the Pre-Study CSAS score (7.23) for
the Intervention group was compared with the Post-Study CSAS score (7.37) for the
Control group. Since these scores were both derived after watching the IoT video they
were considered a fair comparison, and would ensure that the influence of the IoT video
in both groups was equal (See Figure 6.1). There was no significant difference found
between the two groups therefore Hypothesis H3 was accepted.
Finally, results for the Control group showed that their Post-Study CSAS score (7.37)
was lower than their equivalent Pre-Study CSAS score (10.51) therefore Hypoth-
esis H2 was accepted. After watching the video explaining IoT threats participants
reported being less confident in their ability to detect threats. This result appears to
confirm the assertion in [19] that suggested participants may have some awareness of
potential threats, but may not fully understand the implications or potential for misuse.
Once they had a better understanding of the threats, their reported confidence score
more accurately reflected their level of confidence. In this chapter the question “Are
conversational agents a viable method for making users aware of threats in consumer
IoT networks?” was explored. It is clear from the results that the two conversational
agents had a positive impact on participants confidence to detect threats. This evidence
provides the justification for the further research presented in this thesis, in particular
measuring the utility of the agents, and the extent to which performance metrics such
as accuracy and efficiency can be improved.
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6.5 Conclusions
Previously, Chapter 5 demonstrated how situational awareness of threats could be
improved by presenting users with additional information about smart device activity
in their environment. The study demonstrated how a Visual(Vi) modality could be
used effectively to increase awareness of threats. This chapter presented the results of a
cross-sectional study which explored the viability of using conversational agents, based
on Aural(Au) and Verbal(Ve) modalities, to improve Cyber Situational Awareness.
Participants reported increased confidence in identifying threats when using the two
agents developed in this study. The findings of this cross-sectional study now serve as
a basis for a final longitudinal study presented in the next chapter, where the use of
the two agents will be extensively tested.
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Chapter 7
Longitudinal Study to Assess the
Utility of Conversational Agents
to Improve Cyber Situational
Awareness
Chapter 6 presented the cross-sectional study aimed at exploring the viability of con-
versational agents for improving Cyber Situational Awareness. Two agents based on
Aural(Au) and Verbal(Ve) modalities were created and tested in a cross-sectional study.
The results of the study were promising with participants reporting increased confi-
dence in threat awareness when using the agents. The study successfully demonstrated
the suitability of conversational agents for aiding improved situational awareness, and
provided the justification for further and deeper investigation. Based on the feedback
from the cross-sectional study the two conversational agents were further refined. In
this chapter, the results of a longitudinal study are presented, where the utility of
agents were assessed over a longer period of time.
7.1 Introduction
The focus of this chapter is attempting to answer sub research question SQ4: “Are con-
versational agents effective in making users situationally aware of threats in consumer
IoT networks?”. Consistent with the methodology used in Chapter 6 a quantitative
approach was used to examine the use of the conversational agents for improving Sit-
uational Awareness of threats. Mica Endsley’s [1] model was again used to assess how
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participants perceive device activity, comprehend this in the context of their environ-
ment, and use the knowledge to determine if a threat exists. However, since the aim was
to fully explore the effectiveness of the agents for improving situational awareness, the
three layers of Endsley’s model were investigated separately. In addition, as discussed
in Section 3.3.4 the International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO) state that
systems should be evaluated for usability in terms of a users ability to achieve goals
effectively, efficiently and with satisfaction [164]. Therefore, the study was designed to
collect data relating to these metrics and also the three individual layers of Endsley’s
model namely: Perception, Comprehension and Projection.
Finally, a qualitative approach was also taken to examine the usability and utility of
the conversation agents. Following completion of the study presented in this chapter,
short structured interviews were undertaken to elicit feedback, and assess if participants




This study explored the usability and utility of the conversational agents in depth.
Previously in Chapter 6, the three levels of Endsley’s model were combined to create a
single metric (CSAS). In this study, the aim was to explore each level separately, there-
fore, the mean Perception (pe), Comprehension (co), and Projection(pr) were
calculated individually using the statements created in Section 3.3.5. Data collected
was ordinal and used as a dependent variable. In addition, the usability of each agent
was measured. This involved measuring the efficiency (in seconds) with which partic-
ipants could assimilate information about events in their environment, synthesise this
into a meaningful understanding of the situation, and the accuracy with which they
could identify threats in a network. Finally, participants satisfaction when using the
agents was measured. For this study, accuracy, efficiency and satisfaction were used
as dependent variables. While the Aural(Au) and Verbal(Ve) conversational agents
were used as independent variables. For consistency, a Pre-Study/Post-Study design
was used for analysis of the dependent variables and the reported differences in Cyber
Situational Awareness (pe, co, pr), accuracy, efficiency and satisfaction was measured.
The study hypotheses are therefore defined as:
Hypothesis A: Situational Awareness of threats will be improved using conversational
agents.
The study in chapter 6 demonstrated the suitability of conversational agents for aiding
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improved situational awareness. Overall participants reported increased confidence,
however, the aim of this study was to explore if the increased confidence was consistent
across the three levels of Endsley’s SA model [1]. To test this assumption it was
hypothesised that:
H1: Post-Study Mean Perception (pe) score will be higher than the Pre-
Study Mean Perception (pe) score.
H2: Post-Study Mean Comprehension (co) score will be higher than the
Pre-Study Mean Comprehension (co) score.
H3: Post-Study Mean Projection (pr) score will be higher than the Pre-
Study Mean Projection (pr) score.
H4: Post-Study Perception (pe), Comprehension (co) and Projection
(pr) scores of the Control group will Not be significantly different than
the Pre-Study pe, co and pr scores.
Hypothesis B: Performance of detecting threats will be improved using conversational
agents.
In addition to exploring if participants reported feeling more confident when using
conversational agents, this study also assessed if the use of the agents would improve
participants performance when detecting threats. To test this assumption it was hy-
pothesised that:
H5: Mean Detection Efficiency (in seconds) will be lower using a conver-
sational agent than when using the baseline visual method.
H6: Mean Detection Accuracy will be higher using a conversational agent
than when using the baseline visual method.
7.2.2 Study Design
A longitudinal study was conducted to evaluate the utility of using conversational agents
to improve Cyber Situational Awareness. Previously, in Chapter 6 the cross-sectional
study collected data from a large population of users at a single point in time. In this
study, the aim was to collect data from a smaller sample of users over an extended period
[149] lasting twenty-one days (See Figure 7.1). For consistency, the study was similar
in design to Chapter 6 (See Figure 7.2) where participants were recruited and again
assigned to two groups as described in Section 7.2.4. Participants in the intervention
group watched an introductory video about threats facing smart homes, and completed
a short related activity. The group were then asked to complete a Pre-study survey
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and indicate their level of agreement with nine statements (See Appendix I) relating to
their awareness and ability to monitor smart device and network activity. These were
mapped to Mica Endsley’s SA model as described in Section 3.3.5. Participants were
supplied with an Amazon Echo device (preconfigured with the Aural(Au) agent), and
had the Telegram app with the Verbal(Ve) agent setup on their supplied mobile device.
For the remainder of the four day Pre-Study period participants familiarised themselves
with the two conversational agents and a visualisation tool (web application), used as
a baseline to compare the conversational agents against (See Section 7.2.2). It was
important to have a baseline comparison since in the cross-sectional study in Chapter
6, a significant number of participants reported not monitoring their smart devices or
network prior to completing the study. It was, therefore, reasonable to expect that this
may be true of participants in this study, in which case some degree of improvement
from using the agents would be expected. It was equally important to recognise that
some participants did report using monitoring software previously, therefore, again it
was reasonable to expect that this may also be true for some participants in this study.
Since the aim in this study was to quantify the degree of improvement gained from using
the conversational agents, observed improvements were measured against the baseline
visualisation tool. To avoid introducing bias for participants who may have previously
used a monitoring tool and could be familiar with a particular layout/representation,
the decision was made not to use an existing commercial or open source visualisation
tool (e.g. mcafee, wireshark, splunk), but rather develop a simple bespoke tool for use
in this study (See Section 7.2.2).
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Figure 7.1: Longitudinal Study Timeline
The main section of the study lasted twelve days and was split into four sub-studies:
Visual(Vi), Aural(Au), Verbal(Ve) and Multi-modal(Mu) (See Figure 7.1). Each sub-
study lasted three days and participants used the associated conversational agent or
visualisation tool daily to answer questions relating to use-case scenarios presented in
Appendix D.2 - D.5. In the fourth sub-study (Muli-modal(Mu)) participants were able
to use any combination of tools to answer the daily questions. To further avoid bias,
the intervention group was split in half with four participants (p5,8,10,12 ) randomly
assigned to use the Aural(Au) agent in study two and Verbal(Ve) agent in study three,
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and the remaining participants (p2,6,14,15 ) assigned to use the agents in reverse order.
During the undertaking of the four sub-studies participants answers to the use-case
scenario questions were measured for accuracy, efficiency and usability. Finally, during
the four day Post-Study period, participants completed a Post-study survey of the same
nine statements, and variance in their attitudes was recorded. Post-Study interviews
were also conducted with the Intervention group during this period, to elicit feedback
about the study and use of the conversational agents.
The use of a control group again enabled confounding variables to be mitigated and
scientific rigour enhanced. Participants in the control group watched the introductory
video about threats facing smart homes, completed the related activity, before com-
pleting the same Pre-Study survey. Participants did not then engage with the study
between day 5 and day 18, before finally completing the Post-Study survey. This ap-
proach was used to check that variables outside of the study had not influenced the
results in the intervention group. If the control group situational awareness scores
remained roughly the same Pre-Study/Post-Study, the validity of the data could be
confirmed, since any variance in situational awareness scores in the intervention group
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Figure 7.2: Longitudinal Study Design
Use-Case Scenario Design (Amendments from Chapter 6)
For consistency, the seven use-cases from the previous study in Chapter 6 were adopted
for use in this study. In addition, a further two use-cases were added as detailed in Table
3.2. The corresponding scenario devised for each use-case is presented in Appendix D.2
- D.5. As discussed in Section 3.3.2, since the study used the same nine use-cases for
each of the four studies, it was important to have different scenarios to represent each
use-case. This was again important to avoid confounding variables or adding bias into
the research. If a participant had seen a scenario in a previous study it may effect their
decision making or performance. By using different scenarios to represent the same
use-case, confidence could be attained in the reliability of the collected data. Table 3.3







































Figure 7.3: Conversational Cyber Situational Awareness Framework
Cyber Situational Awareness was measured using the nine confidence statements cre-
ated in Section 3.3.5. A survey was generated which included the nine confidence
statements, plus seven additional statements relating to general smart device security
(See Table 6.1). The additional general security questions were again only used as
distraction [200] to disguise the focus of the nine confidence statements. As previously
discussed, this was important as previous studies have emphasised the importance of
avoiding the introduction of bias into a study by priming participants [201, 202]. The
use of the seven additional statements ensured participants were unaware that the fo-
cus of the study was on their confidence to detect threats, which could have resulted
in inflated confidence levels being reported. For each statement in the survey partic-
ipants were asked to indicate their level of agreement using a five-point likert scale
from Strongly Disagree (1) to Strongly Agree (5). Finally, participants completed the
same survey before and after using the conversational agents, and the difference in their
responses was compared. The Pre-Study/Post-Study Survey is presented in Appendix
I.
Figure 7.3 shows the conceptual Conversational Cyber Situational Awareness Frame-
work presented in this thesis. The framework is made up of three modules: Capture
module, Detection module and Awareness module. The Capture module is the ETL
Pipeline presented in Section 6.2.3 The Detection module is the BLSTM-RNN IDS
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presented in Section 4.2.5. Finally, the Awareness module is the Conversational Agents
developed in Section 6.2.3 and 7.2.3. The Awareness module also contained the base-
line Visualisation tool which was developed for this study and is presented in Figure
7.4. The tool was developed using the Gentelella Bootstrap admin template1 and was
designed to have a similar look and feel to standard dashboards a participant may have
used previously in other contexts.





Figure 7.5: Baseline Visualisation Tool Elements
From the dashboard participants were able to find information about network activity
for a five day period. Participants could hover over elements of the dashboard to
quickly see individual device information such as device usage as shown in Figure 7.5a.
Participants could also quickly search for specific features of activities using the search
facility as shown in Figure 7.5b.
Hawthorne Effect
This study explored the responses from two groups (Control and Intervention). For
the intervention group consideration was given to the impact of the Hawthorne Effect
on the study. The Hawthorne Effect concerns research participation, the consequent
awareness of being studied and possible impact on behaviour [162]. It has been reported
that participants may behave differently in lab-based experiments due to being in a
different environment, and the knowledge of being observed [208] [209]. To mitigate the
potential of this phenomenon the study was designed to use Naturalistic observation,
where participants completed the study at home rather than in a lab environment.
The goal was to observe their behaviour from a distance, in a natural setting without
intervention [210]. By doing so, this approach did introduce a risk that the results
may be less accurate. For example, if a participant was distracted while completing a
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task, the time taken to complete the task could be increased. However, the study was
designed to mitigate this by including a pause break between each task, to allow for
such distractions and ensure time duration was only recorded once a participant had
started a task.
7.2.3 Conversational Agent Design (Amendments from Chapter 6)
The conversational agents remained largely the same as presented in Section 6.2.3. Mi-
nor bug fixes were addressed and performance improvements were made in the backend
AWS infrastructure. Participant feedback from the cross-sectional study in Chapter 6,
provided suggestions of how the agents could be improved:
“option to see which devices have been used most each day” (# p3 )
“add more questions I can ask Alexa” (# p2 )
“quick summary for multiple days” (# p10 )
“add the option of a weekend summary” (# p16 )
“multiple day summary” (# p37 )
In response to this participant feedback, two additional intents were added to both the
Aural and Verbal agents as described in the next section.
Agent Intents (Amendments from Chapter 6)
For consistency, the ten intents from the previous study in Chapter 6 were adopted for
use in this study. In addition, in response to user feedback from the previous study, a
further two intents were added to this study as detailed below:
11. unusualActivityLastThreeDays: Responds to a user query and returns a sum-
mary of normal and unusual activity on each of the last three days.
12. mostActiveSrcDevLastThreeDays: Responds to a user query and returns a
list of three most active source devices on each of the last three days.
As a result, a total of twelve intents were created and used within this study. During the
main section of the study, which lasted twelve days, participants were able to choose
which intents they would use to query the agents for information. The participants
then used the responses to their queries to answer the daily questions relating to use-
case scenarios presented in Appendix D.2 - D.5. Table 7.1 shows how each intent
mapped to the nine situational awareness statements which participants completed in
the Pre-Study/Post-Study surveys.
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Table 7.1: Situational Awareness and Intent Mapping
Agent Intents

















pe1 x x x x x x x
pe2 x x x x x
pe3 x x x x x x
co1 x x x x x x x
co2 x x x x x x x
co3 x x x x x x x
pr1 x x x x x x x
pr2 x x x x x x x x
pr3 x x x x x x x x
7.2.4 Participants
In this study, the aim was to assess the utility of conversational agents for improving
awareness of threats facing smart devices. Sixteen participants were recruited for this
final study, which took place between September and October 2019. The study was
advertised within the university and through LinkedIn and Social Media. This approach
enabled a wide range of views to be collected and oversampling of a specific demographic
to be avoided, namely the local student population. Interested parties needed to meet
the following criteria, to be eligible to participate:
• Be over 18 years of age and be able to provide informed consent;
• Own or have previously used a smart device;
• Be available for the full 21 day study;
• Not completed any previous studies associated with this research.
Participants provided informed consent by reading the study agreement (See Appendix
F), before indicating their consent to participate when clicking to proceed to the next
page of the Pre-Study survey.
Additional Participant Profile Screening
Further checks were completed on the suitability of each participant during the Pre-
Study survey. Participants were asked if they had any medically diagnosed visual,
auditory or learning difficulties. These qualities were requested to allow an assessment
135
to be made whether such difficulties could affect the participants performance and the
validity of the collected data.
• Participant 8: reported a 30% reduction in hearing, however, confirmed that
daily activities were not affected.
• Participant 2: reported having Astigmatism, however, confirmed that this was
corrected using contact lenses so does not affect daily activities.
• Participant 14 reported having dyslexia and issues with grammar and spelling.
Following discussions with each participant it was decided that the reported qualities
did not pose a risk to the validity of the study.
Participant Demographics
Participant demographics are presented in Table 7.2, with the largest demographic
being Intermediate users aged 25-39. All participants reported owning or having pre-
viously used smart devices.
Table 7.2: Participant Demographic
Gender % Age % Ability %
Male 8 (50) 18-24 4 (25) Novice 3 (19)
Female 8 (50) 25-39 7 (44) Intermediate 7 (44)
40-59 3 (19) Advanced 5 (31)
60+ 2 (12) Expert 1 (6)
n = 16
In accordance with recommendations for well-designed experiments [157], participants
were randomly assigned to the two groups (Control and Intervention) as shown in Table
7.3.
Table 7.3: Group Allocation
Novice Intermediate Advanced Expert
Control 1 (p9) 3 (p1, p3, p7) 3 (p11, p13, p16) 1 (p4)
Intervention 2 (p2, p12) 4 (p6, p8, p10, p15) 2 (p5, p14) 0
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All sixteen participants completed the study, therefore, attrition was not present in
the study. In addition, since the study design followed guidelines for well-designed
experiments [157], the intervention results presented in this thesis are believed to have
validity.
7.3 Results
This section presents the results of the study using the metrics stated in Section 7.2.1,
namely usability and situational awareness. For usability, the study measured partici-
pants accuracy and efficiency of detecting threats, and also their satisfaction of using
the conversational agents. For situational awareness, the study assessed participants
ability to be aware of threats in their surroundings by considering how they perceive,
understand and react to situations.
7.3.1 Usability
Detection Accuracy
The first metric measured how accurately participants could detect threats using the
conversational agents. Specifically, it recorded their accuracy of collecting the necessary
information about smart device activity, and how well this was used to determine if
threats had occurred. Table 7.4 shows the Precision (P), Recall (R) and F-measure (F1)
scores for each of the nine use-cases described in Section 7.2.2. The Mean, Median and
Standard Deviation for the agents is presented in Table 7.5 which shows an improvement
in mean precision (1.0) when using the Verbal(Ve) agent compared with the respective
score (0.973) for the baseline Visual(Vi) method, suggesting false positive detections
were present when using the visual method. Recall scores show that false negative
detections (0.987) were also present when using the baseline visual method, but not the
verbal agent. Precision (0.869), Recall (0.924) and F-measure (0.887) were noticeably
lower when using the Aural(Au) agent compared with the baseline visual method.
Analysis of the data shows that false positive detections in particular contributed to
the lower f-measure score (0.887) demonstrating that in some cases the participants
had gathered the necessary information but had failed to comprehend its meaning,
resulting in incorrect answers provided. Finally, when participants chose to use a
Multi-modal(Mu) approach using a combination of agents and baseline visual method,
perfect precision and recall was achieved.
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Table 7.4: Precision, Recall and F-Measure Detection Accuracy of Threats
uc1 uc2 uc3 uc4 uc5 uc6 uc7 uc8 uc9
Precision 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.88 0.88 1.0
Visual(Vi) Recall 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.88
F-Measure 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.93 0.93 0.93
Precision 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Verbal(Ve) Recall 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
F-Measure 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Precision 1.0 1.0 0.86 1.0 0.83 1.0 0.75 0.63 0.75
Aural(Au) Recall 1.0 1.0 0.86 1.0 0.71 0.75 1.0 1.0 1.0
F-Measure 1.0 1.0 0.86 1.0 0.77 0.86 0.86 0.77 0.86
Precision 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Multi(Mu) Recall 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
F-Measure 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Table 7.5: Mean, Median and Standard Deviation: Precision, Recall and F-Measure
Precision (P) Recall (R) F-Measure (F1)
x x̃ σ x x̃ σ x x̃ σ
Vi 0.973 1.0 0.53 0.987 1.0 0.04 0.977 1.0 0.035
Ve 1.0 1.0 0.00 1.0 1.0 0.00 1.0 1.0 0.00
Au 0.869 0.86 0.14 0.924 1.0 0.12 0.887 0.86 0.093
Mu 1.0 1.0 0.00 1.0 1.0 0.00 1.0 1.0 0.00
n = 8
Detection Efficiency
The second metric measured how efficiently participants could detect threats using the
conversational agents. Specifically, it recorded how long (in seconds) it took to collect
the necessary data about smart device activity, process this into meaningful information
which they could use to determine if a threat had occurred. Table 7.6 shows recorded
detection times for each of the nine use-cases described in Section 7.2.2. The Mean,
Median and Standard Deviation for each agent is presented in Table 7.7 which shows
that participants were less efficient when using the Verbal(Ve) (473.13) and Aural(Au)
(539.52) agents compared to when using the baseline Visual(Vi) (460.49) method.
138
However, when participants were free to chose a Multi-modal(Mu) approach using a
combination of agents and baseline visual method, efficiency was improved (455.17).
Table 7.6: Detection Efficiency
uc1 uc2 uc3 uc4 uc5 uc6 uc7 uc8 uc9
Vi 26.25 91.12 30.33 27.13 59.90 27.33 60.64 55.38 82.42
Ve 35.73 41.62 65.54 53.88 64.19 54.65 58.41 47.58 51.53
Au 33.16 50.91 74.55 43.29 73.99 64.38 74.26 66.34 58.63
Mu 33.29 56.06 43.83 44.20 66.20 41.39 57.88 49.88 62.45
efficiency shown in seconds (s)
Table 7.7: Mean, Median and Standard Deviation: Detection Efficiency
x x̃ σ
Vi 460.49 443.94 54.02
Ve 473.13 478.20 12.62
Au 539.52 540.31 11.93
Mu 455.17 459.51 21.70
n = 8
To check if differences were significant a Friedman test was carried out to compare
participant efficiency scores for the four detection methods (Vi, Ve, Au, Mu). The
test showed there was a statistically significant difference in efficiency between the four
methods, χ2(3) = 12.900, p = .005
Satisfaction: System Usability Questionnaire
The usability of any system has to be viewed in terms of the context in which it is used,
and its appropriateness to that context [164]. This view is reflected in the ISO 9241-11
standard which provides a framework for understanding the concept of usability and
its application to interactive systems. In compliance with this standard, the study
sought to asses user satisfaction relating to the two conversational agents. In Table
7.8 the system usability scores for each conversational agent are presented. Scores for
each participant were calculated using the methodology described in Section 3.3.4. As
described in [164] SUS scores are presented on a scale from 0 to 100. The final SUS
score was calculated by first determining the sum of each item. The score contribution
for odd numbered questions was adjusted to be the scale position minus 1. The scale
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contribution for even numbered questions was adjusted to be 5 minus the scale position.
Finally, the sum of the scores was multiplied by 2.5 to obtain the overall value of system
usability.
Table 7.8: System Usability Scale (SUS) Scores
p2 p5 p6 p8 p10 p12 p14 p15
Ve 75 80 52.5 65 75 70 80 95
Au 52.5 47.5 40 70 80 60 95 87.5
To interpret the results, a score of 68 was used as a measure of usability. A score
falling close to this point can be assumed to have average usability [164]. The tests
conducted in this study found that six participants scored the Verbal(Ve) agent above
average, compared to only four participants scoring above average for the Aural(Au)
agent. These results suggest that both agents require further improvement.
The validity of the study data was tested using techniques consistent with [211, 212,
213]. A Cronbach alpha coefficient test was therefore performed for the SUS results of
both conversational agents. The test checked for internal consistency, where a reliable
scale is said to have a Cronbach’s alpha coefficient above .70 [207]. Cronbach alpha
coefficients for the Verbal(Ve) and Aural(Au) agents exceeded this recommended value
with α = .89, .93 respectively, therefore the data was considered valid with good internal
consistency
7.3.2 Cyber Situational Awareness
The study measured participants ability to be situationally aware of threats in their
environment using Endsley’s reference model [1]. To achieve a level of awareness in any
given situation the three levels of the model, namely Perception (Pe), Comprehension
(Co) and Projection (Pr), are combined. To measure the effectiveness of the conver-
sational agents to improve situational awareness, participants were asked to indicate
their agreement with the SA statements in Table 6.1 before and after using the agents
to answer questions in each of the four studies (See Appendix H). Table 7.9 shows Pre
and Post-Study situational awareness scores. The Mean, Median and Standard Devi-
ation for each of the three elements in Endsley’s SA model is presented in Table 7.10.
The results show that mean Post-Study perception (4.13), comprehension (3.92) and
projection (3.75) scores improved as a result of using the conversational agents.
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Table 7.9: Pre-Study Post-Study Situational Awareness Scores
Perception Comprehension Projection







p2 4 2 1 2 2 1 1 2 3
p5 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
p6 3 2 2 3 3 3 2 2 2
p8 2 2 2 3 3 2 2 2 2
p10 4 3 2 2 2 3 3 3 2
p12 4 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
p14 4 4 3 3 3 2 3 3 3








p2 4 3 3 4 4 3 4 4 3
p5 4 4 4 5 4 4 4 4 4
p6 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 3
p8 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
p10 4 4 4 4 4 3 4 4 4
p12 5 4 4 5 5 4 4 4 4
p14 5 5 5 4 4 4 4 4 5
p15 4 4 4 4 4 2 3 3 3
To check if differences between the Intervention group Pre-Study/Post-Study scores
were significant, Wilcoxon Signed-Rank tests were carried out to compare the three
elements of situational awareness (Perception, Comprehension and Projection). The
Post-Study Perception median score (4.00) was found to be higher than the Pre-
Study score (2.33). A Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test indicated that the difference was
statistically significant, Z = -2.53, p= .011. The Post-Study Comprehension median
score (3.83) was found to be higher than the Pre-Study score (2.50). A Wilcoxon
Signed-Rank test indicated that the difference was again statistically significant, Z = -
2.585, p= .010. Finally, the Post-Study Projection median score (4.00) was also found
to be higher than the Pre-Study score (2.17). A Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test indicated
that the difference was again statistically significant, Z = -2.530, p= .011.
The Pre-Study/Post-Study Mean, Median and Standard Deviation for the Control
group are presented in Table 7.10. Perception scores were found to be consistent
between studies, however, a small variance in Comprehension and Projection were
recorded. To check if variances were significant a Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test was again
carried out which showed the variances in Comprehension and Projection were not
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statistically significant, Z = -.324, p= .746, Z = -.577, p= .564 respectively.
Table 7.10: Mean, Median and Standard Deviation: Cyber Situational Awareness
Perception Comprehension Projection
x x̃ σ x x̃ σ x x̃ σ
C
T
L Pre-Study 2.75 2.67 .79 2.79 2.67 .73 2.25 2.17 .77
Post-Study 2.75 2.33 .79 2.71 2.50 .97 2.29 2.00 .72
IN
T Pre-Study 2.46 2.33 .62 2.42 2.50 .05 2.38 2.17 .45
Post-Study 4.13 4.00 .47 3.92 3.83 .43 3.75 4.00 .05
To test the validity of the data a Cronbach alpha coefficient test was conducted on both
groups Pre and Post-Study situational awareness scores. Cronbach alpha coefficient for
the Control and Intervention groups (α = .93, .96 respectively) were found to be above
the recommended value .70 [207], therefore, the data was considered valid with good
internal consistency.
As a final measure of validity, the equation in Section 6.2.1 was used to calculate and
compare the Pre-Study CSAS score for the Intervention group (7.26) in this study with
the corresponding CSAS score for the Intervention group in the cross-sectional study
(7.23) (See table 6.5). The CSAS scores were found to be consistent, providing further
validity to the data.
7.4 Discussion
This study was undertaken to assess the utility of conversational agents for improving
Cyber Situational Awareness. Specifically, the aim was to explore if user awareness
and perception of threats facing consumer IoT networks could be improved through
the use of the agents. The mean Perception (pe), Comprehension (co) and Pro-
jection(pr) was calculated and used as metrics to measure if participants Cyber Situ-
taional Awareness improved Pre-Study/Post-Study. In addition, the aim was also to
assess the usability of the agents. Participants in the Intervention group were asked
to use the two conversational agents to answer questions relating to use-case scenarios
presented in Section 7.2.2. To measure the usability of the agents the study calculated
the efficiency (in seconds) with which participants could assimilate information about
events in their environment, synthesise this into a meaningful understanding of the
situation, and the accuracy with which they could identify threats in a network. To
measure how satisfied participants were when using the agents, a SUS score for each
agent was calculated. Finally, during the four day Post-Study period (See Figure 7.1)
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short interviews were conducted with the intervention group to elicit feedback about
the study and agent use (See Appendix J). For brevity, a representative sample of re-
sponses are provided below for each of the questions asked. First, participants were
asked to provide feedback about their overall experience of using the conversational
agents. Participants all reported a positive experience, stating they found both agents
to be user friendly and easy to use.
“Overall my experience using these devices [conversational agents] was quite
positive. I found them quite exciting and interesting to use. Simple to use
and quite clear in the responses [answers to queries] ” (# p8 )
“I found both the conversational agents user friendly and fairly easy to use
once I had a play around with them. ” (# p10 )
Next, participants were asked about their experience of using both agents to answer
questions relating to the three areas of investigation: Perception, Comprehension
and Projection. Specifically, their experience of using the agents to find out which
devices were using the network and how much activity they had (Perception). Their
experience of using the agents to work out if a smart device or network was functionally
normally (Comprehension). And finally, their experience of using the agents to
determine if a smart device had been compromised, or an attack had taken place on the
network (Projection). For each of the three areas, participants were also asked if they
preferred using one of the agents to answer the question or the baseline visualisation
tool. For queries (intents) which elicited quick or short summary responses, participants
reported finding the conversational agents more convenient than the visualisation tool.
This was evident for intents such as “what is the status of the network today ?” (i6 )
or “give me a summary of today’s activity” (i1 ).
“In this case when it’s just a simple question of ”is there something unusual
happening or not” then probably the conversational agents were better be-
cause it was quick and simple to ask, and in the case of someone who is not
as computer oriented, it’s a way for them to know without having to go into
all the nooks and crannies of the visualisation tool.” (# p14 )
“For quick check of devices the conversational agents were more convenient.
You could get the information from the visual tool but I felt it took longer,
plus it was less convenient” (# p10 )
For queries (intents) which elicited longer responses or more detailed information, par-
ticipants still enjoyed using the conversational agents, however, found the Verbal(Ve)
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agent to be easier and more efficient. They reported difficulty understanding percent-
ages when using the Aural(Au) agent, often requiring the agent to repeat a response
several times. This was evident for intents such as “give me a summary of activity by
Smart Camera on 20th January 2019” (i3 ).
“In terms of the Alexa again it’s a quick way of asking for the direct infor-
mation, but I found listening and drawing out percentages [specific detailed
information ] quite tricky in comparison to telegram, which I found easier
to read the information and gather the required information ” (# p12 )
“In general with both Alexa and Telegram, when it comes to finding out
which source devices [were using the network] or whether there was any-
thing unusual or normal [activities] they were about the same for me, I had
no issues. But, when it came to asking about anything where the answer
involved percentages of whether [activities were ]normal or unusual, Alexa I
struggled with more because I had to repeat [answers] a couple of times, but
eventually I did get there. So in terms of that I would prefer the telegram
overall ” (# p14 )
For queries (intents) which elicited specific information in a response or which contained
long detailed information, participants reported a preference for combing an agent(s)
with the visualisation tool to gather the necessary information in a staged approach.
This multi-modal preference was reflected in the accuracy and efficient results in Table
7.4 and 7.7, which showed participants were most accurate and efficient when using a
multi-modal approach. This was evident for intents such as “give me activity totals for
the Smart Camera for the last three days ” (i9 ) or “give me details of the first unusual
activity on 20th January 2019” (i3 ).
“I would use a combination of all three. I would initially use Alexa or
Telegram to see if any issues had been detected, but would then use the
visualisation tool to get the detailed information” (# p2 )
“The conversational agents were good to give me the initial status of the
network. This made me want to then use the web interface [visualisation
tool] to determine what had actually happened” (# p5 )
“I would prefer to use the Alexa to determine whether a system or a smart
device was functioning normally. But beyond this if there’s any unusual
activity I would then prefer to use the visualisation tool to narrow down the
areas that have been affected” (# p8 )
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The study next assessed if the participants felt the agents had improved their aware-
ness of threats, understanding of suspicious activity, and their ability to identify a
compromised device in the future. If participants reported improvements in these ar-
eas, this would suggest that the agents had improved Cyber Situational Awareness, by
deriving benefits at all three layers of Endsley’s SA model [1]. Participants reported
improvements in all areas.
“For sure I could tell which devices were using the network and how much
and if anything unusual was going on. Before [doing this study] I didn’t
even think about it or have a clue what they were doing” (# p10 )
“Yes because before a device may have looked ok but actually it had been
tampered with. Now at least I would have more of an idea if things weren’t
right ” (# p2 )
“I believe the conversational agents help me understand more because I
didn’t know what was going on in the network before” (# p5 )
In the Post-Study survey, participants were asked if they felt it was likely/unlikely that
smart devices would be compromised and used as described in this study. They were
also asked if they felt the risk of smart devices being compromised is high enough to
justify the effort required to monitor them. The participants were asked to expand on
the responses they gave to these questions in the survey. This was important in order
to gain a deeper understanding of their general awareness and perception of threats
facing consumer IoT networks. Participants reported being aware of previous threats,
in particular threats targeting smart devices.
“I’ve read in recent articles that the Amazon ring doorbell has been com-
promised quite severely leading to attacks. But, there are also other ways of
getting into a network” (# p5 )
“I’ve read a lot of articles recently about data being stolen, and a lot of the
problems have been these home security devices. I feel the risk is therefore
high enough to warrant checking the network for these kinds of intrusions”
(# p5 )
“I feel that, and this is probably very naive of me, that I am not somebody
that would be targeted because I am just average Joe Bloggs off the street. I
think that’s probably why I’m not taking these threats seriously enough [at
present] whereas I probably should be” (# p12 )
“When I was looking at the information I knew something wasn’t right but
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I didn’t know what. I’ve seen stories before on social media Facebook about
how the smart devices had been hacked ” (# p2 )
Finally, participants were asked if they would be more likely to monitor their smart
device and network activity if they had access to the Aural(Au) and Verbal(Ve) agents
at home, and if so, would they feel better equipped to detect unusual smart device
activity in the future. Participants reported they would be more likely to monitor
devices, and feel equipped to detect unusual activity in the future.
“I think I probably would monitor smart devices more at home, just because
with Alexa and Telegram it’s a case of ease of use. I don’t need to hook
up my laptop or use Wireshark or stuff that I’m normally used to doing,
which takes more time to analyse. This [conversational agents] will give me
a quick response so makes it easy to check more often than probably I would
normally do” (# p14 )
“Yeah I think for the time it takes to actually monitor the activity I would
definitely make an effort to use these facilities [conversational agents]” (#
p8 )
It was clear from the responses in the Post-Study interviews participants found the
agents to be an effective way to monitor smart device activity.
In this study, a large amount of quantitative data was collected and used to test the
hypotheses in Section 7.2.1.
Hypothesis A: Situational Awareness of threats will be improved using conversational
agents.
Table 7.10 shows the Pre and Post-Study Perception (pe) , Comprehension (co) and
Projection (pr) for both the Control and Intervention group. The Post-Study Mean
Perception (pe) score (4.13) was found to be higher than the Pre-Study Mean Per-
ception (pe) score (2.46) therefore Hypothesis H1 in Section 7.2.1 was accepted.
The Post-Study Mean Comprehension (co) score (3.92) was found to be higher than
the Pre-Study Mean Comprehension (co) score (2.42) therefore Hypothesis H2 was
accepted.
The Post-Study Mean Projection (pr) score (3.75) was found to be higher than the
Pre-Study Mean Projection (pr) score (2.38) therefore Hypothesis H3 was accepted.
The Post-Study Mean Perception (pe) score (2.75), Comprehension (co) score (2.71)
and Projection (pr) score (2.29) were found not to be significantly different than the
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Pre-Study pe (2.75), co (2.79) and pr (2.25) scores, therefore Hypothesis H4 was
accepted.
The results lead to a conclusion that the participants ability to be situationally aware
of threats was improved using conversational agents.
Hypothesis B: Performance of detecting threats will be improved using conversational
agents (See hypotheses in Section 7.2.1).
Table 7.7 shows the mean detection efficiency of the Verbal (Ve) and Aural (Au)
conversational agents compared to the baseline Visual (Vi) method. The detection
efficiency when using a Multi-modal (Mu) approach was also reported.
The mean detection efficiency of the baseline Visual (Vi) (460.49) method was found
to be lower than both the Verbal (Ve) (473.13) and Aural (Au) (539.52) agents,
therefore Hypothesis H5 was rejected.
The mean detection accuracy of the Aural agent (Au) (P = .869, R = .924, F1 = .887)
was lower than when using the baseline Visual (Vi) method (P = .973, R = .987, F1
= .977), however, the results for the Verbal (Ve) agent (P = 1.0, R = 1.0, F1 = 1.0)
were found to be higher. As one agent was found to be more accurate Hypothesis H6
was accepted.
The aim of this chapter was to explore the question “Are conversational agents effective
in making users situationally aware of threats in consumer IoT networks?”. The results
showed that when participants used a Multi-modal (Mu) approach using a mix of
conversational agent and the baseline visual method, accuracy (P = 1.0, R = 1.0, F1 =
1.0) and efficiency (455.17) were both better than when using only the baseline visual
method. It is, therefore, reasonable to conclude that participants performed better at
detecting threats when using the conversational agents, demonstrating them to be an
effective method of improving Cyber Situational Awareness.
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7.5 Conclusions
This chapter, reported the results of a longitudinal study where the utility of conver-
sational agents was assessed over an extended period lasting twenty-one days. The
study was mapped to Mica Endsley’s Situational Awareness model and was used to as-
sess how participants perceive device activity, comprehend this in the context of their
environment, and use the knowledge to determine if a threat exists. In addition, the us-
ability of the agents was evaluated in terms of a users ability to achieve goals effectively,
efficiently and with satisfaction. The study demonstrated that participants reported in-
creased confidence in identifying threats when using the two agents. In addition, when
using a multi-modal approach involving a combination of the conversational agents and
the baseline visualisation tool, accuracy and efficiency were also improved. In the final
chapter, a summary of the findings in this thesis are presented and the implications of
the results are discussed. The limitations of the work are also discussed, before finally




The aim of this thesis was to explore the use of conversational agents to improve Cyber
Situational Awareness. This chapter begins by summarising the findings of this thesis
and how these answer the research questions posed in Chapter 1. Second, it shows
how the findings contribute to the body of knowledge in Cyber Situational Awareness.
Third, it discusses the major strengths and limitations of each of the studies presented
in this thesis, and then suggests avenues for potential future research.
8.1 Summary of Findings
In order to reflect on the contribution made in this thesis, the original research questions
are revisited. Each question is considered in the context of the study conducted, and
the contribution to knowledge each has made.
In Chapter 4 the study set out to answer the question “Can current security methods de-
tect the presence of threats within consumer IoT networks ?”. An existing open source
IDS (Snort) which could be used freely within a consumer network was tested, and
proved effective at detecting (Mirai) botnet traffic. However, the study also suggested
that mutated versions of the malware could prove more difficult to detect, rendering
existing signatures ineffective. A new threat detection model (BLSTM-RNN) was pro-
posed which harnessed the power of deep learning for threat detection in consumer IoT
networks. Once trained with previous attack data, the IDS model could accurately
predict future threats facing consumer IoT network. At the time of undertaking this
research, a lack of IoT botnet datasets was identified. An important output from this
study is, therefore, the generation of a new mirai botnet dataset, providing a much
needed resource for future research in this area. The dataset has already been made
public and been used for comparative studies [14, 15].
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In Chapter 5 the study changed the focus of detection from systems to users, and set
out to answer the question “Can users visually detect the presence of threats within
consumer IoT networks?”. Understanding how users perceive risk, is an important
consideration when attempting to evaluate and promote better situational awareness
of risks relating to security and privacy. A cross-sectional study of 158 participants was
undertaken to analyse the features users require from IoT devices and the importance
placed upon security and privacy. The study also evaluated each users ability to identify
if a smart device had been infected, and was being used to perform attacks on the
Internet. Previous work [189, 190, 191] had suggested that demographic characteristics
may have an effect on users awareness of threats. However, although this appeared
to hold some truth, it was not evident whether a clear association existed between a
users age or technical knowledge and their ability to detect threats. The results of
the study demonstrated that users valued security and privacy but found identifying
threats difficult. In addition, it found that a lack of information about network traffic
can result in little or no awareness of security issues; however, if users were presented
with data, awareness could be improved. It also clearly showed that the presentation of
data is vitally important, otherwise the presence of the additional data, can have little
impact. The research from the study contributes to the developing knowledge relating
to risk perception and awareness. The contribution has significance since it tested
assertions made in previous research, providing further clarity about their application
to security and privacy within consumer IoT environments.
In Chapter 6 the study built upon the findings of the previous chapter to explore the vi-
ability of using conversational agents for improving situational awareness. It set out to
answer the question “Are conversational agents a viable method for making users aware
of threats in consumer IoT networks?” As shown in the literature review conversational
agents have experienced a significant rise in popularity, and have been widely adopted
by a range of companies, producing Microsoft’s Cortana, Apple’s Siri, Google’s Assis-
tant and Amazon’s Alexa. A cross-sectional study of 72 participants was undertaken
to assess the effectiveness of conversational agents for improving situational awareness.
The study used a Pre-Study / Post-Study design, where participants indicated their
agreement with confidence statements (mapped to Mica Endsley’s SA model [1]) relat-
ing to their awareness and ability to monitor smart device and network activity. The
statements were completed before and after using the agents to perform a series of
tasks, allowing variance in Pre-Study/Post-Study scores to be observed. The results
demonstrated that situational awareness was improved when using the two agents, since
participants reported an increase in confidence in their ability to identify threats. In
Chapter 7 the results of the previous cross-sectional study served as the basis for the
final longitudinal study in this thesis. This study evaluated the utility of agents and
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set out to answer the question “Are conversational agents effective in making users
situationally aware of threats in consumer IoT networks ?”. Sixteen participants took
part in a twenty-one day study, which again was mapped to Mica Endsley’s Situational
Awareness model, and was used to assess how participants perceived device activ-
ity, comprehended this in the context of their environment, and used the knowledge
to determine if a threat exists. In addition, the usability of the agents in terms of a
users ability to achieve goals effectively, efficiently and with satisfaction, was evaluated.
The results demonstrated that participants reported increased confidence in identifying
threats when using the two agents. Importantly, the agents proved most effective when
used as part of a multi-modal approach involving a combination of learning modalities
(Aural, Verbal and Visual). The results also demonstrated that the use of the agents
improved the accuracy and efficiency of detecting threats. The two studies presented
in Chapter 6 and 7 provide a novel contribution to the developing body of knowledge,
since collectively they build upon previous research such as [3, 189], which focused on
improving Cyber Situational Awareness using a visual modality. These studies pre-
sented the use of aural and verbal modalities, demonstrating them also to be effective
at improving Cyber Situational Awareness.
The ultimate objective of this thesis was to investigate if conversational agents could
be used as a mechanism to improve Cyber Situational Awareness. In doing so, the
research set out to answer the question “Can Situational Awareness of threats in the
Internet of Things be improved using Conversational Agents ?”. The results of the
four studies clearly demonstrated that conversational agents can improve situational
awareness of threats in the IoT. In doing so, this thesis has contributed to the body of
knowledge by providing empirical evidence to add to the gaps in literature identified
in Chapter 2. Namely, the use of deep learning (BSTM-RNN with word embedding)
to extract semantic meaning from packets, and perform deep packet inspection. Also,
providing the first study to investigate the effectiveness of conversational agents for
threat detection and network monitoring, specifically the use of multi-modal agents to
aid situational awareness of threats in consumer IoT networks.
8.2 Implications of Results
A key implication for research practice arising from this thesis surrounds the use of
multi-modal approaches to improve awareness of security and privacy issues. The work
has shown that the way information is presented has a major impact on the cognitive
ability of users to understand events in their surroundings, which directly affects their
ability to be situationally aware. The work has also demonstrated that Endsley’s
definition “the perception of elements in the environment within a volume of time and
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space, the comprehension of their meaning, and the projection of their status in the
near future” [1], still holds true, and can be successfully applied to improve situational
awareness in a cyber context.
Additionally, and of importance when considering Smart Homes and the IoT, the work
has shown the promise of using conversational agents to improve daily life. Ever since
Alan Turing posed his question “Can machines think?” [125], the race has been on for
developers to create the ultimate conversational experience. Competitions like the Loeb-
ner Prize and Amazon’s Alexa Prize have encouraged developers to push the boundaries
of artificial intelligence, the later in particular focusing on agents assuming the role of
an assistant, conversing through fluent and enjoyable interactions, to help users in their
daily lives. In this new era of voice computing, the growing popularity of conversational
agents is clear, where personified AI is being widely adopted to control many aspects of
home life, such as heating systems and smart appliances. This work has demonstrated
how the benefits of using agents can be extended to address the growing issue of security
and privacy within the home. The multi-modal approach of integrating conversational
agents with existing technologies has implications for future research since it will likely
lead to further questions not only in the area of Cyber Situational Awareness, but more
broadly for questions relating to the IoT.
Finally, the work demonstrated how deep learning can be applied successfully to IoT
security. In particular, to address the growing issue of malware and botnets targeting
consumer IoT devices. The work has implications for future research in this area since it
demonstrated that previous methods of deep learning are not restricted to technologies
found within larger networks, but can also be applied to smart homes. Successful
detection was achieved at the packet level, which could lead to further research using
the methods in this thesis, and applying deep learning methods to networks unable to
collect network traffic flows.
8.3 Limitations of Work
Despite promising results in all four studies, a number of limitations must be acknowl-
edged relating to the research presented in this thesis.
In Chapter 4, the deep learning method of detecting IoT malware was only tested using
a single type of IoT malware (Mirai). While it is acknowledged that testing included
a range of DDoS attacks, they were all generated from the same malware. Using a
different malware type, perhaps a phishing attack, may have returned different results.
In addition, although previous research has used LSTM models to detect malware
[97, 98, 99, 100], the studies all utilised flow traffic, not individual packet inspection.
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Since the detection model presented in this thesis used a BLSTM-RNN with word
embedding to extract semantic meaning from individual packets, comparisons with
previous studies was not possible. Finally, at present the detection method utilises an
offline detection method, meaning the full Conversational Cyber Situational Awareness
Framework presented in Figure 7.3 has not yet been achieved.
For the study in Chapter 5 several limitations have also been identified. Firstly, the
study is limited by the use of self-reported data. Since participants undertook the survey
without interference from the researcher. Furthermore, socially desirable knowledge,
skills and attitudes towards IoT security and privacy may have been provided and
socially undesirable equivalents under reported. For example, participants may have
ranked security and privacy highly because it is generally accepted as important, rather
than because they personally believed this to be true. As a result, bias could have been
introduced. In addition, the initial use of convenience sampling may have contributed
to an over representation of student respondents (54%) in the total sample population.
Since many were also studying a computing related course, this may also have con-
tributed to the largest samples of technical knowledge levels being Intermediate (44%)
and Advanced (36%). Finally, only one type of malware was again investigated. The
use of other malware types may return different results, and provide a basis for further
research in this area.
For the study in Chapters 6 and 7 similar limitations have been identified. Again, the
use of convenience sampling in the cross-sectional study may have contributed to an
over representation of student respondents (54%) in the total sample population. Since
the study was held on the University campus, this could have resulted in the largest
sample of participants being identified as aged 18-24 (47%)and with Advanced technical
knowledge (44%). In addition, in the longitudinal study, while careful consideration
was given to mitigating the Hawthorne Effect (See Section 7.2.2) the use of naturalistic
observation may have introduced risk into the study, since the efficiency results could be
less accurate if a participant was distracted while completing a task. This was partially
mitigated by including pauses between tasks to allow for such distractions, and only
recording time duration once a participant had started to undertake a task. However,
the possibility of a distraction was still present.
8.4 Future Work
There are a number of possible avenues to further the work presented in this thesis.
Firstly, some of the limitations of this research could be addressed. For instance, the
novel approach of using a BLSTM-RNN with word embedding to extract semantic
meaning from individual packets, has proven to be effective method of detecting IoT
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malware. However, one avenue of further research would be to reproduce the model and
test its ability to detect different types of malware. In addition, the model currently
performs offline detection of malware, however this could be taken further to establish a
real-time online detection mechanism. Finally, at the time of undertaking this research
there was a lack of IoT malware datasets. Since then, new datasets may have been
created, which could also be used to test the performance of future detection models
based on the approach taken in this thesis.
Second, due to constraints of time and resources the longitudinal study presented in
this thesis was limited to twenty-one days. Another avenue of further research would
be to increase the number of participants and duration of the study. In addition, the
verbal agent could be deployed to a range of different platforms, and the difference in
their integration and performance tested. This thesis presents a novel study investi-
gating the use of conversational agents to improve Cyber Situational Awareness. The
research could be taken further by extending the agents to include more functionality
and provide the user with more varied types of information. This could lead to further
improvements in situational awareness, which could be measured and compared with
the results in this research. Finally, the research highlighted the effectiveness of using
a multi-modal approach to improve Cyber Situational Awareness. This aspect of the
research could be extended to consider different combinations of modalities and explore
if a clear association exists between a users preferred learning style, and the accuracy,
effectiveness and satisfaction of using different conversational agents.
8.5 Final Remarks
In this thesis, the use of conversational agents was explored in the context of the IoT.
In doing so, it provided the first analysis of their ability to improve Cyber Situational
Awareness. The research demonstrated how deep learning could be used to detect IoT
botnet activity in consumer IoT networks. Existing research has focused on detection
in network flows [97, 98, 99], however, the method used in this research was the first to
use a BLSTM-RNN with word embedding to extract semantic meaning from packets,
and perform deep packet inspection to detect IoT malware. This was important since
it is unlikely SOHO routers and consumer networks would be able to generate network
flow traffic. The study resulted in a labelled dataset which has been made public and
has already been used for comparative studies [14]. In addition, a cross-sectional study
evaluated users awareness and perception of threats within the IoT, demonstrating that
although users value security and privacy, they found it difficult to identify threats and
infected devices. It also demonstrated that although a lack of network communication
can result in little or no awareness of security issues; if users are presented with data,
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their awareness could be improved. Finally, novel cross-sectional and longitudinal stud-
ies evaluated the use of conversational agents and demonstrated that agents could be
used as an effective method to improve Cyber Situational Awareness. In particular, the
study found this to be true when following Endsley’s guideline of using a multi-modal
approach [116], combing aural, verbal and visual modalities.
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A summary of the procedure undertaken to setup the main components of the sand-
boxed botnet environment used in Chapters 4-7 is presented.
C&C Server Configuration
Essential packages were installed using apt-get install unzip gcc golang electric-fence
screen –y
Domains were created for report.McDPhD.org and cnc.McDPhD.org, and added to
table.c and main.go.
MySQL was installed using apt-get install mysql-server mysql-client –y and a user
created using INSERT INTO users VALUES (NULL, ’miraiuser’, ’miraipassword’, 0,
0, 0, 0, -1, 1, 30, ”); Once configured main.go was edited to include the MySQL
credentials.
Cross compilers for the required binary architectures (e.g. arm, mips) were installed and
appropriate export paths added to /etc/profile using export PATH= $PATH: /etc/x-
compile/mips/bin. To allow information regarding C&C connections, compiler issues
and flood status to be sent the C&C server ./build.sh debug telnet was run. The re-
quired binary files for each architecture were created and stored in the release directory
using ./build.sh release
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Scan Loader Server Configuration
Apache was installed using apt-get install apache2 –y and binary architecture files
created earlier, were moved to the loader/bins directory. The Scan/Loader IP address
was added to main.c and full permission granted using chmod777* . The loader file was
compiled and added to the loader directory using ./build.sh
To reduce the number of IP ranges available for scanning and ensure the range used in
the environment was allowed, excluded IP ranges were amended in scanner.c to reflect
the topology.
The Scan/Loader IP address was added to scanListen.go and port 48101 specified as the
default port to listen for brute force results. Within the tools directory the scanListen
file was compiled using go build scanListen.go and moved to the loader directory.
The Sricam AP009 IP camera used in the lab setup did not include wget , therefore tftp
was installed using apt-get install tftpd tftp.
A tftp configuration was created using touch /etc/xinetd.d/tftp and /tftpboot specified
as the directory where the architecture binary files will be copied to for delivering later
delivering the payload.
DNS Server Configuration
The Mirai malware requires access to a DNS server to discover the C&C server’s IP
address. Bind9 software was installed and used to create two required domains re-
port.McDPhD.org and cnc.McDPhD.org in named.conf.local . These will be used by




Architecture (Chapters 6 and 7)
A summary of the procedure undertaken to setup the conversational agents used in
Chapters 6-7 is presented. The architecture consisted of three components; a data
pipeline (1) which uploaded classified IDS logs into the back end DynamoDB table (2)
via an S3 bucket in Amazon Web Services, and front end architectures (3) built for
both agents.
1. ETL Pipeline
The implementation of the ETL pipeline required three processes, as shown in Figure
6.2. In (step 1) crontab was configured on a local raspberry pi to run a script on a
specified schedule. The script monitored a local directory for new classified IDS logs,
and invoked a process to upload newly added JSON files to an S3 bucket on AWS. For
the studies in Chapters 6-7, the dataset created in Chapter 4 was manually added to
the directory and processed by the ETL pipeline.
First, to handle the backend functionality, an IAM Role was required. From the AWS
Management Console, a new IAM Role was created and (AmazonS3FullAccess, Ama-
zonDynamoDBFullAccess, and AWSOpsWorksCloudWatchLogs) permissions assigned.
In the pipeline, a Lambda Function (step 2) was used to transfer items from the S3
bucket into DynamoDB (step 3). A table was created using the attributes found in the
JSON dataset (see Source Code 6.1). DynamoDB is a schema-less database that only
requires a table name and primary key. The table’s primary key is made up of one or
two attributes that uniquely identify items, partition the data, and sort data within
each partition. The ID attribute was set as the primary key to uniquely identify items.
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The Lambda function was configured to be triggered when a file upload event occurs
in the configured S3 bucket. Lambda handler (event,context) was configured as the
handler to start the AWS Lambda function. Once called, the function was configured
to wait for data to be retrieved through the S3 service, before reading the JSON file.
Data was then passed to the insert data() function, which takes control of the table




The Alexa Developer Console1 was used to create the frontend for the Aural aegnt.
A new skill named Threat Detector was created, an invocation name was assigned,
and used to invoke the Alexa Skill from the Echo device. Twelve custom intents were
configured, and used to trigger specific event functionality and enable a user to query
the DynamoDB table for information. Seven in-built intents were used as triggers to
perform preconfigured functionality such as repeat , stop or cancel an intent. The twelve
intents are detailed below:
1. activitySummaryToday: Responds to a user query and returns a summary of
all activity taking place today.
2. activitySummaryByDate: Responds to a user query and returns a summary
of all activity taking place on a specified date.
3. activitySummarySrcDevAndDate: Responds to a user query and returns a
summary of all activity from a specified source device on a specified date.
4. firstUnusualActivityByDate: Responds to a user query and returns details of
the first activity on a specified date, which is classified as unusual.
5. activityDetailsByID: Responds to a user query and returns details of a speci-
fied activity ID.
6. networkStatusToday: Responds to a user query and informs if there has been
any issues detected on the network.
7. listSrcDevToday: Responds to a user query and returns a list of all active
source devices on the network today.
8. listSrcDevByDate: Responds to a user query and returns a list of all active
source devices on a specified date.
1https://developer.amazon.com/en-GB/alexa
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9. activityTotalBySrcDevLastThreeDays: Responds to a user query and re-
turns details of how much activity a specified source device had on each of the
last three days.
10. activityTotalLastThreeDays: Responds to a user query and returns a sum-
mary of how much activity has occurred on each of the last three days.
11. unusualActivityLastThreeDays: Responds to a user query and returns a sum-
mary of normal and unusual activity on each of the last three days.
12. mostActiveSrcDevLastThreeDays: Responds to a user query and returns a
list of three most active source devices on each of the last three days.
For each custom intent, a series of utterances were configured. Utterances are the
phrases a user may use to trigger a particular intent. Given the variation of spoken
language in the real world, there will often be several ways to express the same request.
To invoke the activitySummaryToday intent a user could say “show me a summary of
today’s activity”, “show me the summary of today’s activity ” or “show me summary for
today’s activity ”. To ensure an intent could be invoked using a variety of expressions,
a minimum of three sample utterances were configured for each custom intent.
Utterances which contained words that represented variable information a user spec-
ified, were assigned a slot . For example, to invoke intent activityDetailsByID the ut-
terance “show me details for activity id {ID}” was used, where the {ID} slot would be
replaced with an id number specified by the user, such as three hundred sixty six.
Finally, the endpoint was set to AWS Lambda, since the Alexa Skill will invoke the
Lambda function to process the identified request and return a response which is spoken
back to the user.
Verbal (Ve) Agent
For consistency, frontend development for the Verbal agent followed a similar method-
ology as the Aural agent however, Dialogflow1, a google platform for creating conver-
sational agents was used. A new agent called Threat Detector was created and the same
twelve custom intents were configured to enable a user to query the DynamoDB table
for information. These were combined with in-built intents such as Default Fallback
Intent and Default Welcome Intent and used to trigger specific event functionality.
For each custom intent the same utterances were created but amended to be text based
queries rather than converted speech, in order to help the agent identify the user’s
intent. Again, utterances which contained words that represented variable information
1https://dialogflow.cloud.google.com/
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a user specified, were assigned an Action. The action functioned the same as the slot
for the Aural agent and specified a placeholder within a sentence to be replaced by
the specific variable information requested by the user.
We again needed to set the endpoint as AWS Lambda so that user queries could be
serviced by the Lambda Function in order to query the DynamoDB table. To link
Google’s Dialogflow with Amazons Web Services we created an AWS API , and set the
fulfillment of each intent to use this webhook and send user queries to AWS Lambda.




The main components of the backend architecture are the AWS Lambda function and
DynamoDB table (See Figure 6.3). To control access to backend resources, the Identity
and Access Management(IAM) service was used to control authentication and autho-
risation. An IAM Role was created and inline policies assigned for DynamoDB access
and AWS Lambda execution, to allow the Alexa Skill to invoke the Lambda function as
its backend. The DynamoDB created earlier was used to store all uploaded IDS logs.
The main engine of the backend query handler, is the AWS Lambda function. From the
AWS Management Console, a new Lambda function was created, runtime environment
specified, and previously created IAM role attached. A handler object was specified,
which serves as the hook that AWS Lambda uses to execute the code in the Lambda
function. The Alexa Skill Kit was specified as the trigger to execute the Lambda
function and the Alexa Skill ID was input as the endpoint to receive POST requests
when a user interacts with the Alexa Skill.
Finally, to link the Lambda function to the Alexa Skill, the Amazon Resource Number
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































(Chapters 6 and 7)
The use-cases used to evaluate the use of conversational agents for improving situational
awareness are presented. Each use-case was designed to represent realistic descriptions
of how a user might want to use the conversational agents for monitoring smart device
and network activity. To avoid introducing bias a different set of scenarios were created





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The coding tables produced from qualitative analysis of responses in Chapter 6 are
presented below. Responses were examined to identify common themes, ideas and
patterns of meaning that came up repeatedly within the text. Example responses are
provided for each Theme/Sub-theme.
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Chapter 6: Analysis of Responses from Cross-sectional
Study
Table E.1: Aural Agent Most Liked Features








Convenience “lots of people already own an
Alexa so this would be a good
way to get people to monitor
their smart devices”
Hands free “I liked how it was hands free and
didn't require a laptop etc”
Quick “much quicker than checking
each device individually”




“how everybody in the home
could share in monitoring their
own devices”
Accessibility Visually Impaired “it would be great for anyone vi-
sually impaired”
Interactive
Enjoyable & Fun “I enjoyed using this technology”
Educational “I liked learning new technology”
New Experience “I liked playing with an Alexa for
the first time”
Digital Assistant “I like the idea of making better
use of my my Alexa to assist me





“This would actually convince
me to care more about security”
Improved Security “non technical people like me can
understand it”
Q. In a few words, what did you like most about the Aural Agent ? Why ?
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Table E.2: Aural Agent Least Liked Features









Laggy “Was a bit laggy for a while”
Voice recognition “sometimes struggled to under-
stand me first time”
Bugs “it crashed on me when using it”
Functionality Guidance “I couldn’t remember what each
query did” ”
Design
Voice “the Alexa should be customis-
able i.e. different voices”
Query Design “questions seemed a little long
winded”
Information “I found it hard to remember
some of the information if the an-
swer was long”
Privacy
Data Breach “No sure I would want an Alexa
in my home listening to my con-
versations”
Trust “Not sure I trust amazon with
my data”
Nothing - “nothing it was great”
Unsure - “cant think of anything”
Q. In a few words, what did you like least about the Aural Agent ? Why ?
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Table E.3: Verbal Agent Most Liked Features








Convenience “that I can check my devices
are ok from my phone anytime
I want”
Quick “Much quicker than opening my
laptop to use some software”
Easy to Use “I found it easier to read some of
the information on the phone”
Accessibility
No extra device “I like how this just runs on a
phone so I don’t need to buy an-
other device”
Portability “I think most people would find
the ability to use it anywhere the
best feature”
Interactive Enjoyable/Fun “Again it was actually cool to be
able to chat with the bot and get
the information”





“This would actually convince
me to care more about security”
Improved
Understanding
“I like how it simplifies some-
thing that would normally be
quite difficult”
Q. In a few words, what did you like most about the Verbal Agent ? Why ?
187
Verbal Agent Least Liked Features









Typing “it was slow to type the questions
out”
Human Error “typing each question could be
prone to error”
Slow “it was slower than using the
Alexa”
Accessibility Portability “I never take my iPad outside the
house so would be better on a
phone”
Functionality Guidance “lack of help to know what
queries were available”
Design
Query Design “It was hard to figure out which
query to use”
Colours “background was too dark”
Nothing - “nothing it’s a good idea”
Unsure - “Don’t know”
Q. In a few words, what did you like least about the Verbal Agent ? Why ?
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Table E.4: Aural Agent Suggested Improvements
Theme Sub-theme Example Comments












More queries “quick summary for multiple
days”
Alerts “alexa should tell you as soon as
you say Hi that there have been
issues on the network”
Advice “have alexa tell you what to do
when you find unusual activity”
Turn off Device “have alexa disable infected de-
vices”
Accessibility Portability “not sure if this is possible but be
able to speak to the alexa device
from outside your house”
Design
Voice “everything works well but for
fun add some celebrity voices e.g.
Ricky Gervais the Office”
Notification “use the blue light on top of the
echo when an attack occurs so
when you walk in the room you
know straight away to check your
devices””
Queries “two of the questions gave too
much information, this could be
cut down to just the essential in-
formation”
Nothing - “nothing I think it works well”
Unsure - “can’t think of anything”
Q. If you could suggest one improvement to the Aural agent what would it be ?
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Table E.5: Verbal Agent Suggested Improvements
Theme Sub-theme Example Comments
Usability
Typing “predictive typing like when you
are texting on your phone”
Command List “some kind of reminder of the











More queries “option to see which devices have
been used most each day”
Alerts “alerts e.g. Your network has
been hacked”
Advice “advice about what to do when
my device is infected”
Turn off Device “ability to switch off a device
which you think might be mal-
functioning”
Design
Colour “different colours. I struggled to
read the text on the blue back-
ground”
Emojis “I really liked it - maybe some
cool emojis”
Queries “add the option of a weekend
summary”
Platform
Social Media “never heard of Telegram, more
people might use it if it was on
something like Facebook messen-
ger”
Messenger “it would be nice to run this in
WhatsApp rather than having to
download another app”
Nothing - “nothing, seems pretty simple”
Unsure - “can’t think of anything”
Categorised Same “same as alexa”
Q. If you could suggest one improvement to the Verbal agent what would it be ?
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Table E.6: Device and Network Monitoring




Smart Device - “I routinely switch devices on to
check them”
Local Software - “sometimes scan my network us-
ing Kali”
Network Device - “When I have time I occasionally




Time Consuming “it’s the kind of thing I put off
then forget”
Data not important “didn’t think anyone would be
interested in my data”
Risk/Reward Ratio “the risk is quite low so I tend
not to worry about it”
Cost “I don’t want to buy more soft-
ware”
Unconcerned “never been that concerned
about my devices being hacked
before”
Awareness




“I didn’t think my smart devices
were that vulnerable”
Knowledge
Difficulty “I’m not very technical so would
struggle”
Don’t know how “I don’t know how to do it to be
honest”
Not considered - “I have never given it any
thought”
No smart device - “I do not own any smart devices”
Uncategorised No reason given “No”
Q. Do you currently monitor your smart device activity or home network ?
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Table E.7: Likeliness of Smart Device being Compromised





Perceived Risk “now that I know how hackers
can use devices, I want to make
sure they don't do it with mine”
Perceived
Vulnerabilities
“I didn’t know how easy it was
for devices to be hacked”
Concerned “it wasn’t really something I
was concerned about, but I have
changed my mind””
Knowledge
Difficulty “I think so because it doesn’t
look quite as daunting as I
thought”
Don’t know how “it seems quite likely my devices
could be targeted, so I should try
to learn how”
Uncategorised No reason given “yes”
N
o Apathy
Time Consuming “I should but I still think I would
keep putting it off”
Risk/Reward Ratio “it’s probably going to take one
of my devices being hacked to
make me start”
No smart device - “I do not own any smart devices”
Uncategorised No reason given “no”
Q. Do you think the likeliness of your devices being compromised
is sufficient enough for you to consider starting ?
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Table E.8: Likeliness of monitoring Smart Devices and Home Network with Aural
Agent





Convenience “I liked the convenience of using
the Alexa”
Quick “I have no excuse as it’s quick
and I have an Alexa already”





“without the Alexa I probably




“they would give me a better
awareness of what was going on
on my network”




Time Consuming “I know I should, but I proba-
bly wont find time to monitor my
network”
Data not important “to be honest im still not sure
I have any important data that
hackers would want”
Risk/Reward Ratio “I don’t think the risk is high
enough to force me into action or
warrant buying an Alexa”
Q. If you had access to the aural conversational agent at home
would you be more likely to monitor your smart devices and home network ?
193
Table E.9: Likeliness of monitoring Smart Devices and Home Network with Verbal
Agent





Convenience “being able to check my devices
anytime and anywhere using my
phone would be very handy”
Quick “it looks quite simple and quick,
so I would be more likely to check
them”
Easy to Use “because without an app like the
one I tested it would not be easy




“having the app on my phone I
would have no excuse”
Improved
Understanding
“the tools made it easier to un-
derstand what my devices were
doing, so I would be more likely
to monitor them”
Privacy
Data Breach “I likely wouldn’t use the Alexa
for fear of eavesdropping, but
Telegram yes”
Trust “I don’t own an echo device be-
cause I don’t like the idea of a
device listening to my conversa-
tions. The telegram app would
encourage me to monitor my de-
vices more”




Time Consuming “I know I should, but I proba-
bly wont find time to monitor my
network”
Data not important “to be honest im still not sure
I have any important data that
hackers would want”
Q. If you had access to the Verbal conversational agent at home
would you be more likely to monitor your smart devices and home network ?
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Table E.10: Ability to detect unusual Smart Device activity in the Future using the
Aural Agent




Usability Convenience “I would be more likely to take
care of my devices so would be




“it is easy to see each devices ac-
tivity so I would know when a de-
vice is not functioning normally”
Improved
Understanding
“Alexa makes it easier to find out
if unusual activity has occurred,
and then find out exactly which
device was at fault”




Time Consuming “again still seems like a time con-
suming job to stay on top”
Q. If you had access to the Aural conversational agent at home would you
feel better equipped to detect unusual smart device activity in the future ?
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Table E.11: Ability to detect unusual Smart Device activity in the Future using the
Verbal Agent




Usability Convenience “I wouldn’t be tied to only check-
ing when in the house, so if I sus-
pected something had happened




“If I did decide to the use the
Telegram chatbot I could check
my devices a lot more, even
whilst at work or on the bus”
Improved
Understanding
“Getting a quick summary of
what devices were doing made
it easier to monitor them, and
know if they were doing some-
thing unusual”




Time Consuming “again still seems like a time con-
suming job to stay on top”
Q. If you had access to the Verbal conversational agent at home would you
feel better equipped to detect unusual smart device activity in the future ?
196
Appendix F
Informed Consent (Chapter 7)
The study agreement and informed consent form is presented.
You are invited to participate in a research study titled Appreciation of Smart Device
Activity. This study is being undertaken by Christopher D. McDermott from
Robert Gordon University, Aberdeen.
The purpose of this research study is to measure your understanding and apprecia-
tion of threats facing smart devices in the home. The study will run for a 21-day
duration, and your participation in this study is entirely voluntary. You are free to
withdraw at any time or omit any question.
To the best of our knowledge, no personally identifiable data will be collected during
this study. We also believe there are no known risks associated with this research;
however, as with any online related activity, the risk of a breach is always possible.
To the best of our ability your answers in this study will remain confidential but
may be used in future thesis and research paper publications. We will endeavour to
minimise any risks by securely storing this data until the end of the research period,
whereupon it will be destroyed.
If you agree to voluntarily engage in this research, and allow us to process your data
in line with the University’s privacy policy, please click the Next button below to give





The questionnaire used to assess the usability of the Aural and Verbal conversational






























































































































































































































































































































































































Chapter 7 Study Questions
The questions for each of the four studies in Chapter 7 are presented.
Table H.1: Study 1 Questions
# Day 1
1 Has unusual activity occurred on the network today ?
2 Which source device had the first unusual activity today ?
3 Which of the following smart devices have used the network today ?
# Day 2
1 Was any unusual activity detected on the network yesterday ?
2 How many normal and unusual activites did the smart camera have
yesterday ?
3 Was activity 30 identified as normal or unusual ?
# Day 3
1 What was the total number of normal activities for the whole network
on each of the previous two days ?
2 How many Smart Camera activities were identified as normal on each
of the previous two days ?
3 Which three devices have been most active for the five day period ?
Use-Cases are described in Tables 3.1-3.2
Study 1 Scenarios are described in Appendix D.2
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Table H.2: Study 2 Questions
# Day 1
1 Has there been any issues detected on the network today ?
2 What was the destination device of the first unusual activity today ?
3 Which smart devices have been active on the network today ?
# Day 2
1 Did any unusual activity occur on the network yesterday ?
2 What percentage of normal and unusual activity did the Smart Camera
have yesterday ?
3 Was activity ID 423 normal or unusual ?
# Day 3
1 How many normal activities was there for the whole network on each of
the previous two days ?
2 How many normal activities did the Smart Camera have on each of the
previous two days ?
3 Which smart devices had the most activity yesterday ?
Use-Cases are described in Tables 3.1-3.2
Study 2 Scenarios are described in Appendix D.3
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Table H.3: Study 3 Questions
# Day 1
1 Has the network experienced any issues today ?
2 What was the ID number of the first unusual activity today ?
3 Which of the newly installed smart devices (Smart Doorbell or Smart
Bulb) have been active on the network today ?
# Day 2
1 Did the network experience any unusual activity yesterday ?
2 If the Smart Bulb was active on the network yesterday, what percentage
of normal and unusual activity did it have ?
3 Was the smart device communication for activity ID 657 normal or un-
usual ?
# Day 3
1 How many activities on the network were identified as normal on each
of the previous two days ?
2 What was the number of normal activities generated by the Smart Bulb
on each of the previous two days ?
3 Which three devices were most active on the network two days ago ?
Use-Cases are described in Tables 3.1-3.2
Study 3 Scenarios are described in Appendix D.4
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Table H.4: Study 4 Questions
# Day 1
1 Have any activities been identified as unusual on the network today ?
2 Which smart device was the source of the first unusual activity today ?
3 Which smart devices have successfully connected to the new network
and had activity detected today ?
# Day 2
1 Was all activity on the network yesterday identified as normal ?
2 How much normal and unusual activity did the Smart Doorbell have
yesterday ?
3 What was the data type of activity ID 500 ?
# Day 3
1 How many normal and unusual activities were there for the whole net-
work, on each of the previous two days ?
2 How many normal and unusual of the previous two days ?
3 Has the Smart Camera been one of the three most active devices for
either of the previous two days ?
Use-Cases are described in Tables 3.1-3.2





(Chapters 6 and 7)
Pre-Study / Post-Study questionnaires are presented below.
Chapter 6
Table I.1: Pre-Study/Post-Study Survey
Demographics (Pre-Study)
1 Please enter your age below
under 18 18-24 25-39 40-59 60+
2 Please indiciate your level of technical knowledge, when using
computers/smart devices
Novice Intermediate Advanced Expert
3 Please specify if you own any of the following Smart devices
Amazon Echo/Alexa Google Home Smart Light Bulb Smart IP Camera
Smart Thermostat Smart Door Bell Other
SA Statement (Pre-Study/Post-Study)
pe1 I am confident I can tell which smart devices are using my home network.
± Smart devices are more secure than non smart equivalent devices.
pe2 I am confident I can tell how often a smart device is communicating on my
homework, and how much of the available network bandwidth it is using.
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± Smart devices update themselves automatically.
pe3 I am confident I can tell which smart devices have the highest usage on my
home network.
± Smart devices are intelligent and can protect themselves from attackers.
co1 I am confident I can tell if my network is experiencing a normal level of
device communications and bandwidth usage.
± Smart devices alert you if an attacker is trying to compromise the device.
co2 I am confident I can tell if a smart device is functioning normally.
± Smart devices are less likely to be targeted by attackers.
co3 I am confident I can tell if a smart device is using my home network more
or less than normal.
pr1 I am confident I can tell if an attack has taken place on my home network.
± Smart devices in the home are not accessible from the Internet.
pr2 I am confident I can tell if a smart device on my home network has been
compromised.
± Smart devices in the home can be used to perform attacks on the internet.
pr3 I am confident I could tell in the future if my home network or smart device
had been compromised.
Prototype Feedback (Post-Study)
1 In a few words, what did you like most and least about the Aural agent and
Verbal agent ? Why ?
2 If you could suggest one improvement to the Aural agent and/or Verbal
agent, what would it be ?
Smart Device and Network Monitoring (Post-Study)
1 Do you currently monitor your smart device activity or home network ?
Yes No
2 If you answered No above, do you think the likeliness of your devices being
compromised is sufficient enough for you to consider starting ?
Yes No
3 If you had access to the Aural agent and/or Verbal agent at home, would
you be more likely to monitor your smart devices and home network ?
Yes No
4 If you had access to the Aural agent or Verbal agent at home, would you
feel better equipped to detect unusual smart device activity in the future ?
Yes No
Questions highlighted Blue answered by Intervention group only
± used as a distractor statement
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Chapter 7
Table I.2: Pre-study/Post-study Survey
Demographics (Pre-Study)
1 Please enter your age below
under 18 18-24 25-39 40-59 60+
2 Do you have a medically diagnosed hearing impairment ? If so, please briefly
describe the impairment.
Yes No
3 Do you have any medically diagnosed visual impairments (including colour-
blindness) ? If so, please briefly describe them.
Yes No
4 Do you have any medically diagnosed learning difficulties that might be
relevant to this study (e.g. Dyslexia) ? If so, please briefly describe them.
Yes No
5 Please indicate your level of technical knowledge, when using
computers/smart devices
Novice Intermediate Advanced Expert
6 Please specify if you own any of the following Smart devices
Amazon Echo/Alexa Google Home Smart Light Bulb Smart IP Camera
Smart Thermostat Smart Door Bell Other
7 Please indicate if you have used any of the tools used in the study before.
Amazon Alexa Telegram Messaging App




pe1 I am confident I can tell which smart devices are using my home network.
± Smart devices are more secure than non smart equivalent devices.
pe2 I am confident I can tell how much a smart device is using my home network.
± Smart devices update themselves automatically.
pe3 I am confident I can tell which smart devices have the highest usage on my
home network.
± Smart devices are intelligent and can protect themselves from attackers.
co1 I am confident I can tell if my home network is functioning normally.
± Smart devices alert you if an attacker is trying to compromise the device.
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co2 I am confident I can tell if a smart device is functioning normally.
± Smart devices are less likely to be targeted by attackers.
co3 I am confident I can tell if a smart device is using my home network more
or less than normal.
pr1 I am confident I can tell if an attack has taken place on my home network.
± Smart devices in the home are not accessible from the Internet.
pr2 I am confident I can tell if a smart device on my home network has been
compromised.
± Smart devices in the home can be used to perform attacks on the internet.
pr3 I am confident I could tell in the future if my home network or smart device
had been compromised.
Smart Device Security (Post-Study)
1 How realistic do you think it is that smart devices could be compromised
and used as described in this study ?
Very Unlikely Unlikely Neutral Likely Very Likely
2 Do you feel the risk of smart devices being compromised is high enough to
justify the effort required to monitor them ? Why ?
Yes No
Learning Style (Post-Study)
1 In which way do you believe you learn most effectively ?
Visually Aurally (hearing/speaking) Verbally (reading/writing) Kines-
thetically (by doing) Uncertain
2 If you selected more than one learning style in the previous question, please
rank you preferred mode of learning, in order of preference.?
Visually Aurally Verbally Kinesthetically
Questions highlighted Blue answered by Intervention group only





The questions asked in the post study interviews, carried out in Chapter 7, are presented
below.
General
1. What was your overall experience of using the Aural and Verbal conversational
agents ?
Perception
2. Please describe your experience of using the Aural and Verbal conversational
agents to find out which devices were using the network and how much activity
they had.
3. Did you prefer using the conversational agents or the visualisation tool to gather
this kind of information ? Why ?
Comprehension
4. Please describe your experience of using the Aural and Verbal conversational
agents to work out if the network or smart device was working normally. For
example, discovering if any unusual activity had occurred or if a device was using
the network more or less than normal.
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5. Did you prefer using the conversational agents or the visualisation tool to gather
this kind of information ? Why ?
Projection
6. Please describe your experience of using the Aural and Verbal conversational
agents to determine if a smart device had been compromised, or an attack had
taken place on the network.
7. Did you prefer using the conversational agents or the visualisation tool to gather
this kind of information ? Why ?
Situational Awareness
When using the conversational agents did you feel they improved your:
8. Awareness about how smart devices were using the network. Why?
9. Understanding if a device’s activity was suspicious or had changed. Why?
10. Ability to identify now or in the future if a device had been compromised or an
attack had taken place on your network. Why?
11. In the Post Study survey, you said that it was (very unlikely/unlikely/likely/very
likely) that smart devices would be compromised and used as described in this
study? Can you explain why?
12. In the Post Study survey, you said you (did/didn’t) feel the risk of smart devices
being compromised is high enough to justify the effort required to monitor them?
Can you explain why?
13. If you had easy access to the conversational agents at home do you think you




The fictitious Smart home environment used in Chapters 4 - 7 is presented below.
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